

MUSLIM VIEWPOINT(S) ON CURRENT AFFAIRS

# impact

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
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## From Sinned Against to Sinning

HUMAN RIGHTS IN BANGLADESH

By Ibn Nizam

Flash-back to December 1971, Mukti Bahini  
revenge on collaborators

"Police has submitted a charge-sheet against the former Vice-Chancellor of Dacca University for collaboration with the occupation army of Pakistan against Bangladesh during the war of liberation . . . investigations against Dr. Mohar Ali, a former Reader in History in Dacca University had been completed . . . The charges . . . carry a minimum punishment of three years rigorous imprisonment under the Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order 1972 . . . (both) wrote a joint letter to . . . the *London Times* in support of the army action . . . According to the charges the former Vice-Chancellor was one of the signatories to a booklet called "A Statement by East Pakistan scholars and artists in protest against a report of massacre of scholars at Dacca by the International Committee on University Emergency, New York."

"Investigations against some former university teachers, Dr. Hasan Zaman (Chief of the now defunct Bureau of National Reconstruction), Dr. Deen Muhammad and Dr. Mustafizur Rahman were in progress . . ." (*The Bangladesh Observer*, Dacca, 6 November, 1972).

Dr. Hussain's and Dr. Ali's letter to *The Times* (7 July 1971) had sought to correct "the impression that a large number of Bengali intellectuals, including university teachers were deliberately killed by the Pakistan Army on March 25-26, and subsequently". They mentioned Mr. Munir, of the English Department whom *The Sunday Times* (13 June, 1971) had reported shot dead on 25 March, but who "was very much alive". They wrote: "there has been no 'massacre' of the intellectuals. No teacher was killed at Rajshahi or Chittagong universities on March 25 or later. The number of teachers at Dacca known to have lost their lives is nine. This is certainly most unfortunate and regrettable. But these colleagues of ours would not have died if armed members of the Awami League Volunteer corps had not used the buildings in which they lived and the neighbourhood as a base for their operations against the Army. A personal friend of ours, Dr. Guha-Thakurta, who died in hospital three days later told his friends that he would not have been wounded had

**Outrage in Hebron**  
**Nationalism, Baghdad Pact,**  
**Revolution and Education:**  
**Dr. Fadhel Jamali, former Iraqi**  
**P.M. speaks to Impact**

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Dilemma  Iraq's Kurdish Problem  Nixon's  
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Books *New Spectrum News Brief*

student volunteers (affiliated to the Awami League) not entered the building in which he lived. On the other hand there had been "no security for any one, particularly for those who had not lined up with the Awami League. University teachers regarded as 'dissenters' were subjected to relentless pressure and intimidation by Awami League workers. The names of some were published in the Awami League controlled newspapers with the warning that they would be punished for their refusal to support the Awami League programme and its ideology. At Rajshahi repeated attempts were made to liquidate teachers who did not subscribe to the Awami League philosophy".

Bangladesh has been free from Pakistan for almost one year yet the official climate continues to carry heavy undertones of both American McCarthyism and Russian Stalinism. There hardly is a day when the Bangladesh press would not carry news about persons arrested, tried, and sentenced as collaborators or a call for purging the services, schools and universities of the collaborators.

Last October, the Bangladesh Home Minister had announced that they held 41,000 persons as "collaborators". On 31 August, this figure was 20,000. Unofficial estimates are many times higher, but at the level of real human magnitude, there is no significant differences between 41,000/150,000 or even a million. To this have to be added the thousands who have been declared absconding and whose names are announced almost every day in the press. One column-inch carries about 3.5 names, and the average list takes between 20-30 column-inches. That means a daily absconder average of 90.5. Since the list has not been closed, the final count remains frightfully inestimable.

But who really are the "collaborators"?

On 24 July, 1972, the President of Bangladesh "on the advice of the Prime Minister" published an order known as Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order 1972 which defines collaborator as a person who has:

"(1) participated with or aided, or abetted the occupation army in main-

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taining, sustaining, strengthening, supporting or furthering the illegal occupation of Bangladesh by such an army; (ii) rendered material assistance in any way whatsoever to the occupation army by any act, whether by words, signs or conduct; (iii) waged war or abetted in waging war against the People's Republic of Bangladesh; (iv) actively resisted or sabotaged the efforts of the people and the liberation forces of Bangladesh in their liberation struggle against the occupation army; (v) by a public statement or by voluntary participation in propagandas (sic) within and outside Bangladesh or by association in any delegation or committee or by participation in purported bye-elections attempted to aid or aided the occupation army in furthering its design of perpetrating its forcible occupation of Bangladesh." (2(b)).

The Order empowers "any Police Officer" to arrest "without a warrant", any person whom he "reasonably" suspects of having been a collaborator. (3(1)). Under the Order "no fact shall be deemed to be disproved or not proved merely on the ground that there is no *post-mortem* report... or that there is delay in giving information to the Police... or that the dead body was not found... "Whenever any official document is produced before the Special Tribunal purporting to contain any names of members of any force raised to assist the occupation army or members or office-bearers of any committee, the Special Tribunal shall, unless the contrary is shown, presume the list to be true. (10A(a) & (b)).

The punishments provided for vary from a *minimum* imprisonment of three years to a sentence of death or transportation for life, plus a liability to fine in all cases. On conviction both the movable and immovable property of the collaborator may be forfeited to the government. (11(a) to (d)). Any person who knowingly harbours a collaborator shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for "not less than three years", (11A(1)).

The Order is based on the preamble that certain persons and organisations had aided or abetted "by act, word or sign towards maintaining, sustaining, strengthening, supporting, or furthering the illegal occupation of Bangladesh by the Pakistan Armed Forces or have waged war or aided or abetted in waging war against the People's Republic of Bangladesh". The collaborators also "aided or abetted the Pakistan Armed Forces in committing genocide... and in committing atrocities against men, women and children and against the person, property and honour of the civilian population of Bangladesh..." By limiting the cognizability of the atrocities "to the civilian population of Bangladesh", the Order has the effect of excluding from its mischief measures against the Mukti Bahinis who obviously were armed irregulars.

On its own premise, the Order seeks to deal with two category of persons: those who were politically opposed to Awami League's concept of Bangladesh, and those who in doing so aided, abetted or committed atrocities against women, children and the civilian population. The latter includes those who did so under duress as well as those who, of their own volition, committed, aided or abetted atrocities.

There should be no argument about punishing those who wilfully and culpably committed "crimes against humanity". However, the Order, as it stands amounts virtually to punishing anyone on the mere presumption of guilt. Even if it is accepted that the collaborators must be punished, then it is all the more necessary to prove clearly and unmistakably the act of collaboration.

A person is to be punished not on the basis of any proof of guilt but on the "un-proof" of non-guilt. Since its promulgation, at least three other Presidential Orders (Nos. 11, 60, and 103) have been issued and these account for forty-two amendments which make the Order virtually acquittal-proof. The Law Minister explained that "relaxations" in Evidence Act and the Criminal Procedure Code were considered necessary in

regard to the circumstances in which the offences were committed. The jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter of writs of Habeas Corpus has been "restricted", the Minister said, to expedite investigations. The Order seeks to punish even such acts which were not an offence when committed, but the most extra-ordinary provision, is the provision of a *minimum* punishment of three years.

The recently adopted Constitution of Bangladesh had to protect the Order by saying that it will be decreed "effective notwithstanding other provisions" of the Constitution. The exception makes it an exceptionally bad law. To quote Abul Mansur Ahmad, it is "unparalleled in the history of the civilised world" (Daily *Ittefaq*, Dacca, 8 September, 1972). Mr. Abul Mansur, lawyer, well-known Bengali literateur, a close associate of the Awami League founder, Mr. Husain Shaheed Suhawardy, a former Awami League Minister under Pakistan and a Senior Vice-President of the Awami League is not a collaborator. He is one of the few ideologues of Bengal Nationalism.

It's not known what is actually going on in the courts of the "Special Magistrates" and in the "Special Tribunals", all over Bangladesh. Before the Order was amended to set the minimum punishment at three years, Mr. Nurul Islam Chaudhry (Pakistan Democratic Party) was given a sentence of two months rigorous imprisonment and fined £100, because he had taken part in the bye-elections during the occupation period. Ironically Mr. Islam had earlier as an Awami Leaguer spent seven months in prison during Ayub Khan's regime for advocating Six Points.

Among the 'criminal' cases so far reported in the Bangladesh press, two concern political workers who were accused of committing or abetting kidnapping or murder of intellectuals in Dacca. And the sort of "proof" they have been convicted upon is an eloquent testimony to the quality of justice available.

Abdul Khaliq had been employed as an office-secretary in the office of Jamaat-e-Islami, a party which stood for the unity of Pakistan. He was "found guilty of kidnapping Shahidullah Kaiser, (a journalist) with the intent of murder", awarded seven years rigorous imprisonment and fined £500 mainly on the ground of his association with the party. Before arrest his photograph had been published in all the daily newspapers; and after arrest he was taken to the house of those who subsequently testified as being witnesses to the alleged kidnapping. The "discrepancies" the judge held were "minor and natural." Since a revolver had been issued to him by the Pakistan army (for which he must have described himself as a pro-Pakistani), and since he could go out during curfew hours, "these facts prove that he was a collaborator". And since he was a collaborator, he must have committed the crime. As for the publication of his photograph in the papers the Tribunal relied on the statement of the witnesses that they were so "perturbed and worried at the loss of Shahidullah Kaiser (that) they were not in a mood to see any paper". (*The Bangladesh Observer*, 18 July 1972). Needless to point out that Mr. Kaiser's body has not been recovered.

In another case, a Special Tribunal sentenced one student Zubair and two others to death. Zubair was found to belong "to the renowned Shah Sahab family (and) to be a member of the Islami Chatro Sangha" (Islamic Students Organisation), and that "he was seen in the Al Badar uniform in the area of the Alia Madresa where he had been a student". The "judgement relied upon a prosecution contention that men like the accused with fanatical religious bias were pro-Pakistan". (*Bangladesh Observer*, 6 October, 1972). The three cases exemplify the impossibility of justice under the existing orders and procedures, particularly where it involved political differences.

All those who had political differences with Awami League or those who were opposed to seeking liberation with Indian help or those who wanted to keep their country united cannot be

branded and punished as criminals; it was an exercise of their democratic rights. Were those who "sincerely and genuinely believed that by taking part in the elections they would help restoration of normalcy" and democracy, really committing a crime?

Mr. Ataur Rahman, President Bangladesh National League, in his interview with *Impact* (Vol. 2:8) mentioned the case of the Chairman of the Union Committee who "came to me and said that the authorities had asked me to form a Peace Committee. What is a Peace Committee, he asked". Mr. Ataur Rahman explained in Bengali what peace meant and the villagers said: "Yes, it is a good thing". To say now that this was an offence is ridiculous. Mr. Ataur Rahman rightly reminded the judge in whose court he had been appearing that the judge "too had been doing his work during the period which is called occupation period. He received salary, sent people to prison and so on. Would that be a crime?"

But the most eminent and relevant example is that of Sheikh Mujib himself. What plea had Sheikh Mujib entered before Yahya Khan's military tribunal? Did he say heroically and courageously that yes I had asked my colleagues to declare independence of Bangladesh on 26 March, 1971, and the Pakistan army was now an occupation army, and that he and his people were within their legal and moral rights to wage war for their liberation?

It would be interesting and certainly help correct history if Sheikh Mujib's defence plea as well as the proceedings of the tribunal were published by the Pakistan authorities. Lest it may not be done, it is necessary to reveal that Sheikh Mujib had solemnly and unequivocally affirmed loyalty to the integrity of Pakistan. Would he and/or the Pakistan authorities deny this? The only plausible explanation that could now be forwarded is of duress. But would that not apply more appropriately to hundreds and thousands of ordinary political workers, members of the Peace Committees, the voluntary corps, teachers, workers and farmers who were involved, willingly or otherwise, in protecting the peace and order of their own hearth and home?

Whatever be the rights and wrongs in the whole tragic situation, it is impossible to sustain the political fiction that the independence of Bangladesh was declared on 26 March, 1971 and that from that day onwards, the Pakistan armed forces were in illegal occupation of Bangladesh. At best or at worst, it was "a brutal civil war, in which each side was convinced that the cause they were fighting for was just. The Pakistani army, the Biharis, the Muslim League, and the members of the Jamaat-e-Islam (sic.) were fighting for the unity of an Islamic Pakistan. The Bengalis were fighting for the right to run their own country..." ("Events in East Pakistan", A Legal Study by the Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 1972; p. 31).


The massive scale of the collaborator trials suggests an aim to remove all political opposition before the proposed general elections in March 1973 by dubbing them as collaborators. Anyone convicted as collaborator is automatically disenfranchised. Sheikh Mujib's promise of a general amnesty after the elections supports the view that the trials are politically motivated. The refusal last Friday to allow Sir Dingle Foot, Q.C., to enter Bangladesh to help defend Dr. A. M. Malik the last Governor of East Pakistan, and others is indefensible. In the Agartala Conspiracy Case during Ayub Khan's regime, Sheikh Mujib himself was defended by Mr. Tom Williams, Q.C.

The whole *raison d'être* of Bangladesh was claimed to lie in the injustices, neglect and a later suppression that it suffered at the hands of the Pakistan regimes. Would the experience make it negative, counter-repressive and revengeful even towards its own people? Or as one who has himself been through it all, would try to turn a new leaf. There has already been enough of gory revenge, and any more of it could have consequences reaching far beyond the original sin.

## Survey

## ● ISRAELI SACRILEGE ● TURKISH CRISIS

# Outrage in Hebron



Mosque in Al Khalil (Hebron), 20 miles south of Jerusalem. The mosque stands over the cave of Macphelah which contains the graves of Prophet Abraham, his wife Sarah and possibly of prophets Issac, Jacob, Leah, Rebecca and Joseph.

Jewish use of the Ibrahim mosque in al-Khalil as a synagogue is a brazen and chauvinistic act which reveals an utter contempt for religious dignity and freedom. The fact that it has the full backing of the Israeli authorities is another indication that Israel, despite its protestations, has no regard for the protection and sanctity of holy places and is very far from ever gaining the sympathy of even those who were prepared to have some form of co-operation with it.

Al-Khalil or Hebron became an overt concern of Israeli occupation soon after the 1967 war. Muslim districts, like the village of Beit Awa, were dynamited and bulldozed. Jews started coming into the town and its environs to settle and to pray at the Cave of Macphela where the Mosque of Ibrahim stands. Al-Khalil has been a Muslim city and Ibrahim mosque has been there for over a thousand years. The place was never at any time a Jewish place of prayer "on the admission of the Jews themselves". They have no lien on the mosque.

In September 1968, notables of Al-Khalil protested to the Israeli authorities that Jewish worshippers were desecrating the mosque. The Military governor sent for some of the notables and warned them that force would be used if necessary to allow the Jews to pray inside the mosque. Soon after Moshe Dayan declared: "The Israelis shall pray in the Ibrahim mosque, in the city of Hebron, in spite of Arab objections." This was followed by an attack by ostensibly a Muslim resistance group on Israeli forces for violating the sanctity of the mosque. Israelis destroyed the East Gate of the mosque and other historic buildings in the town and Dayan threatened the Arab mayor and all the citizens of the town with "expulsion beyond the Jordan". It was declared that a Jewish synagogue would be built on the site of the Ibrahim mosque.

Since then the Jews have been systematically carrying out the plan. Since 1968 Dayan gave permission to the Jews to pray in parts of the mosque except on Fridays and Muslim festival days. Now the Jews are to be allowed to use the mosque on Fridays for "eve-of-Sabbath services", on Sabbaths and on Jewish festivals they are to be allowed use of a greater part of the mosque. Further, a special extension inside the area of the mosque is to be built specifically for the worship of Jews. Also there has been desecration of the

mosque by the authorities including the destruction of entrance steps and of a well in the mosque compounds. Jews have brought chairs, cupboards and prayer articles into the mosque.

Both the mayor of al-Khalil, Shaikh al-Ja'bari who had achieved a working relationship with Dayan and the Supreme Muslim Council of Jerusalem have protested against what the latter called "an act of aggression" against the Muslims by the Israeli military authorities. It was feared that the "acts of provocation" would continue. The building of a synagogue within the mosque would have grave consequences not only for the Muslims of the occupied territory but for members of the faith all over the world. There is every indication that what the Jews are doing at al-Khalil, they would also continue to do at Jerusalem.

## Turkey—the Art of the impossible

Turkey's Armed Forces Council which also includes all generals and lieutenant generals, and all admirals and vice-admirals issued a statement on 6 November expressing "hope and confidence that the competent authorities would make the arrangements and adopt the measures needed to maintain peace and stability and to effect reform in due time." However, the meeting also authorised the chief of the general staff, General Gurler, and the commanders of the army, navy and the air force to take whatever action was needed to enact reforms before the elections in October 1973. To this may be added Prime Minister Ferit Melen's remarks that if the government he heads, finds itself compelled to resign, it will not be possible to hold elections in due course.

The crisis following the withdrawal of the Republican Peoples Party's parliamentary support to Mr. Ferit Melen's government, is, therefore, not over; it has only been postponed. The present head of the State, General Cevdet Sunay is a former chief of the general staff, and apparently any intervention now would have been not only embarrassing but also an admission of the general's own failure. General Sunay, who would otherwise be a successful constitutional head, has been trying to moderate both the commanders and the politicians, but wants now to give up and retire in March next year. Therefore, unless there

is some thing precipitating, the present set-up seems to have got a reprieve until that time.

The next four months or so promise to be crucial. Ostensibly the pre-condition to next year's general elections and restoration of democracy is the fulfilment of the aims of the 12th March Memorandum. The Memorandum demands curbing of violence and lawlessness and implementing a programme of socio-economic reforms as conceived by the generals. Unfortunately progress on both the cardinal points has been far from satisfactory. Perhaps it could not have been otherwise.

In the matter of "re-forming" human attitudes and behaviour, the first ingredient to any chance of success is consent and conviction, and these can come only through patience and persuasion and not coercion. The very phenomenon of the rejection of Kemalism in modern day Turkey underscores the point.

The country's military elitists face an impossible task. It is a different matter if Kemalism is just an excuse to perpetuate their own hegemony, otherwise in the dynamic process of history and experience it seems to have been already outpaced. Inevitably dated ideologies and political and social contrivances become outdated, and this is what has happened in Turkey. But this the elitists refuse to accept.

The generals regard the Republican Peoples Party, the traditional custodians of Kemalism as dangerously progressive and left-wing (which it is not) to the extent that "even the frequent use of the word 'people' causes concern". Perhaps the party could be reformed and taken over but the difficulty lies also in the successive refusal of the electorate to vote it to power. Justice Party leans heavily on the support of the masses, particularly the rural masses. Since the masses still continue to be traditional and reactionary, any free hand to the Justice Party carries with it the dangers of an Islamic revival. The National Reliance Party, a party promoted by the generals and drawn from amongst the loyalists in the RPP is so far a non-starter. Only elections, if held would show whether it has been a useful experience. For the present, therefore, there appears no alternative to crisis and conflict.

## Iraqi Baath's Kurdish problem

The strengthening of relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab Ba'athist government of President Al Bakr of Iraq coincides with the deterioration of relations between the Arab Ba'athist government and Kurdish people in Iraq. The two developments may not be unconnected. When President Al Bakr went to Moscow in September, Russia announced its intention to increase arms shipments and material assistance to Iraq in return for which Russia was apparently to have a stronger hold on Iraq's oil resources. Much of Iraq's oil resources lie in Kurdish populated areas and the Kurds have been demanding that a due share of this should be spent on the overall development of the north. This apparently does not coincide with the plans of the Russians. The Kurds indeed have been critical of the Baathist's unilateral nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company and the virtual handing over of it to the Russians.

Whether it is because of economic dissatisfaction and the machinations of Moscow or the failure, deliberate or otherwise, to implement the March 1970 settlement between the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Iraqi central government, Arab-Kurdish relations have continued to worsen. The Baath government however, can claim that the 1970 agreement was being implemented. The Kurdish language and nationality have been given official standing. Some Kurdish governors have been appointed to Kurdish areas and the number of Kurds in the Cabinet has been increased. The KDP, on the other hand, claims that the progress

## Survey

### ● KURDISH PROBLEM ● NIXON'S VICTORY ● BRITISH CENSUS

of the implementations has been far too slow. Some crucial requirements which needed immediate action, like the census in the oil region of Kirkuk, have still not been carried out. This lends support to the charge of Arabization in these sensitive areas.

Meanwhile the accusations and counter accusations are helping to keep the situation on the boil. The Ba'athist paper *Ath-Thawra* and others have accused the KDP of links with Iran, Israel, the CIA, the Chinese and the Muslim Brothers. The KDP, on the other hand, charges the Iraqi authorities with bombing and shelling Kurdish villages, trying to shatter its leadership and with carrying out large-scale and unusual manoeuvres in North Iraq. In response to this, Kurds in the Iraqi army and police are deserting.

As a hopeful sign the Kurds still seem to place faith in the March 1970 agreement. The Iraqi authorities, with the backing of the Soviet Union, would have to show that they are zealously interested in implementing this agreement which is still the best way now available of averting large-scale conflict.

## Nixon's victory sans quality

Nixon has been re-elected with the most massive majority in US history but there are many quarters in which this victory is viewed with cynicism and distaste. Less than half of the Americans eligible to vote, voted for Nixon and voting was the lowest in twenty-four years. (This may reflect other things like disillusionment with the democratic process in general). Those who voted for Nixon as against McGovern did so, it has been said, out of a desire not to be disturbed and out of unwillingness not to be further alarmed and worried. There was little place for the radicalism and shifting policies of McGovern whose call for moral government just went to the winds.

Nixon's victory was based primarily on his success on the international scene for which Henry Kissinger, above the law and the controls of the State Department, was largely responsible. The vote for Nixon, a former Under-Secretary of State remarked, was in fact "a vote for Kissinger" who often held the centre of the stage and left the President with "the set speeches, formal soliloquies, and the pagentry . . ." The American people apparently forgot Nixon's firm commitment in 1968 to end the war in Vietnam before the next elections and were suitably impressed by other forms of peace abroad and global co-operation among the big powers. On the other hand, Nixon's record at home was anything but dazzling. During his election campaign he failed to say what he would do to tackle some of America's many and acute domestic problems and concerned himself with a negative approach. The certainty of victory, assured by high finance and the elaborate conditioning of the democratic process, accounted for a certain aloofness in Nixon's style which bodes ill for the years ahead.

There are other quarters which are well pleased with the Nixon victory. Both the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are well satisfied. Russia has put the improvement in American-Soviet relations as one of the main cause of Nixon's victory, it hopes for the further strengthening of international security. China, though outwardly critical of America, shares the Russian stand. Such countries as South Africa are fulsome in their praise of Nixon while Israel, to assure itself that everything is more than all right, sent its defence Minister to Washington to exact more support and arms supplies.

But what of the future? In the sphere of foreign relations, there are not many places where Nixon can make a dramatic impact and there is the fear that the high hopes of 1972 would lead to a certain anti-climax.

The Middle East, however, is given as one of the main areas of Nixon's attention. The first

thing would be to try and bring about an agreement between Israel and Egypt to re-open the Suez Canal after which a more far-reaching Middle East settlement would be attempted. More American initiative on Europe would be made both as regards NATO and the EEC. More favourable trade and currency agreements with Japan would be attempted and Nixon is expected to press for a greater Japanese role in Asian security.

In carrying out these policies, Nixon might have to reckon more with the Congress. There is every reason to expect that the Congress would try to reassert its due and active interest in foreign policy making and control. To counteract this there is the call for President Nixon to make Kissinger Secretary of State and so avoid the charge of working outside the democratic process.

Meanwhile, despite all the talk of peace abroad and the agreements of SALT, Nixon's proposes to increase America's defence budget rather than cut it down. It will reach \$76.5 billion in the year 1973 and the amount would go towards improving nuclear weapons, building new submarine systems and bombers.

Possibly, however, Nixon would face his most serious challenge over domestic issues. Rising unemployment, inflation, a heavy budget deficit, taxation, the racial problem, increasing corruption in high places, crime—all these are some of the major problems which Nixon has not been able to face up to in the past four years. Some of these problems are likely to fester. For example, Nixon has shown very little interest in one of America's most serious continuing problems: race relations. Indeed he feels no political obligations to blacks who voted overwhelmingly, in so far as they voted, Democratic. In this case as in others, it is feared that Nixon's own inability to recognise ordinary moral distinctions would now communicate itself to the American people as a whole. This is the kind of thing which leads to cynicism and a distaste of American politics.

Yet, whatever the constraints upon him and his own inadequacies, Nixon has the job of governing the most powerful nation on earth. It is a responsibility not only to the Americans but to the world and it behoves Nixon, despite the many pressures on him, to be even-handed in his dealings with people. His is a responsibility not to be discharged by negative and laissez faire policies at home or opportunism and disregard for human life, dignity and justice abroad.

## More Black Britain

Initial comment on the advance analysis of the results of the 1971 census has tended to emphasise the size of Britain's immigrant population born in the New Commonwealth, i.e., the size of Britain's black population. The figures show that this population is 1.5m with the greatest number coming from India, Pakistan, West Indies, Africa and Cyprus in that order. The figure is considerably less than Mr. Enoch Powell and his supporters have alleged but undoubtedly this would not change the view and the policies of those who want to keep Britain white. People would continue to interpret the figures according to their own "ideological predilections" and the arguments about "race relations" (a curiously inapt and unscientific phrase anyway) would heat up rather than subside.

The total population of Britain is given as 53,828,000. But apart from population figures, the census has some interesting figures dealing with births, deaths, marriages, abortions and unemployment. These would also be used in the debate on the black immigrant population. For example, immigrants have brought with them fewer children than many people suppose and the number of wives is also low (among Pakistanis there were only 39 females to every 100 males in Britain in 1971). On the other hand it is pointed out that a high proportion of coloured immigrants are in

the fertile 25-45 age group and the fecundity of the Asian immigrants in particular would soon make the Home Office figures obsolete. There will always be alarms to be sounded to preserve the civilized British way of life.

The abortion figures underline the growing permissiveness (or immorality) of this way of life. Abortions in the three months from April to June 1971 were 39,190, of which 678 were carried out on girls under 16. Almost half the 18,864 women who had abortions were single. 1,230 was carried out under the National Health Service.

In sum, Britain is now more black not only on the basis of the colour of its inhabitants but for more profound reasons too: for the increase in abortions, divorces, illegitimate births and for the state of socio-economic exploitation that the figures reveal.

## So thoughtful on Eid!

Eid messages from the various Muslim leaders in the Middle East and Africa emphasized more than the passing of the blessed month of Ramadan and God's grace to the Muslim *ummah* on the days of festivity. In many ways the messages presented a special angle on the motivations, the preoccupations and on the type of problems these leaders were trying to grapple with.

The most remarkable in many ways was President Numeiry's speech to the Sudan Socialist Union Central Committee which began:

"In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate . . . I am pleased that the Eid-al-Fitr has come after a month in which great achievements have been accomplished and in which we gave the lie to the old saying that Ramadan is a month of unemployment and slackness. God forbid. Islam is only a call for work, activity and jihad . . ." All however was not uncritical praise. Numeiry condemned the mistakes and the failures of both the private and public sectors and such "malignant diseases as making or talking poisonous nonsense at gluttonous eating sessions" Numeiry, also gave some sobering talk to the Sudanese Women's Union a day before addressing the SSU. He called on mothers to "cut down expenses on their clothes and jewellery" and to be less "extravagant in our domestic expenses". The need was for "the good and educated woman" who could help wipe out illiteracy and the cause of backwardness. Every woman, he emphasised should abide by the teachings of the orthodox religion and its wise ethics or to the teachings of her own divine book if she does not belong to the Islamic faith". He ended by announcing an allocation of "£S10,000 annually to be paid as prizes to young men and women under 40 who learn by heart the book of God or part of it."

Are these speeches of Numeiry to be taken as some indication of a change of heart towards Islam and its role in the nation's affairs? Those who are familiar with Numeiry rather feel that they are the words of an opportunism, a last recourse to identify with the religious aspirations of the Sudanese people and by so doing take the winds out of the sails of a burgeoning opposition.

If the Sudanese military leader did not exactly hit it off with his people, the Eid messages of the Egyptian leadership must have sounded rather unconvincing to the Egyptian people and to the soldiers especially. On the third day of the Eid, President Sadat met the officers, NCO's and soldiers on the front, congratulated them on the feast and confirmed the "inevitability" of the battle, saying: "It is the only way to liberate the land and to restore Egypt's dignity and honour and to prove to the world that we are serious in our determination to liberate our territories regardless of the sacrifices." He assured the soldiers that the entire people stood behind them and were prepared for any sacrifice for the sake of the battle and victory.

It was clear that the leadership had very little in the way of achievements with which they could

● EID THOUGHTS

stir the Egyptian people and the armed forces. The statements about the inevitability of battle even though they were made at the emotive time of Eid ring false especially with the renewed talk of a peace settlement in the Middle East following Nixon's presidential victory.

The Syrians were very much in the same position as the Egyptians. President Hafiz al-Asad who, it will be remembered, was the one who surrendered the Golan Heights to the Israelis even before they had captured it, spent the days of Eid al-Fitr having meetings with the Army and Air Force and encouraging them to "heroism and steadfastness". Asad who is a Ba'athist does not come from the mainstream of Syrian life.

The Yemenis on the other hand had good reason to rejoice, and to be penitent, at the end of Ramadan. North and South Yemen, "brothers in Arabism, were engaged in bloody strife—a crime of great enormity especially in the month of Ramadan. Against many expectations, a formula of unity between the two Yemens was achieved and Muhsin Al-Ayni, Prime Minister of the North, took the occasion of Eid to announce "the ending of the war, the beginning of a new era". He praised the mediation efforts of other Arab leaders, in particular Bumadyan and Qaddafi, in allowing Yemen to give a "marvellous example of Arab cohesion" and "to raise victoriously the banner of Arabism and Islam everywhere". He had some harsh words to say about Haykal and his *Ahram* article on the Yemen which was "full of bitterness" and which stated that were it not for the strategic importance of the Yemen it would not matter if blood was being shed or whether blood was flowing in that Arab land.

Unlike Muhsin Al-Ayni, the Tanzanian Vice-President, Mr. Aboud Jumbe, bitterly condemned Col. Qaddafi for being "against the African revolution and siding with Zionism to sabotage the Arab cause" while addressing an Eid *baraza* at the People's Palace in Zanzibar. Mr. Jumbe warned Tanzanians to be on guard against the enemies of Africa and especially against those who use religion to try to divide the spirit of African unity. In another speech as President of the Afro-Shirazi Party of Zanzibar, Aboud Jumbe said that "the practice, faith and patience attained during the holy month of Ramadan could also be used in the service of the people, so as to bring about the development of the country".

"Economic development of our country" was the theme of Idi Amin's Eid speech and the spirit of confrontation was very much there: "Anyone in Uganda, who, in any way, frustrates the achievements of our objectives in this economic war, stands warned that he will be dealt with most severely..." Eid was proclaimed a public holiday for people of all religions and not Muslims only.

Where other leaders visited barracks or political party HQ's, Qaddafi himself delivered the Eid sermon at a Tripoli mosque where he said: "We in Libya thank God for our Islamic faith and for the sublime examples and ethics to adhere to. The deviations we are now witnessing are the beginning of the waves of darkness which has swept over the nations round us. We must return to the duties entrusted to us, awareness and understanding". The opportunity was taken to talk about Libya's amenities and resources, oil, desalination plants, Egyptian-Libyan unity, resistance to big power pressures, all of which were "gifts from God" which must be utilized properly.

There were messages from other leaders. Whether out of tradition, necessity or genuine conviction leaders made their appearances at Eid. In one way or another the problems of national development were raised, but the speeches did represent varying degrees of perception and practice so far as Islam was concerned. Although only a small cross section of the speeches has been given here, is it possible to deduce from them the extent to which the leadership of the Muslim world is in line with the values and aspirations of the people whom they represent, govern or rule over?

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"The present conflict in Mindanao, cannot be fully understood unless we have an adequate knowledge of the history, glories and vicissitudes of the Muslims, the policies of the colonial governments in the Philippines towards them, and the circumstances of their contacts with the Christianized inhabitants of the country."

## AN UNKNOWN CRUSADE

Cesar Adib Majul\*

The seeds of Islam in South-east Asia were planted almost imperceptibly by the Muslim traders, and they grew slowly until the end of the 13th century. From then on, its expansion accelerated on account of various complementary forces. By the end of the 13th century there was a Muslim principality on the north of Sumatra. By the beginning of the 15th century, Malacca had a Muslim ruler and this port became the emporium of Southeast Asia, a port of call for rich merchants and eventually a theological centre of Islam. By the end of the 15th century, many of the ports of Java had become Muslim principalities. Earlier, on account of contacts with Malacca, Brunei, on the north of Borneo, had become Muslim. From Brunei, Islamic influences began to be felt in Manila probably at the beginning of the sixteenth century or a generation before Magellan's arrival in the Archipelago.

While the north of Sumatra witnessed a Muslim ruler around the end of the thirteenth century, there was already a settlement of foreign Muslim merchants on the island of Jolo. Muslim travellers with commercial and religious motives came to Sulu around the end of the fourteenth century. This is the phase of the coming of the *makhdum* and *maulan* who visited or stayed in Malacca and Java, and it can be said that more than one *makhdum* visited Sulu. By the beginning of the fifteenth century, Muslim influences from Sumatra, as telescoped in the report of the coming of *Rajah Baguinda*, appeared in Sulu. Judging by the names of the religious and traditional chiefs who welcomed the Sumatrans, it can be inferred that the area of Buansa was full of Muslims. As is well known, the Sulu sultanate was then established in Buansa around the middle of the fifteenth century. From Buansa, Islam was spread by the first Sultan, the Sharif ul-Hashim, to the interior of Jolo island. During this time, a few Muslims,

with religious motives, and reportedly related to some famous religious personages in Java and Borneo, visited Mindanao—possibly at the area around the mouth of the Pulangi and Malabang.

In 1511, in their search for alternative sea routes to get at spices, the Portuguese circled around the south of Africa and arrived in India and then Southeast Asia. The Portuguese were able to win a few naval battles and to capture Malacca. At this point scions of the fleeing royal family of Malacca spread out to neighbouring areas to establish kingdoms of their own. One of them was probably the Sharif Muhammad Kabungsuwan who must have arrived at Malabang around the second decade of the sixteenth century, that is, about ten years after the fall of Malacca. Probably, the first to accept Islam from Kabungsuwan were Iranuns who later on introduced it to their close kinsmen, the Maranaos. In any case, the Maguindanao dynasty claimed descent from him. Later on, the Buayan dynasty, an older one than the Maguindanao, would claim kinship relations, by marriage, with the *sharif*.

When the Spaniards came to the Philippines in 1565, under the leadership of Legazpi, the sultanates of Sulu, Maguindanao and Buayan represented centralized principalities with each claiming allegiance from various scores of *banuas* (or *barangays*) to several islands. For example, in 1578, the Spaniards had taken it for granted that the Sulu Sultan exercise sovereignty over the islands of Jolo, Tawi-Tawi, Taguima (Basilan) and a few points in Zamboanga. Also around 1625, the Dutch observed that the Rajah of Buayan held sway over at least 25 settlements, only two of which were considered as non-Muslim *banuas*. The Rajah of Maguindanao, at this time, controlled settlements around the mouth of the Pulangi as well as countless settlements in the Iranun areas. To be mentioned also is that there were some settlements in Mindoro which had Muslim chiefs at the time of Legazpi's arrival. Certainly, Manila, on the southern banks of the Pasig had Muslim rajahs who were related to the Sultans of Brunei, and thereby also to the Sulu sultans.

Part of the political structure of the sultanates in the Philippines were based on Islamic models. Certainly, this included the principles involving legitimacy to rule. But a great deal of the pre-Islamic political structure as well as the rights to hold land were based on the traditional pre-Islamic institutions. Among these were the *datu* system and bilateral inheritance. In this respect, those natives of the Archipelago who became Christians had a great deal in common with the Muslims. Those *datu*s in Luzon and the Visayas who became Christians were constituted as the *principalia* which represented the highest political position a native could aspire to and which was the tool used by the Spaniards to keep the ordinary natives in check. There is no doubt that Islamic political institutions as found in the orthodox centres of Islam gave a more formal and cohesive character to the government of the sultanates in the Philippines. This became more so when the sultan began to exercise spiritual functions.

With Islam came the Arabic alphabet, new aesthetic models, and novel legal tenets. Nevertheless, the old-pre-Islamic, *adat*, especially those of its elements which were not contrary to Islam, continued to survive. The monotheism of Islam swept away the old divinities and spirits and inculcated among the people a sense of religious discipline. It also served to moderate social differences and tensions between the rulers and the ruled by its principle that all men were equal before Allah except in terms of piety. Islam increased the sense of moral worth of those who embraced the religion and gave them a new ethical outlook on life, society and nature. The Muslims came to look upon themselves as part of a wider religious community whose glories, achievements, and travails were taken also as their own.

Islam introduced so many features and had so transformed the older culture that it produced a veritable new culture. In spite of varying degrees of religious consciousness and sophistication, there was something unmistakably Islamic and common among the Iranun chief, the Maguinda-

nao or Buayan farmer, the Tausug warrior, and the Samal sailor. In spite of linguistic differences, dynastic loyalties, kinship ties, and regional peculiarities, it cannot be denied that the different Muslim groups in the Philippines formed one single spiritual community and shared a common culture distinct from those of non-Muslims in these islands.

The Spaniards came to these Islands with a clear and dual purpose to convert the inhabitants to Catholicism and extend the imperial domains of the Spanish Monarch. It had been pointed out various times by Spanish chroniclers that if the Spaniards did not come at the time they did with Legazpi and Urdaneta, Islam would have inevitably been spread over Luzon and the Visayas. Antonio de Morga, writing around 1600, commented that it would have then been very difficult for the Spaniards to extirpate Islam in these islands in the same manner that they were having difficulty in fighting it in Sulu and Mindanao. Morga and other friar writers, therefore, viewed the arrival of the Spaniards and their blocking of the northern expansion of Islam as an act of God Himself.

The Portuguese who captured Malacca in 1511 and the Spaniards who arrived in our Islands in 1565 considered their fight against the Muslims in Southeast Asia as a continuation of the Crusades. To emphasize this continuity, they called the Muslims in these regions "*moros*," a tacit recognition that the Muslims in Southeast Asia belonged to the same spiritual community as did the Spanish Arabs and Moros of North Africa. It is believed by some Dutch authors, principally Bertram Schrieke, that the religious fanaticism of European Christians provoked a counter fanaticism among the Malay Muslims—a factor that made Muslim Malays to exert efforts to propagate their Faith among non-Muslim Malays. This they maintain was a major cause of the accelerated growth of Islam in this part of the world in the sixteenth century. Be as it may, the struggle of the Muslims in the Philippines against the Spaniards can be considered as part and parcel of the general resistance of the Muslims against Western Imperialism, Colonialism, and Christianity in Southeast Asia. As it were, Islam had become a cherished way of life that had to be defended even at the cost of one's life, family, and possessions. In effect, the struggle of the Muslims against the Spaniards in the Philippines cannot be viewed as an isolated phenomenon but must be seen as an important facet in the general struggle of Muslim Malays against Western intrusion. However, eventually the people of the Malay Peninsula, the Indonesian Archipelago, including Borneo, and a great part of the Philippine Archipelago fell under Western rule.

The long series of wars between the Spaniards and the Muslims in the Philippines had been conveniently lumped together under the term "Moro Wars". Spanish chroniclers as well as other historians sympathetic to their views have interpreted such wars as consisting mainly of Spanish expeditions against Muslim pirates or to stop Muslim depredations in Spanish-held territories in the Archipelago. But this needs a closer analysis.

The first stage of the Moro Wars refers to the contest between the Spaniards and the people of Brunei, added by the Sulus, for the religious and commercial dominance of the Archipelago. It began at the arrival of the Spaniards in 1565 and ended in the invasion and defeat of Brunei in 1578. The Sulu Sultan, a brother-in-law of the Brunei Sultan, was led to offer some pearls and gold to the Spaniards, interpreted by the latter as "tribute". The second stage refers to the attempt of the Spaniards to reduce the rajahs of Sulu and Maguindanao to vassalage and found a few colonies in their territories. In 1576, the newly designated Governor of Mindanao was killed by the people of Buayan. Soon after, the Spanish colony in Sampakan and the fort in La Caldera (close to Zamboanga) were abandoned. In this stage the people of Ternate were the staunch allies of the people of Mindanao.

The third stage, beginning around 1590, represented a contest between the Maguindanaos, aided by the people of Buayan and Ternate, and

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the Spaniards as to who would collect tribute from the Visayas. The fall of Ternate to the Spaniards in 1606 weakened the above alliance. However, to this stage belongs the devastating raids of the Sulus, aided by Borneans, on Spanish-held coastal towns in Luzon and the Visayas. The Sulus were mainly victorious or successful in their expeditions to weaken the Spanish presence in the islands.

The fourth stage begins with the Spanish fortification, on Jesuit advice, of Zamboanga in 1635. This time the Spaniards were more determined than ever to conquer the sultanates, christianize the Muslims and exact tribute from them as vassals of Spain. In 1637, Qudarat, the Maguindanao sultan, was defeated and his dynastic rival, the Rajah of Buayan, thoroughly intimidated by the Spaniards. In 1638, the major *cotta* (fort) of the Sulu Sultan, after a magnificent defense, fell to Governor General Corcuera. Intense guerilla warfare in Sulu and Mindanao then ensued. Because of the lack of help from neighbouring principalities, and in spite of some Dutch help, the Muslims were forced to maximize their own resources. On account of fear of Dutch designs and more so because Sultan Qudarat was able to eventually strengthen himself in Mindanao, the Spaniards entered into a treaty with the Sultan in 1645. At this time the Spaniards were forced to recognize the sovereignty of Qudarat over the areas now known as Cotabato, Lanao, Bukidnon, Davao, and parts of Zamboanga and Cagayan de Oro. No native leader in the Philippines had ever exercised so much power over so much territory as Qudarat. In 1646, the Spaniards entered into a defensive and offensive alliance with the Sulu sultan. On account of Spanish incursions into his territories as well as attempts to convert him and other Muslims, Sultan Qudarat, in 1656, declared the *Jihad* against the Spanish government of Manila. He sent letters to the sultans of Sulu, Ternate, Makassar, Brunei, and possibly other sultanates, to help him in the defense of Islam and the *Shariah*. Spanish priests interpreted this action of the Sultan as a front to disguise personal ambitions. But the facts show that the Sultan was learned in *fiqh* and was a pious Muslim. He was also gifted with the attributes of charisma, bravery, magnanimity, dedication and utter selflessness for the cause of Islam. The wars that followed were fearful. However, in 1663, on account of the Koxinga threat, the fort of Zamboanga was abandoned and Qudarat was able to exercise his rule over his Samal subjects there.

To note in this fourth stage, unlike the first two stages, is that the Spaniards pursued the deliberate policy to destroy all Muslim owned orchards, farms, and settlements. All sea craft, whatever the size might have been, were captured or burned. Muslim prisoners, if not used for the galleys or sold as slaves, were executed and their corpses publicly displayed to inspire terror to other Muslims. Coastal settlements in Tawi-Tawi as well as interior settlements in Jolo island were systematically destroyed. A decimation of the population, especially in Sulu, had become Spanish official policy. The effects of all these are still visible after three centuries.

From 1663 to 1718, there was peace between the Spaniards and the Muslims in the Philippines. As long as they were left alone, the Muslims stopped bothering the Spanish-held coastal towns in the Philippines and started to resume their commercial activities. However, left to themselves they, as usual, began to quarrel with one another principally on dynastic rivalries or collection of tribute. In 1718, on account of continuous Jesuit agitation, Zamboanga was occupied and re-fortified by the Spaniards. The fifth stage of the Moro Wars soon commenced. The Sulus and Iranuns tried to dislodge the Spaniards from the fort to no avail. However, some of the Maguindanaos even helped supply food to the Spaniards in return for concessions from the latter. At this stage, the Spaniards adopted another tactic. They tried to conclude peaceful and commercial treaties with the Muslim rulers provided the latter would accept Catholic missionaries in their realms. To this stage belongs the conversion of 'Azim ud-Din (Alimudin) and members of his family. But the deposition of this

sultan and the succession of his brother led to a desultory war between the Spaniards and the Muslims. The Spaniards, once again, pursued their policy of enslaving Muslims, branding them, and burning their settlements, orchards, plantations, and sea craft. Interesting to note is that the brother of Alimudin tried to contact the Ottoman Sultan of Constantinople and the Chinese Emperor for help against Spain.

The sixth stage of the Moro Wars began around 1851 and ended in the last days of Spanish rule in the Philippines. The Spanish Campaign in 1851 was waged to prevent the French, British or Dutch from forging an alliance with the Muslims or gaining a foothold in Muslim areas. To this stage belongs the despoliation of the Balanguingui islands and the dispersal of its population. Moro piracy was the excuse for the campaign as well as for later ones. However, the facts demonstrate that the Sulu sultans themselves hated piracy and punished pirates out of an interest in keeping all commercial lanes open. Actually, the Sulu sultans were sharp traders themselves and had an interest in curbing piracy which existed in Malay lands even before the advent of Islam and the establishment of the sultanates. On this score it should be mentioned that the capture of Christian natives in the Philippines by the Muslims was to weaken the Spanish war machine in the Philippines, since the Spaniards utilized the Christianized natives to fight the Muslims. This is not to deny that many of the captured natives were sold in the slave markets of Batavia, Makassar, and Borneo. However, the moment they became Muslims, they were not sold but became warriors or household retainers.

If a seventh stage is to be looked for, then it would refer to the American pacification campaign against the Muslims. A few bloody wars took place during this stage. But American officials did not care, in general, to convert Muslims to Christianity. In many cases, they even came to admire Muslim warriors whom they discovered had a faith competitive with that of their own.

The Moro Wars left a deep imprint on the character of the Muslims in the Philippines which they still evince. First of all, to the Muslim of the Philippines, Islam has become a major element of his identity. To him, the lines dividing Islam from patriotism, love of the soil, and loyalty to his community are thin ones. Bravery to him has become a religious as well as a communal duty. He has come to believe that the military expeditions against his people came about because of his Faith and that therefore if he were not a Muslim, retaliations against the defense of his family and land would have not been so severe. He has come to be quite suspicious of Christian Filipinos since these formed the bulk of the expeditionary troops sent to rob him of his freedom and his religion. This is partly because of the attitudes and actions of Christians and their mentors, the former Spanish friars.

The Christianized Filipinos were taught to hate the Muslims who were painted in the blackest and dirtiest of colours. The *moro-moro* plays, the model of which was first staged in 1637 after the defeat of Sultan Qudarat by Corcuera, were designed to make the Christianized *indios* hate the *moros* in the name of the Christian Faith. Logically speaking, there is no difference between the *moro-moro* plays and the People's Theatre in China, in so far as they are calculated to produce certain conditioned attitudes among the generality of the populace. However, it is a good sign that the modern Filipino youth, in general, has not been exposed to such *moro-moro* plays, thus making it relatively easier for them not to hate the Muslims. But if older Filipinos had come to hate Muslims, it was for the fact that Catholicism had likewise become a source of identity for them and this was the way the Spaniards wanted things to be. We must all recall that the term "Filipino" as applied to a native in the Philippines in a national and secular sense is not more than 75 years old. For more than three centuries, being a Catholic and subject of the Spanish King were the two congruent sources of identity for the conquered and converted *indio*. When the Spanish campaign against Sulu was launched in 1876, a veritable

Crusade was launched with Spanish friars actually justifying the war in the name of religion. Towns and rich Chinese merchants were persuaded to contribute to the national effort to conquer the Muslims and even school children were reported to have given their share. We can only hope that this heritage of hate is banished forever, for if it is not banished we shall all find ourselves in the eighth stage of the Moro Wars.

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IN July 1958, when Abdel Karim Qasim overthrew the Iraqi monarchy and the government of Nuri el-Said, Fadhel Jamali was at the United Nations. Prime Minister of Iraq twice, Foreign Minister eight times, twice President of the National Assembly, Jamali had relinquished office as Foreign Minister in April 1958.

"When the revolution came I had simply gone to the Security Council to defend Lebanon. I returned and I was condemned to death and to 55 years prison sentence. It was very funny. I was supposed to have intended to move the Iraqi Army to invade Syria and if I had invaded Syria, then the Syrian Army would have attacked Iraq and I would then have exposed the country to external danger; and whoever exposed Iraq to such danger deserved to be put to death. I said I did not want to move my Army to Syria and the Syrian Army did not invade Iraq. Therefore, I did not expose Iraq to danger, but I had to be condemned anyway. I stayed in prison for over a year and several times my execution was postponed because of international pressure. Dag Hammarskjöld, the then UN Secretary-General, intervened. Nehru intervened, the European powers (not Britain or America) intervened and of course the Muslim States. Ayub Khan wanted to come to Baghdad, to save my life, but the last man who finally succeeded in saving my life was King Muhammad V of Morocco. He was invited to come to Baghdad, but he said I cannot come as long as Jamali is under death sentence. So when he came the sentence was commuted to 10 years imprisonment".

But before he came into politics, Jamali was a teacher. Once a teacher, always a teacher, and that is how Prof. Mohammed Fadhel Jamali—now teaching at the University of Tunis—seems to look at the past. There is none of the bitterness that one could expect in such a situation. To him the whole problem is educational. Boys are boys, some dull, some bright, some good, and some bad, but to him they are all boys. You feel sorry but never bitter or negative.

It is about fourteen years since Qasim's revolution. How does he evaluate these post-revolution years? Does it in any way vindicate his policies and his politics?

"The trouble is that there is a great chaos of values, political values, moral values, social values, they are all upset and it makes very difficult for one to judge or to pronounce. I myself believe that the humanity at large, as anywhere else, should be guided by three basic principles. First the Faith, its universal purpose and wherein the Will of God dominates. Second, application of science and scientific methods, in thinking and in every relevant department of life. Third, and this is much misunderstood, is democracy. By democracy I mean, let me make it very clear, social justice, co-operative and shared living, freedom of thought and expression and the dignity of the human person. Unless we accept and apply these fundamental rules of life, which are in themselves part of Islam, we will continue to go down. We will continue to have unrest... Problem is, the Arab world is not clear on what it wants. It is confused, and undecided".

Why this is so?

"There are two reasons and one of them goes back in history. We inherited decadence, that's one thing, and the other is that we are overwhelmed by foreign ideologies, influences and powers, and those external forces still play on us and use us as pawns in their own game. But had we not been weak and retarded that could not have happened. That means we must begin with ourselves. If we are strong from within then there is no danger from without."

How did you happen to become weak from a position of strength? Certainly something must have gone wrong, to begin with.

"I said we inherited weakness from the dark periods of Muslim history when ignorant and selfish rulers and governors became despots and began to oppress and exploit their own people. They demanded submission in all situations, in all circumstances as if they were pharaohs."

Are you referring to the Ottomans?

"No, it begins from the last days of the Abba-

## Nationalism, Baghdad Pact, Revolution and Education

Prof. Fadhel Jamali speaks to  
IMPACT about his years in Iraqi  
politics



Mohammed Fadhel Jamali

sides when the Muslim society got infected with racialism and chauvinism, with bigotry and narrow-mindedness, and when the religious schools closed their minds and stopped thinking. I suppose that was the background situation when Arab nationalism started taking roots".

If you go back to the nature of your situation, the whole set of problems that arose, the problem of despotism, the problem of discrimination, the problem of inequity, of bigotry, of narrow-

mindedness, it all starts from the deviation of the leadership and society from Islam. This is a deviation from the normal, now how do you start solving the problem: by trying to revert to the normal or by going away from the normal, no matter in what direction? To an outsider this phenomenon of Arab emergence or Arab revolts, whichever way you put it, has shown itself as a self-defeating exercise. You started, or you thought so, from being the Arab nations, and now one can see where the Arabs are?

"The point is that Arab nationalism, modern Arab nationalism, was not meant to be self-defeating. It was meant to be a positive link in developing a group of Muslims".

But why should one seek an exclusive development of a particular group of people? The problems arise because of a deviation from the normal. One may be a Turk, a Persian, or an Arab or an African, but this is irrelevant, if one accepts that as the causal factor. Have emancipation and liberation got to be exclusive and separate? You don't divide, you unify and harmonise if you seek liberation.

"Well to me, nationalism is not divisive at all. It should not be. It is a natural social bond, it's like a bond within a family or a tribe, I belong to a family, a tribe and a country, and I also belong to the world of Islam. If you read the Qur'an you will see that it recognises nationalism, for the purposes of identification but, not for division and discord. Once you come to know and to recognise one another you begin to develop togetherness and mutuality. True that has not been understood so clearly. My object in politics and in education has, therefore, been and is, to prove to my Arab fellows, to my Muslim brethren that that's the meaning of nationalism. I have travelled very widely. I went to Malaysia, to Pakistan, to Turkey and so many other Muslim countries and I always felt at home with our Muslim brethren. I remember speaking in the Great Mosque of Djakarta; I was over-whelmed, I felt as close as a brother. That was after the Bandung Conference".

What you are trying to say means that perhaps a great many Muslim Arab nationalists were well-meant, but one can see that they have failed.

"Yes that's true, we have not been able to educate our people. The leaders too were confused. Our masses are well-meant, but the leadership unfortunately is confused and ignorant. In such a situation one who shouts, who is a demagogue, can come up and be the leader... Anyway to my mind the basic problem is education, we must have a sound new system of Islamic education for the Arabs, for the Pakistanis, for the Indonesians, for the Iranians, for the Turks, for the Africans, for the Chinese; we must all work towards this goal. I have myself written one book in Arabic and another in English: "The Reconstruction of Islamic Education". The Muslim world needs to be clear on the point and decide what type of society it wants to establish. It's really a great injustice to Islam to regard the Muslims as representatives of the Great Faith. Could we not establish even a small village which is an embodiment of the true Muslim way so that we show it and tell the world, this is the way Muslims live: co-operation, mutuality, honesty, creativity, dignity and work."

One thing which is very difficult to understand is that people like yourself, when they are out of power they come with very good things about Islam, about education, and so on, but what about the period you actually had the opportunity of implementing those things? How does it help now to talk of the opportunities lost?

"If you are interested and if you have the time I would invite you to study the record of my cabinet during the period I was Prime Minister. As Foreign Minister my record is clear, because it is mainly in the United Nations; one can see what I said and what I did. My foreign policy is known, but as a Prime Minister, when I first took office, I did a few things which I can humbly feel happy about. When I came to power there was no freedom of the press in the country, the newspapers and the press were under strict control. The political parties were suppressed; they were not allowed to function and from 1948 onwards



there had been Martial Law. We lifted Martial Law, lifted restrictions on press and the political parties. We fixed a minimum standard wage for the worker. We controlled rents and distributed state land among the landless. One thing which I must also tell, today it may sound reactionary, but there used to be a very big alcohol advertisement on the bridge of Baghdad, in beautiful colours, a lady pouring wine and serving to the public. I got that removed. The prostitution quarters were abolished and prostitution banned. One can look into my record.

In the field of education we started the University, we started educational reform, but I did not stay long enough to see its results. Of course, I am partly responsible for a certain period in education. That's a long history; for twelve years I was Director-General of Education. During those years my main aim was to liberate our system of education from foreign influence and to inculcate the idea of Pan-Arabism; we were trying to liberate Syria and Palestine, also Lebanon. We tried to extend education in the whole country and opened schools for the tribal people. Education was confined not to the cities alone, we also tried to reach the rural and the outlying areas. We tried to see that the people of Iraq were treated justly, and that there was no discrimination between the urban and the rural people or between Turks, Arabs and Kurds. We tried to eliminate differences by providing every group an equal opportunity and a harmonising climate. We similarly tried to promote girl education and give them the same opportunities as the boys. All my twelve years I resisted attempts to establish the British-type schools for the aristocratic families and was much unpopular for that."

To liberate the system of education from the British frame was of course important and necessary, but that is only negative. What positive measures were taken to Islamise the system of education?

"One thing we did was very important. In Iraq we have both Shias and Sunnis who form part of the nation. I established a committee of eminent scholars from amongst both and asked them to draw a combined programme of Islamic education. They were able to prepare a unified syllabus and it was a great achievement."

You still had the revolution. Would you say that the coming of the revolution signified the failure of your work or that it was some other phenomenon?

"I want to tell one thing: At the beginning of the war the British insisted that I should be kicked out of the Education Ministry. After me they brought a communist gentleman to head the Ministry of Education. This was in 1941; they also brought an English adviser to undo what I had done. So I would say that part of the revolution owed itself to that. They said that I was a Nazi, which was of course not true. After I left the Ministry of Education, the Oriental Secretary of the British Embassy, Capt. Holt came to my house and told me that the British Ambassador (the British Ambassador in fact was the ruler of Iraq at that time) was sad that I had to leave. I said: 'Please give my compliments to His Excellency and tell him that if he really thought I was a Nazi, then also tell him that he was now planting Communism in Iraq and some day they will have to pay for it.' So that was the seeding of the Iraqi Revolution?"

I have discussed the Iraqi revolution in "Al-Iraq Al-Hadith" published from Beirut. It incorporates my point of view on the causes of the downfall of monarchy in Iraq. The causes were both internal and external. Internally, as I said earlier, my policy was not followed. There was persecution, there was despotism, there was feudalism, there was sectarianism, and all sort of other corruption, like any other country in the Third World. Externally Nasser played a big role, the Ba'athists played a big role, and some other powers played a big role. America and Britain acquiesced and I put a question mark over there, because I have proof that they knew what was going to happen . . ."

You don't think the Americans were more involved than the British?

"I do not know. It is possible, but I really can't tell. I say that we and the British and the Americans were friends. If they knew what happened and did not tell us, that's betrayal. If they did not know and it happened, then they were bankrupt. That is my view. There are some signs which point that they knew what was going to happen."

The most controversial part of your Foreign Ministership is Baghdad Pact?

"Yes, I am still a great believer in Baghdad Pact, not in relation to the West, but in its relation with the Muslim world. I always considered Iraq as a great Islamic country and felt convinced of the need to unite Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. This has been my goal. I saw the Iraqi role as a bridge between the Arab and the non-Arab Muslim countries. That was a natural role. Iraq is a meeting point for Persians, Turks and Arabs."

**Menderes was invited to go to Cairo ... then came the incident of the Muslim Brethren ... the invitation was withdrawn ... Before that Nasser had written beautifully about the Turks ... Menderes then came to Iraq ... Iraq happened to take the lead ... That started the trouble ...**

No matter the quality of your own sentiments, but one cannot overlook the whole origination of Baghdad Pact: by the West and for the West.

"I said then and even now maintain that in order to protect themselves weak powers should have alliances with the bigger powers, whether of the East or the West. Non-alignment to me is advantageous only if you could maintain it."

Now if the object is to seek protection, then the natural protector in your case should have been Soviet Russia rather than the West?

"Yes that is the dilemma. If I go to America I may lose part of my economy and I may be exploited to some extent politically but culturally I am less exposed, but if I go to Russia, I am no more a Muslim, I am no more an Arab, I am a Marxist. That is why I always said we could not go to Russian side. I am not against the Russians as fellow humans, but I do not like Communism, and to my mind Communism and Imperialism are one. In fact Communism is more thorough. I do not differentiate between Zionist Communism and Zionist Capitalism. As a Muslim I believe in our own system of economy and our system of social justice. In 1947, Faris al Khoury of Syria came to me and said: let's vote for the Russians. It was at the UN and I told Faris I will vote for the Russians provided they supported us on the Palestine issue and vote against the Partition Plan. But if they don't I will be losing both Palestine and my own self. I am opposed to all kinds of ideological totalitarianism."

You don't see Western Imperialism as another kind of ideological totalitarianism?

"No, one can still kick and cry. During the British rule in Iraq, we could make demonstrations and shout and curse, but under a Communist regime all such people are either liquidated or put in a mental asylum."

In a situation like yours, where you have a big power like Russia so close to you and another big power, America, not physically close, yet very closely involved, would you not be more sensible to steer clear of both?

"Yes, provided I could do that. I am not dogmatic about that. But if you must have friends, then it is for you to choose those who are less

harmful. I told this to Nehru. At Bandung we had a 24-hour secret debate and Nehru attacked Baghdad Pact. I said: Mr. Nehru I can see the Communist danger; while they form one solid block, the non-Communist world is split and divided. If you want to create a block and guarantee my defence, come along, *tafaddal!* But if you cannot, then I have to find my own solution."

"I said that colonialism was on the way out and we had succeeded in meeting it, but Communism was an on-coming colonialism, and more dangerous. When you have two evils to choose from you decide on the lesser one. That, of course, is a negative approach, but positively I always say: we don't shut our eyes and our minds to that which may be good and useful either in the East or the West."

"Talking of Baghdad Pact one has to think also of the situation which then existed. Personally, I worked hard for Baghdad Pact because I was working for the unity of Iraq and Syria. The US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, told me that America would not support that union unless we joined Baghdad Pact. To me it was a means to the goal of unifying Iraq and Syria."

But in actual fact Baghdad Pact served to subdivide the Arabs?

"That was unfortunate, because it was not properly handled. Our propaganda machinery failed to explain it in the correct light."

How do you interpret Nasser's attitude? Was it a clash of personality with Nuri el-Said or ...?

"No, it was not like that. I have dealt with the subject in my memoirs. Nasser was supposed to be in the Baghdad Pact. He had accepted it."

Can you prove it?

"I speak from personal knowledge. Adnan Menderes, the Turkish Prime Minister, was invited to go to Cairo and then came the incident of the Muslim Brethren when Nasser was alleged to be shot at. There is no logical correlation between the two, but the invitation to Menderes was withdrawn. Before that Nasser had written beautifully about the Turks: the Turks are our brothers, we are related by marriage, we are one family and so on. Menderes then came to Iraq and since Iraq happened to take the lead, Nasser felt offended. That was, to my mind, a question of petty jealousy. That started the trouble. Nasser tried to isolate Iraq. He called a meeting of the Arab League in Cairo. Nuri refused to go. I went on his behalf and explained Iraq's position very very clearly, but all that my explanation did was to neutralise the Arab states and make them accept that Iraq was entitled to do what she did. I did achieve the non-alienation of Iraq, but I could not convince Nasser."

"It would not be correct to think that Nasser was opposed to Baghdad Pact because he was anti-West or the like. The agreement he made with Britain allowed the British troops to come back, in the event of an attack. He had already acquiesced to the British return to the canal, and if you want to brag about patriotism, nationalism, anti-imperialism etc, then that was not the case."

"The Anglo-Egyptian agreement was signed in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact came a year later in 1955. Before the Pact I was having dinner in Cairo with Naguib and Nasser and the next evening Nasser came to the Iraqi Embassy and had dinner with us. He had brought a copy of the *New York Times*. It carried a report on an alliance between Turkey and Pakistan which Iraq would join subsequently. Nasser did not say that we should not join, he said: Do not join until we have finished our job with the British and the evacuation from the canal is complete. I agreed and gave my word. After that I returned to Baghdad and "Sawt al-Arab" radio began to attack me."

Why?

"They said they had information that we had joined. This was false. We had not joined. It came later. Nasser had finished his job with the British, and from all moral and legal consideration, Iraq was entitled to join Baghdad Pact. By then I had resigned and Nuri had taken over. What followed later is well known. Nasser, it seems, wanted to tell the West that it was he who had the Arab world's cards in his hands. But, in our days Iraq would not yield to such things."

"Christian Aid supports something like 150 projects in over 80 countries. These projects could range from something like a thousand pounds donation for an oil rig in Malawi to a very broad-base programme in another country like the one in Philippines which is a programme of social justice picking up a whole number of community development schemes, supporting them with around £50,000 to £60,000—so that we can galvanize an entire community."

*Where does the money come from?*

"Christian Aid raises about three million pounds a year and it is now supposed to be the fastest growing charity in the U.K. The money comes mainly from the churches and more particularly during what is known as Christian Aid Week. During Christian Aid Week we raise about 1½ million pounds. This figure is increased by further donations given by churches at Christmas and all-the-year round campaigns. We calculate that most of our money comes from non-Christians, although it may well be that the organisers of the collections are Christians themselves."

*Does Christian Aid work exclusively through Christians?*

"Of course, being a Christian organisation it is normal that we work through Christian groups but this isn't always the case for there are many countries where the Christian community is very small indeed, such as India or Pakistan. So in these cases we work through another body which perhaps shares the same ideals as the Christian community. But we always insist that no special help is given to Christians over any other section of the population."

*Does Christian Aid involve itself with politics?*

"Inevitably, Christian Aid is involved in politics. For instance, at present Christian Aid is organising aid to North Vietnam and we will soon be sending out £100,000 worth of medicine. There are people who say we disapprove of the Hanoi Government, we don't feel that Christian Aid should be helping them. On the other hand, Christian Aid says that our intention is not to help a political force, be it Americans or the North Vietnamese, but rather to help those who are in need... Being removed from the political field, it allowed us recently to successfully negotiate peace in the Sudan, when we learned that both the Khartoum Government and the Anyanya leaders were in fact seeking peace, but did not know how to go about it. Christian Aid paid the money which enabled the Anyanya leadership to travel and meet all their people, scattered around five different countries in Central Africa. Christian Aid also paid for the services of Sir Dingle Foot, who drew up the settlement that consequently enabled peace to come to the Sudan after seventeen years of war. It is a very unusual role for a charity to

## THE NEW MISSIONARIES

**Unfortunate reality:** In the world of 1972 over half the human family suffers from poverty and is thus condemned to a miserable existence and in the end, a miserable death.

**Rev. Alan Booth, Director of Christian Aid:** "... poverty is not just hunger or being badly clothed or being cold. It is imprisonment in helplessness. It is just being a machine for survival. The spiritually damaging thing is that the man... has no choice at all. He has nothing to choose about; there are no options; he is the tool of circumstances of his environment. He is taking no initiative because there are no initiatives to take..."

**Slogan:** "If you feed a man a fish, you feed him for a day; if you teach a man to fish, you feed him for life."

**Report:** Christian Aid is an organisation which challenges world poverty and brings together people who have already decided to act on behalf of the poor: both those who suffer because of natural disasters and those who are the victims of underdevelopment.

Zia Sardar has been speaking to  
**Don Thompson and  
Celia Williams** of Christian Aid

play but still a very significant one."

*What is Christian Aid doing in Africa?*

"Christian Aid is best known for its work in Nigeria. In fact, it is the agency which in spite of Government warnings and many rumours that it was inadvertently prolonging the war, night after night brought food into Biafra by planes. Some people said that this was providing cover for those who were flying guns in Biafra. It was a very difficult decision for us to make; in the event it proved to be the correct one, for soon after the cease-fire we discovered that the food had literally kept millions of people alive. After the cease-fire we started a fairly big reconstruction programme in Nigeria on the request of the local Christian Council. We have built many schools, hospitals and dispensaries. This reconstruction work is only just now beginning to wind up, it's

being handed over to the Government. So we have had three years of it and it has made the local Christian Council in Nigeria a very famous body indeed.

"As regards work in other parts of Africa we have had requests to support the so-called African Liberation Movements such as FRELIMO and others in Portuguese-controlled territory. Now the World Council of Churches, with whom we are connected, has decided to give financial support to some of these Liberation Movements; the money is to be used for education and medicine. Christian Aid, however, decided not to support this for a number of reasons but principally because we feel that if the organisation is to do good jobs, and to do them properly, it must be seen to be independent and non-political. To be seen to give support to so-called Liberation Movements could damage our reputation throughout the world where we are working."

*Is Christian Aid doing any work in the Middle East?*

"Christian Aid has many contacts in the Middle East. We continue to give much assistance to the refugees: we have education, medicine and health programmes and we give a considerable amount of money to these and have been doing so for some time. Once again we are accused of supporting the guerrilla movements. We can only say that our motives are that people should not be short of food, that people have a right to education and a right to health. If it gives them the strength to fight with the guerrillas, then it is the right of every people to have a right over their own lives: we are not responsible for the choices they make. We think it right that we give them the means to make the choice.

"One of the main policy tenets of Christian Aid is that we support people overseas to do what they see is applicable to their own situation in developing and helping their own people and we don't dictate from London what we think they ought to do."

*Is Christian Aid Imperialism?*

"We try to take every precaution to make our aid not imperialism. The projects which we support come to us largely through the Council of Churches or agencies usually church-related in the countries concerned. They are nationals usually of the countries concerned, they put their priority programmes to us through the World Council of Churches where they are screened by the Asia project. Screening is done not by white people, not by Europeans but by Asians themselves. Christian Aid supports projects which do not always seem to make sense to us but which the people on the spot say they definitely want. As long as it is within the terms of reference by which we raise money in this country we will support them. So I think, we try to do everything to make our aid not imperialism."

## Books

## Faiz, Iqbal and “unemployed dogs”

Poems by Faiz translated by V. G. Kiernan, George Allen and Unwin, London, 288 pages, £4.50.

“Poems by Faiz”, is a very welcome addition to the growing collection of books on Urdu poetry and poets by eminent western scholars. The layout of the book is very appropriate. First the Urdu text is reproduced in bold, clear and pleasing *nasta'liq*. Facing it is first an English translation in verse, then a literal translation in English, and then a Roman transliteration of Urdu verse. A better scheme could hardly be conceived of, except that the Urdu version is too bold (and thus out of proportion) and leaves inadequate spacing between the words.

There are, however, quite a number of statements set out in the Foreword and the Introduction that are rather unfortunate. It is impossible here to comment upon all of them yet it seems necessary to make observations about some at least.

In the Foreword Professor Kiernan expresses the view that the Urdu script is not “well adapted to the requirements of a utilitarian age” (p. 9) and proposes that the Roman script be adopted instead of the present Urdu script, citing the example of Turkey. This is no new suggestion. People have been suggesting for well over a century now that Roman should replace the Urdu script. But nobody has so far been able to explain convincingly why. However, nothing could be more unscientific than to claim the Roman script to be a scientific one. Professor Kiernan describes Devanagari as the ‘more scientific Nagari script of Hindi’. There is no such thing as a ‘scientific script’. The Devanagari script has its own profound anomalies and pit-falls which, for lack of space, we regret very much that we cannot set out here. But in passing, we would like to reproduce a famous *qata* by Akbar (1846—1921) the great master of wit and satire who commented on the Devanagari script thus:

بھائیو! تم کبھی ہندی کے مخالف نہ بنو  
مر کے سمجھا ہوں میں اتنا کہ یہ تھی کام کی بات  
بس کہ تھا نامہ اعمال مرا ہندی میں  
کوئی پڑھ ہی نہ سکا ہو گئی فی الفور نجات

“O my brethren! never oppose Hindi,  
Only after death I came to understand  
how useful it could be,  
Since the record of my deeds was in  
Devanagari (Hindi)

No one could decipher it, and I got off scot free.”

The preface too has some major lapses; we shall point out only two concerning the pronunciation, as these seem to be prevalent among the orientalist in general. Kiernan writes that “Urdu is not in all respects phonetic. The word *mahfil* sounds in ordinary speech like *mehfil* and *bahut* like *bohat*”. (p. 19). One must remember that Urdu is a fully developed language in its own right, and no matter what pronunciation a lone word might have had in its original form or language, Urdu has given its own pronunciation and sometimes its own spelling and meaning too. For some curious reason the orientalist think that in Urdu *bohot* should be pronounced as *bahut*. The reason seems to be that the earlier compilers of the lexicons simply ignored the original character of the Urdu language, so much so that J. F. Platts does not recognise Urdu as a distinct and separate language. In Urdu the pronunciation is *bohot* (though the ‘o’ is not like English ‘o’) and never *bahut* which is Hindi, and is considered archaic and rustic. The same goes for certain other words of Arabic origin; *mehfil* is not *mahfil* (p. 19), no matter what Johnson, Taylor, Forbes, Fallon, Platts, etc. say. In Urdu it is *mehfil*. Similarly *mohabbat* is not *mahabbat* but *mohabbat* and *peh* is not *pah* but *peh*; *pehla* is not *pahla* but *pehla*. (p. 19).

On page 19: “I have used hyphens also between pairs of words linked by ‘o’ (and), but only when the two words are so closely associated by meaning or convention as to form really a single compound, e.g. . . . *lauh-o-qalam*, but *tabl o 'alam*”. It seems Professor Kiernan thinks that ‘*lauh*’ and ‘*qalam*’ are more closely associated by meaning or convention than ‘*tabl*’ and ‘*alam*’. He is quite mistaken. All these four words are used separately with equal frequency when required and ‘o’ (and) serves exactly the same function in both the compounds. There is no justification for hyphenating one and not the other.

The introduction is interesting, and full of generalisations. On page 23 Kiernan states that “there is no term for ‘bottle’”, and thinks “*shisha*, a classical word, has come to be used for tumbler”. *Shisha* is not tumbler, but bottle, and *shisha-i-mai* is not a tumbler of wine but a bottle of wine. *Shishi* is a small bottle.

The introduction reveals a lack of knowledge of Urdu literature in general and of Urdu poetry in particular. One gets the impression that the translator has not read more than a few poems of Iqbal and also not all of Faiz’s poems (which are not numerous), and has perhaps uncritically accepted opinions from others. The result is this that he thinks that “Urdu

has a smaller prose content” (p. 19) and that it needs to produce more varied prose (p. 44). Another remark: “. . . in modern Urdu . . . a writer may be classed either as a serious poet or, with a touch of disparagement, as a *ghazal*-writer”. One does not know what is the basis of such an undergraduate remark.

It is needless to say that Urdu prose has a long tradition and a very rich and varied literature ranging from treatises on art and music to pornography, from physical sciences to applied mathematics, philosophy, logic, philology and medicine etc—not to mention Islamic learning and theological polemics, besides a vast treasury of stories, fiction, criticism and so on. Drama is perhaps the only exception, but Urdu-speakers feel proud that drama is not a part of their tradition and culture.

Professor Kiernan also thinks that in Urdu poetry “. . . death is a far less prominent theme than it has been in Europe. Exile, separation, loneliness, take its place . . .”. Nothing could be farther from the truth. I cannot speak about European poetry, but in Urdu poetry *death* is a very dominant theme, and nothing takes its place—neither exile nor separation nor loneliness. And there exists such deep and profound poetry of exquisite charm on death alone that one is tempted to say that alongside love, death is the only other major theme of the Urdu poet.

Kiernan claims: “It has been noted that Faiz has far more than Iqbal of a sort of ‘masochism’ habitual in Urdu poetry, which seeks the pangs of love rather than its fulfilment”. This statement too is based on an insufficient study of Iqbal. Faiz may have a greater measure of morbid masochism than Iqbal, but Iqbal, in fact, is a poet of *firaq*, separation, rather than of *visal*, union. He has developed this theme of *firaq* to a degree which is unparalleled in the realm of Urdu poetry. He even praises *Iblis* as *Khawaja-i-Ahl-i-firaq*. Iqbal’s preference for *vahdatush shahud* over the more popular and more commonly accepted doctrine of *vahdatul vujud* is also an indication of his preference of *firaq* over *visal*.

Professor Kiernan has compared Faiz with Iqbal and put them on the same footing. To compare Iqbal with Faiz is to compare incomparables. They belong to two different realms. Those who know what Iqbal and Faiz stand for cannot pronounce their names in the same breath. Faiz is a good poet and occupies a very distinguished place among his contemporaries. To claim any permanent place in posterity he has yet to go very far to improve both quantitatively and qualitatively. Professor Kiernan is correct when he says, “Much remains for him to do”, but not so in the remark that “he has done enough to be looked upon as the most significant Urdu poet, in Pakistan and India, of the time since Iqbal . . .”. Faiz is a significant poet, but there are others more significant and many poets as significant as Faiz.

In Pakistan there has been a tendency for the past few years to deify Iqbal. Instead of understanding his philosophy, and concentrating on the thought-contents of his poetry, people tend to clothe him in a holy robe. Iqbal no doubt was a genius, but one cannot overstress his greatness. Iqbal had his own limitations and inconsistencies and he never claimed to have pronounced the last word on every thing. One should treat him as a philosopher and a poet with a universal message for the sick and deprived humanity, but no more.

Faiz and Iqbal are, however, incomparable.

Faiz is very well known in his own land and in foreign lands too. His fame has spread far and wide. One feels proud of him and enjoys his compositions very much yet cannot overlook the fact that his fame both in and outside Pakistan rests largely on his meticulous planning and public relations. Middle of the road, he would never antagonise anyone beyond reconciliation or lavish praise on a person or a system to the point of flattery. The extreme leftists and the Marxists feel warm towards him because he at least sings some of his compositions on the same frequencies as they do. And they would keep him humoured rather than lose him completely to the other side. And the other side, the Capitalist and the Establishment, would do the same: to patronise and to retain.

Professor Kiernan writes (p.40), "Iqbal was going to one more source when he brought Nietzsche into the Punjab, and Faiz when he helped to introduce Marx." This, however, shows a lack of understanding of Iqbal's message, its depth, and its dimensions. An attempt to limit Iqbal's appeal to Punjab is very much so. As for Faiz, it is very much doubtful if he 'introduced Marx' into Punjab, let alone Urdu poetry. Faiz no doubt has written some beautiful and powerful poetry on poverty, economic exploitation, social degradation and the enslavement of the body and the spirit. And who in the thirties and early forties has *not* written on such themes? To confuse this with any ardent love scientific socialism may be embarrassing for Faiz! Like any other artist, Faiz looks at these situations as a model, and creates pen-pictures of exquisite beauty and charm yet stays very much detached. To use Professor Kiernan's words, "Faiz belonged to a generation that examined poverty at close range", but he has managed to keep a safe distance between himself and the crushed "bodies that have emerged from the oven of disease, (and) pus flowing from rotten ulcers". (p.67).

To be fair to Faiz, this cool, detached and artistic interest in poverty, and in the socio-economic conditions of life, is not peculiar to him alone. This he shares with the entire progressive literary aristocracy of the Indo-Pak. subcontinent. Such an

attitude to life and its problems explains Faiz's ambiguity of expression and vagueness of symbolism.

Professor Kiernan's effort to introduce Faiz and Iqbal to the English reading public is a commendable service in the cause of Urdu poetry. His English rendering of Faiz is as good as Faiz's original. However, as this whole exercise is aimed at helping the western students of Urdu, it seems necessary to point out some lapses in translation. If there are two words in English to represent an Urdu word, Kiernan uses the more appropriate one in the English verse translation and the less appropriate in the literal translation. This could lead a beginner to think that the exact and correct English equivalent of the Urdu word is that which is used in the literal translation, and that the one used in the English verse translation is an elegant and sophisticated substitute for a cruder Urdu word. Examples of this are quite numerous, but we give here just three: on page 75, *mazdur* is translated in the literal version as 'workman' and in verse as 'labourer'. Obviously 'workman' is not only inappropriate, but in this context incorrect too. On page 51, '*gham-e-rozgar*', in the literal version is translated as 'distress for daily bread' and in this verse as 'daily cares'. At places this creates a comic effect. For instance on page 83, '*be-kar kutte*' is translated as 'unemployed dogs'! The mental picture one gets is of a queue of dogs in the employment office.

Such and other lapses, one hopes would be remedied in the next edition. On page 87, *Jan* is translated as 'life', whereas in the context it should be 'soul'. On page 93 '*ghubar*' is translated as 'cloud', which is incorrect. On page 99 '*sokhta ashk*' is translated as 'burning tears' in the literal version and as 'blistering tears' in the verse. Both are wrong. The translation of '*sokhta ashk*' is burnt up tears and the implied meanings are 'dry tears' or 'dried up tears' as the last part of the line makes clear "... that do not come into the eyes."

Lack of space does not permit going into some misconceptions, which are rather misleading, about Urdu, its development and literature. Similarly Professor Kiernan's over-stressing of the Punjabi domicile of both Iqbal and Faiz lies in the domain of politics and not literature. It may be reflective of the depreciation of the original Pakistani universalism, but it does affect the objectivity of such a tremendously useful work.

Dr. Khalid Hasan Qadiri

#### ZAKAT PAYMENT GUIDE

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NEWSMEDIA BOOK SERVICE

## Briefing

**Be Fruitful and Multiply**, by John Fremlin, Hart-Davis, £2.95.

The author, a physicist, debunks the pronouncements of the prophets of doom by suggesting that the planet earth can easily support and shelter 20,000 million people or even a greater number. We are, he says, in no danger of ever consuming up the earth's entire oxygen blanket. If we burnt all the available and recoverable fuel reserves of the world we could not use more than a small fraction (0.7%) of the available oxygen. "The belief that the end of the world is at hand has of course been around for a very respectable period ... During the Christian eras of implicit faith in the Bible, complex arithmetical calculations from data presented therein ... were used to produce dates far enough ahead to be advertised, and close enough to be interesting ... Now it is pollution. This is better, because while calculations based on the number of letters in the Authorised Version of the Bible are difficult to refute, concern about the air can be settled by doing the sums". This is what he has done in his book rather convincingly. As a scientist, he accepts the principle of uncertainty which most prophets of doom seemingly fail to understand and allow for the effect their forecasts will have on the course of human progress. Fremlin does not agree that the human race would countenance growth to the disaster point.

**Nasser: The Cairo Documents**, by Mohamed Heikal, New English Library, £4.50.

An account of Nasser in power, his problems and the people he dealt with, from the pen of the most influential Egyptian journalist. Many world figures we meet here and see them as Nasser saw them. Mr. Chou En Lai talking to Nasser about the American troops in Vietnam said they were happy that these troops were there as it put them directly within China's grasp.

**Moshe Dayan**, by Shabtai Teveth, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, £4.00.

'Unruly, insubordinate, a trouble-maker and ruthless' fellow who dressed like a ruffian: shoes uncleaned, trousers unpressed' and an "indiscriminate" womaniser! But nonetheless an accomplished guerrilla leader. This is the portrait, the author, a hero-worshipper, gives us of the Israeli defence minister. Tracing the childhood and early life of Dayan, the book gives a detailed account of his political and military career.

**Jesus in Bad Company**, by Adolf Holl, Collins, £1.60.

A Roman Catholic Lecturer in Vienna University, Adolf Holl portrays Jesus as a rebel against authority and convention with a vision of a world where power is nothing, love everything. The author rejects the Gospels as reliable and maintains that Jesus did not intend to found a new religion with its own priesthood and sacraments. He also rejects the deification of Jesus and his crucifixion (in which the pharisees had a major share) as an atoning sacrifice as doctrines which originated long after his death.

**The Third Arab-Israeli war**, by Edgar O'Ballance, Faber, £3.50.

Retraces the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, but seems already out of date. An instance: the author asserts that 'on the Israeli side there was no powerful secret weapon'. But only last month the Israeli Defence Minister disclosed that Israel had blacked out Egyptian radar on the eve of the war. Such lapses are evidently due to the author's inability to obtain material from Egyptian and Israeli resources. The book does not answer the question why the Egyptians failed to mount a serious counter-offensive after their initial set back.

**The Light Garden of the Angel King: Journeys in Afghanistan**, by Peter Levi, Collins, £3.00.

Describes the journey of the author, a Jesuit of

Jewish descent, through Afghanistan, which he said he visited to answer the question: "what was Greek occupation of Afghanistan like, and what became of these remote Greek Kingdoms?" As a travel book it gives a colourful picture of Afghan Provincial life and land, but his conclusion: "Afghanistan is still sufficiently distant and extraordinary for it to be stupid to travel there alone".

**Moscow Conversations**, by Susan Jacoby, Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, \$6.95.

Wife of a journalist-husband, the author met and interviewed ordinary soviet citizens. The present book introduces fourteen of them, ranging from a "model citizen" Galina, to Boris Aleksevich an old communist of 67 who narrates his fight for survival and disillusionment. He spent twenty years in labour camps during Stalin's days and says: "Now I have no hope and my mind is at peace. Hope can drive a man madder than despair".

**The South African Connection**, by Ruth First, Jonathan Steele and Christabel Guney, Temple Smith, £3.50.

The book examines the apartheid through the economic spectrum and shows that South Africa's system of exploitation depends on Western, particularly, British capitalism: "From the economic point of view, South Africa offers advantages to the investor which few other countries do. Only Malaysia offers higher returns on capital. South Africa has also been relatively free—except in the case of the white minority—of the problem of wages rising faster than productivity. This is exactly what apartheid is all about..." How deeply Britain and other Western powers are involved in South Africa and are knowingly making huge profits from the inhuman system can be judged from these figures: British stakes alone in the country amount to more than £1,000m; one third of South African exports come to Britain; nearly 60% of total foreign investment is from sterling area; more than 500 British companies have subsidiaries in South Africa. The case studies of nine leading western companies investing in South Africa e.g. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp., General Motors, Dunlop, British Leylands and Imperial Chemical Industries, further support the point. Only recently the church commissioners sold away their £1.5 m. shares in Rio Tinto Zinc, which with a mere 7.7% of its assets in South Africa made 42% of its total world profits from one South African operation, the Palabora Copper Mine.

The authors with well documented data explode the 'liberal' British business theory of shattering apartheid through prosperity. On the other hand, enormous amount of western capital pumped into South Africa has positively strengthened apartheid. As a result, the African worker is becoming poorer while the whites and the overseas (white) investors are growing richer and richer. "The most spectacular differentials are to be found in the mines, where the ratio of white to black wages was 11.7 to 1 in 1911, and reached 17.6 to 1 by 1966, and by early 1971 was 20.3 to 1." This is despite a steady real growth rate of 5.7% in national income. In manufacturing the ratio of average white wages to black wages in 1966 was £122 to £22. The overall share of national income given to African education is still 0.49%, lower than that in 1953. All that the foreign investment has contributed to, is tightening apartheid and ensuring cheap labour, which the British and western capitalism favours for the consequent high rate of profits: "The levels of skill change, but the cheapness remains". The attitude of the British and others is reminiscent of Lord Dartmouth who back in 1775 when questioned about slave trade said: "We cannot allow the colonies to check or to discourage in any degree a traffic so beneficial to the nation".

**Twilight in China**, by K. P. S. Menon, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, Rs.22.50

India's Agent General in Chungking (September

1943) Mr. K. P. S. Menon was on the formation of the interim Government in 1946 made a full fledged Ambassador. In 1948 he became the Foreign Secretary of India. The present book is a collection of his personal and private letters from China between 1943 and 1948, with a prologue and an epilogue.

### Listing

**A Study of History** by Arnold Toynbee, OUP with *Thames & Hudson*, £8.50 (An abridgement of the original twelve volumes; but re-written by Toynbee and Jane Caplan).

**Population and Social Change**, Edited by D. V. Glass and Roger Revelle, *Edward Arnold*, £7.50. (Historical Demography of the pre-industrial and early industrialising stages of developed societies).

**The Structure of Human Population**, edited by G. A. Harrison and A. J. Boyce, OUP, £7.00.

**Black Men, White Cities: Race, Politics and Migration in the United States 1900-30**, and **Britain 1948-68** by Ira Katznelson, OUP, £3.50.

**White Society in Black Africa: The French of Senegal** by Rita Cruise O'Brien, *Faber & Faber*, £3.50. (Of the continuing French Connection; of economic and military dependence, cultural servility; and the precarious balance between the Muslim masses and the ruling Christian minority).

**New Theories of Revolution** by Jack Woodis, *Lawrence and Wishart*, £4.50. (A communist commentary on Fannon, Debray and Marcuse, three "New Left revolutionaries" and their unscientific Marxism).

**800,000,000: The Real China**, by Ross Terrill, *Heinemann*, £2.50. (A travelogue in China, it gives the picture of China after the cultural Revolution and includes interviews with the Premier Chou En Lai).

**Student Power: Problems, Diagnosis, Action**, edited by Alexander Cockburn and Robin Blackburn, *Penguin*, 35p.

**A Critical Survey of the Press, Radio and T.V.** by J. Aronson *International Publishers*, New York. (A Marxist view of the role of the mass-media industry in the US).

**Political Leaders of Latin America**, by Richard Bourne, *Penguin*, 35p.

**The Monetary Sin of the West** by M. Jacques Rueff, *Macmillan*, New York, \$6.95.

**Cost-Benefit Analysis in Administration** by Trevor Newton, *Allen & Unwin*, £4.15.

**A New Introduction to Bibliography** by Phillip Gaskell, *Clarendon Press*, O.U.P., £6.00.

**Indira's India** by P. N. Kheta and Jodh Singh, *ISSD Publication*, Delhi Rs. 40. (Covers the events in Pakistan leading to the creation of Bangladesh, the progress of war, Indo-Pakistan relations since 1947).

**India: Planning for Industrialization** edited by Jagish N. Bhagwati, O.U.P. £6.50

**Pakistan: Industrialization and Trade Policies** by Stephen R. Lewis Jr. O.U.P. £2.95.

**Your Child and Religion** by Johanna L. Klink, *SCM Press*, £1.95 (Attempts to show the importance of 'faith' in the lives of children).

## Israel and the Prophecies of the Holy Qur'an by ALI AKBAR

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## Follow-up

### "Of Zionism and Palestine" \*

**From Haven to Conquest—Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948.** Edited by Walid Khalidi, Beirut, 914 pages. \$12.

Since its establishment the Institute for Palestine Studies has issued or sponsored several important publications. The present contribution, edited and introduced with loving care by Professor Khalidi, is a welcome addition to the list. The fat volume comprises eighty pieces, already published but carefully selected and assembled here in a single unit for the first time, together with nine appendices and twenty-two maps.

The anthology seeks to portray the history of Arab Palestine principally from the formulation in 1897 of the Zionist programme for an eventual national state to the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. It is largely the story of British coercion of the Arabs to accept a Jewish national home, post-war American political pressure on an international scale in favour of Zionist ambitions, the Zionist military force that in 1948-49 wrested control of the larger and most fertile areas of Palestine from the Arabs, and finally the conversion of the Arab majority partly into a depressed minority in Israel and largely as refugees outside their homeland.

The volume contains numerous pieces by Zionists and their protagonists. In fact these pieces constitute the largest single group in the volume. By comparison, there is nothing by any Palestinian Arab or indeed any Arab. The Arab case is represented through official reports or Western writers. This imbalance is redressed by the introduction which is a masterpiece of analysis. But one would have preferred a more accurate and appropriate word than 'exodus' (p.xxii) to describe the forceful expulsion or terrorising of the bulk of the Arab civil population. The editor was right to include pieces on Zionist terror during the mandate and on the size of the Zionist forces in 1948. He might have added to the former at least a press report of the mysterious time-bombs that claimed scores of Arab lives in the market places of large towns like Jaffa and Haifa, and to the latter, for contrast, the Arab ignorance or gross under-estimate at the time of the strength of their adversary.

The British withdrawal from Palestine on 14 May 1948, described by the editor "as an open invitation for a Zionist take-over of the country", might have been represented also as a constitutional mistake of great magnitude, and not simply as an abdication of military responsibility. Britain spent the greater part of the period of the mandate coercing the Arab majority, often in armed revolt, to accept foreign immigrants and all the while denying self-government to the Arabs because of opposition by the Jewish minority. Why, in all law and justice, Great Britain never thought it was her duty to force the minority to accept majority rule in a unitary, democratic state? This is a question no impartial student of the Palestine problem can avoid asking.

Mr. Khalidi's liberal mind hopes that through liberal Jews "a bridge may yet be built between perhaps the two closest peoples on earth—the Arabs and the Jews." Magnes and his associates raised such hopes during the period of the mandate but who among the Zionist leaders ever took them seriously? Who in Israel now would listen to like-minded men if they at all existed?

L.A.

\* "From Haven to Conquest" was reviewed earlier in *Impact* No. 6, 13—26 August 1971.

## Letters

### Subcontinent — the tangle and the triangle

A statement has been attributed to me that 'If I were Indira Gandhi I would not have delayed an attack on Pakistan'.

This is part of a slander campaign against me, and I find it exceedingly difficult to reply to the charges levelled against me from time to time because of the continuous interception in Pakistan of the letters and newspapers that are sent to me by my family.

The sentence which forms a part of my statement before Hamoodur Rahman Commission has been torn out of context from what I had actually stated. Referring to the military action taken by Indira Gandhi in East Pakistan I had said that her motives were political and not humanitarian, because and if she was really keen to save human lives she should have acted much earlier than she actually did.

Indira Gandhi wanted to destroy the two nation theory by creating such bitterness and hatred between the two wings of Pakistan so that they reached a point of no return in their relationship.

In this, she was assisted unwittingly by Gen. Yahya Khan. She is being assisted now, deliberately and knowingly by Mr. Bhutto and by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman both of whom in fact are depending on her for their survival. I am strengthened in this belief by something that I heard from Sheikh Mujib when I met him in London recently. Sheikh Mujib told me that by God he was not standing in the way of the return of the Pakistani prisoners. He said that Mr. Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi had an understanding that prisoners would not be returned by her until such time as he (Mr. Bhutto) could stabilize his position and gather support to be able to make political concessions to her on Kashmir and other issues. Mrs. Gandhi wants Mr. Bhutto to remain in power so that he may be able to deliver the goods he has promised. Sheikh further told me that Indira wanted him not to say or do anything which would undermine Mr. Bhutto's national or international position and she would be able to get Bangladesh a large share of the assets. On the question of recognition of Bangladesh, strangely enough, the Sheikh's position was quite different from what is commonly understood. The Sheikh said that the recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan would weaken his position in relation to India and throw him completely at Indira Gandhi's mercy. He was avoiding meeting Mr. Bhutto because Mr. Bhutto was too keen to recognise Bangladesh and such a meeting would inevitably lead to recognition. Otherwise he is in full contact with Mr. Bhutto. In my presence he received a telephone call from Mr. Bhutto in the Claridges Hotel, London.

I have no doubt that Mr. Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi are both equal partners in a conspiracy to bury the two nation theory. Mr. Mujib is a partner to it on account of his helplessness and fear of losing power. During my talk with Sheikh Mujib I put this question to him, that if you do not believe in the two nation theory then why do you have Bangladesh and West Bengal separate. Why do you want to destroy the two nation theory as far as Pakistan is concerned but to maintain it by keeping (the separate entities of) West Bengal and Bangladesh. He could not answer this question. He promised that he will try to create a suitable climate after his return to Dacca and give a statement that separation of the two wings was brought about by the military junta and they could re-join if the Bengalis have the assurance of a fair deal. I doubt if Sheikh will live up to his promise and have the guts to act on his personal convictions.

**MALIK GHULAM JILANI**  
Secretary,  
Pakistan Istiqlal Party

London W.1.

### Ataur Rahman Interview

This refers to Mr. Ataur Rahman's interview (*Impact*, Vol. 2:8).

There is nothing wrong in feeling proud in being truly independent. But those who know Mr. Ataur Rahman as a sober and cool-headed politician are surprised at his unqualified acceptance of Bangladesh independence which is nothing but Mrs. Gandhi's grace.

Mr. Ataur Rahman must be aware of the background and causes leading to the independence of East and West Pakistan, and that this was in face of Hindu opposition and British hostility. Unfortunately for history, none of the two parties since relented from its negative attitude towards that non-nationalist Muslim state. India's subsequent and overt concern on the freedom and rights of the Bengali Muslims should blind none as to her real long-term aims and interest. The colossal rampage of Bangladesh in the wake of her 'liberation' by the Indian army is admitted by Mr. Ataur Rahman himself, but he fails to draw the right conclusions.

The East Pakistanis suffered much injustice in Pakistan, but one can very well see that Bangladesh is no liberation. However, as a Bengali Muslim, I must say that Mrs. Gandhi or any other outside power is not the problem; the problem is our own leadership—its lack of frankness and sagacity.

SYED AHMAD

London, W.2

### Festival of Islam

I hope it's not late to add one's support and gratitude to the organisers of the last year's Festival of Islam; they did so much to contribute their share in promoting a degree of understanding for Islam and Islamic culture in an otherwise misunderstood or half-understood situation.

I entirely agree with Mr. Paul Keeler (*Impact*, Vol:2:8) for the need now to follow it up and try to present "a correct and enlightened view of the Muslim world". To do this Muslims too should try to share the responsibility, and since there is some time at our disposal, our can help the 1976 festival become a far greater success and a more planned affair by establishing volunteer committees at various levels in the U.K., Europe, America and elsewhere. These committees can play a great role not only in raising funds and generating grass-root support but in pooling ideas, experience and talents so essential for such a truly noble and important undertaking.

DR. A. H. BHATTI  
DR. J. H. QURESHI

Wolverhampton, England

### Congratulations and Bad News!

Congratulation to you for your reports on Iran in the recent issues of *Impact*. The situation continues to be as bad as you reported; the latest victim, the 19-year-old member of the Organisation of Combatants of the People of Iran, OCPI, Mehdi Rezaei, was executed on 7th September after a summary trial in camera.

To hear that the International Islamic News Agency Conference had accepted "the generous offer" made by PARS, the National News Agency of Iran to provide "the necessary editorial and technical personnel" etc., is really a bad news. The media in Iran particularly PARS, is under direct supervision of SAVAK which in turn is run, as is well-known, by the Americans and Israelis.

H. VAFA

London, E.1.

## "Splendid achievement without our being aware of it"

*Impact* report on London's new Muslim Student Centre

The opening of the Muslim Student Centre and Hostel at 38 Mapesbury Road, London, NW2, which was reported in the last issue came after several years of planning and effort.

The setting up of the Centre and Hostel came as a result of the acute need felt by Muslim students in this country. In 1965, the Federation of the Students Islamic Societies in the United Kingdom & Eire (FOSIS) at its second annual conference in Manchester passed a resolution to study the possibility of setting up a centre and hostel in London to cater for the needs of Muslim students. A Hostel Fund was established and later the Muslim Student Trust was formed to be fully responsible for the project and to look after the wider interests of students in this country. The Trust is a legally constituted body and registered with the Charity Commissioners as a charitable organisation.

It is interesting that one of the early objections to the setting up of a hostel was based on the fact that the FOSIS in its early years could not find even a room and the finance to pay for it. Was it not being too unrealistic then, it was asked, to aim at a hostel costing a few thousand pounds? But these objections were overridden and the slow and often anxious process of collecting funds began. Donations from individuals were sought, collections were made on Eid days, and some students even worked during the summer holidays and donated their entire wages to the project. The fund raising campaign was given a boost by His Majesty King Faisal who, during his official visit to Britain in May 1967, gave a generous donation of £20,000.

In 1970, after a long search during which some of the worst aspects of the London property market were revealed, the present building was purchased. The extensive conversion of the building, which was previously arranged into two flats, into a hostel was then put underway. At every stage of the planning and the conversion the local borough authorities were kept completely informed and their approval sought. There was some local resistance to the hostel being put up in a residential area but these were overruled mainly because of the Trust's openness in dealing with the authorities.

The conversion work was begun with very little funds in hand even though more than £15,000 were needed. The plunge was taken partly on the basis of several different promises of help which were made by certain individuals and authorities. There was the feeling that those in a position to help out have been deterred from doing so because so many other projects, including mosques, remain unfinished or never got off the ground. It was felt that once people could see that work was being done, they would be more prepared to help. This reasoning obviously did not hold and the Trust soon found itself in difficulty and very short of funds. An appeal for emergency funds was well responded to by the Muslim students and members of the Muslim public who advanced interest-free loans and donations amounting to well over £7,000.

The Centre and the Hostel was completed in April 1972 and from then onwards started taking in residents, receiving guests and housing the offices of the Trust, the FOSIS and *The Muslim*. Its opening has come at a time when the housing accommodation of students especially in London has become an acute problem. There are definitely not enough housing places. Many students are forced to take ill-equipped and unhealthy "digs" and to compete for the extortionate and spiralling rents charged by landlords. For new students and specially those from abroad the shock of the accommodation situation often leads to depression

of the first order. The situation has never been so bad in London and this is partly why the project of the Muslim Student Hostel is seen to be so important.

The facilities provided compare with the best that other hostels have to offer although they are on a small scale. The provision of hostels and facilities for Muslim students is one of the best contributions that can be made for the benefit of the community. This is why at the opening ceremony, Mr. Salem Azam, Minister at the Saudi Arabian Embassy, expressed the hope that the Trust would set up more Muslim student centres all over Britain. He stressed that Islam was a religion of unity and justice and hoped that the Centre would be able to promote these qualities. He then announced a further donation from King Faisal of £11,000 to the project. To mark the official opening of the Centre, Mohamed Salleh Akram, a student from Malaysia, called the *addan*. Other guests at the opening included diplomats from Muslim countries and the British and Muslim press. Mr. Kemal Rifaat, the ambassador of Egypt, hoped that the Centre would contribute to the unity of Muslims not only among students in Britain but also among non-students all over the world. The Deputy High Commissioner for Kenya, Mr. A. O. Fakhri, expressed his admiration for the "splendid achievement" which happened "without our being aware of it". Mr. Abdulaziz al-Turki, the Cultural councillor at the Saudi Arabian embassy, said that His Majesty King Faisal was taking a great interest in the project and had instructed him "to follow up the contributions that His Majesty's government has made and to keep in touch with the activities and developments of the Centre". His Excellency the Raja of Mahmudabad, the Director of the Islamic Cultural Centre, London, congratulated the Trust and the Muslim students on their "solid achievement" and expressed his confidence that, with this quality of Muslim youth, the future of the Muslim community was very bright indeed.

For the future, the usefulness of the new project would perhaps be greater felt as a centre for Muslim activity. Already many visiting Muslims—lecturers and others, have been received at "The Hostel", as the place is now commonly known. Receptions and film shows have been held for newly arrived Muslim students; there have been wedding receptions, classes to teach English to 'immigrants' and special activities during Ramadan. Non-resident students also use the common room, and library facilities and not infrequently enjoy the friendliness and hospitality of the residents and the warden.

## Washington Council of Imams for N. America

### IMPACT REPORT

The Islamic Centre, Washington, has made a proposal to set up a Council of Qualified Imams in North America. As Islam is left to drift without effective leadership in the United States and Canada many self-made reformers and educators exploit this situation and wrongly associate racism, militarism or ultra-nationalism with Islam. Also, the American news media regularly brings false accusations against Islam. The Council will seek to redress the media mis-information about remarks against Islam.

The Director of the Islamic Centre, Dr. Muhammad Abdul Rouf, has called a three day meeting of qualified Imams on 12, 13 and 14 December to be held in Washington and the agenda includes discussion on ways of setting up the Council, basis of determining unified dates of important Muslim occasions and unified curriculum and textbooks for week-end schools, feasibility of establishing a 'full-fledged' Muslim school and, the best way of helping newcomers to Islam.

## An Islamic Centre for Ireland

### IMPACT REPORT

The Muslim community in Dublin numbers approximately 300 and comprises of residents and students from Malaysia, South Africa, Middle East and East Africa. Since 1958, the community has been depending on the courtesy of the welfare organisations and colleges to hold prayers, seminars and meetings. The demands and the needs of the community, however, require the establishment of a proper Islamic Centre in Dublin. The Dublin Islamic Society has accordingly launched a project to establish such a Centre in Dublin. The Society, the only Islamic organisation in Ireland, is registered as a benevolent society under the Friendly Societies Act of 1896.

The project is estimated to cost between £25,000—£30,000. A fund raising campaign directed primarily at Dublin Muslims has thus far yielded £4,000 and a further £10,000 were collected from South Africa. However, with the phenomenal increase in the cost of houses due to inflationary tendencies (Estate Agents quote 10% annual increase). The D.I.S. (P.O. Box 548, Rathmines Post Office, Upper Rathmines Road, Dublin 6) has appealed for funds from outside Dublin.

The plans for Islamic Centre are very modest. D.I.S hopes to purchase a house in an area convenient to Muslims, and convert it to incorporate a prayer hall with ablution facilities, a library and a meeting room.

## Suit in the U.S. Court

A suit has been filed in the US Federal District Court, Washington, to end the tax-exempt status of the United Jewish Appeal and United Israel Appeal Fund. The seven Arab and American plaintiffs claim the exemption violated the US law on four counts: (1) control over the use of funds does not reside in the US (2) the funds are used for political and ideological purposes and contribute to racial prejudices (3) the funds are contributed to agencies of a foreign government and (4) the exemption violated the equal protection clauses of the US Constitution.

● **The Islamic Society of Greater Houston, Texas** is broadcasting 'Religion on the Line' every Sunday at 9.30 p.m. on KXYZ Radio AM-1320 and 'Afro-Asian Cultural Caravan' on Saturdays at 4.00 p.m. and 'Religious Programming' on Sundays at 10.00 a.m. on KPFT Radio FM-901. Both set of programmes are hosted by Dr. Zafar Taqvi, the editor of society's magazine *Voice of Islam*.

● **The Muslim Students' Association of US and Canada** (North-Eastern Section) organised a leadership Training Camp at Takoma Park, Maryland.

### Land donated for Mosque in Seoul

The Korean government has donated a 1.24 acre piece of land for the construction of a mosque in Seoul to the Korean Muslim Federation (I.P.O. Box 2865, Seoul, Korea). The Federation plans to send delegations to Muslim countries for the raising of funds. When built, this would be the first mosque in Korea.

### IN THE NEWS

**Yakub Kediwala** fined £5 by a Blackburn Magistrate for withdrawing his daughter from a co-educational school. **Pakistan Welfare Association**, (Hounslow, Middlesex, office bearers: E. A. Siddiqui (President), S. M. Tirmizi (Secretary), S. I. Zaidi (Treasurer) and twelve others. Mrs. N. A. Naquib, visiting Lecturer, Child Health, Manchester University.

● An agreement has been signed between Morocco and the Netherlands on social security benefits for Moroccan workers in Holland.

**Pakistan Welfare Association, Wembley** (Middlesex) which started Arabic classes for Muslim children last June now proposes to add 'Islamic Studies' to its teaching programme. The students are taught Arabic with the view to prepare them for the 'O' level examination of the London University. This also enables students to read the Qur'an.

**Pakistan's Amended Nationality Act** enabling Pakistanis in Britain to hold both Pakistani and British citizenship is expected to come in to force early next year.

**Kul Bartaniya Anjuman-i-Taraqqi-i-Urdu** (10 Westgate Terrace, London, SW10) has invited entries for an Urdu short-story evening proposed to be organised shortly by the Anjuman.

**Hounslow Mosque Appeal:** The trustees of the Hounslow Jamia Masjid have appealed for donations for the proposed mosque and school for Hounslow area. Donations to 'Hounslow Jamia Masjid', A/C No. 80496014, Barclays Bank Ltd., Bath Road, Hounslow, Middlesex.

**The Ladies' Islamic Circle** organised an Eid 'get-together' and an exhibition of photographs of Islamic countries on 12 November at the Muslim Students Centre and Hostel, NW2.

**The Khilafat-e-Rashida Movement** in London has decried the expressed intention of the Pakistan authorities to recognise Bangladesh. The KRM believes that despite barriers, the people in the two wings of Pakistan are one, and efforts should be made to realise that unity instead of putting a final seal to the present split.

## Eid in London

### IMPACT REPORTER

Muslims in Britain have established a tradition to have Eid-ul-Fitr on two days; Eid this year was celebrated on 7 and 8 November. In cosmopolitan London one can find Muslims from almost any country. Eid congregations provide one of the best occasions to see the racial harmony of Islam in action. At the Islamic Cultural Centre, where Eid was celebrated on 7 November, one could easily pick out a dozen nationalities from the 5,000-plus strong congregation. Unfortunately, rains did not allow the participants to stay after the prayers and to meet each other. Arrangements, insufficient as usual did not help very much either. The fact that the turn-out was far greater than planned also added to the confusion. Still, it did not prevent many from enjoying the spirit of Eid.

Speaking weatherwise, those who celebrated Eid on 8 November were much better off. At East London Mosque congregations were held at hourly intervals starting at 8 a.m.; due to increased number of participants a further congregation had to be held at 11.30 a.m. About 3,000 Muslims are estimated to have prayed at this mosque. At Waltham Forest, a Council Hall, designed to hold a thousand people, had to take a double 'shift'. Prayer halls were also packed to capacity in Balham, Cricklewood, Barking, Wembley, Forset Gate and Woking and several other places. Eid prayers were also held at the London University and Malaysia Hall. (The latter also had a programme of lectures and exhibition of Islamic books and architecture.)

At several places, the Eid prayers followed Eid re-union programmes most of which were held during the week-end.

# news brief • news brief • news brief • news brief • news brief

**BANGLADESH.** Awami League Secretary, Zilur Rahman, said the bonds of friendship between Bangladesh and Russia will continue to grow despite malicious propaganda by the imperialist agents and the ultra revolutionaries. ● Six Bangladesh Youth Leaders attended the World Working Youth Conference in Moscow. ● Communist Party Leader, Moni Sing, said imperialist agents and the anti-social elements were trying to destroy the sovereignty of Bangladesh. ● Maulana Bhashani called on the government to take steps against secret murders in the country. ● Red Cross officials said the authorities have failed to provide food supply to 15,000 Biharis in Saidpur.

**CHINA.** A Moscow Broadcast in French for Africa said that China had always pretended to be the most loyal friend of the African people, but in fact it never has been. At the UN it refused to support action to implement the Decolonisation Declaration. Although the Chinese Press tried to deny that they existed, China's trade relations with Rhodesia were well known. **EGYPT.** Haykal said, he recently spent five days in London and what he heard about the EEC Paris meeting's attitude to the Middle East is not comforting.

**INDIA.** "Cheetah", the first light-weight multi-role helicopter manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics, completed test flights and will soon be handed over to the Air Force. ● Since the end of Bangladesh war India has received arms orders worth about £2.7m. She now aims at an arms export target of more than £5m a year. ● All schools and colleges in Assam closed *sine die* with effect from 6 November. The Student Union had issued a call for a state-wide strike on the language issue. ● Foundation was laid on 16 October of the Indian Institute of Islamic studies in Delhi. Hakim Abdul Hamid, President of the Institute said the project will be executed in two phases, each lasting five years and is estimated to cost £4m. ● The Muslim World League, Mecca, condemned the recent enactment designed to curb the autonomy of the Aligarh Muslim University. **INDONESIA.** The Director of State Islamic Institute submitted a draft of Muslim Marriage Bill to the Minister of Religion. ● The cabinet decided to stop Eid bonus to its Muslim employees. ● Relations with East Germany are to be raised to Embassy level.

**IRAN.** In a Navy Day speech, the Shah said: "Three or four years ago, I only thought of the defence of the Persian Gulf . . . but world events compelled (us) to think of the Oman sea. And again we are compelled to accept that the sea adjoining Oman sea—Indian Ocean—does not recognise borders. (As for) Iran's security, I will not state how many kilometers we have in mind". He said the naval strength will be increased many-fold. Iran decided to establish diplomatic relations at Embassy level with the United Arab Emirates.

**IRAQ.** Information Minister denied allegations about the persecution of

Jews in Iraq and said they are Iraqi citizens having the same rights and duties as other Iraqis. ● The Soviet Ambassador made a speech over Baghdad television on the occasion of the 55th Anniversary of the October Revolution.

**ISRAEL.** Mrs. Meir told an Israeli Home Service interview that Russia is not encouraging Egypt to seek peace out of concern for Israel but for its own interest. She does not want to get involved in a war for general reasons. She agreed with the view that Russia does not encourage Egypt to seek peace rather than just prevent it from starting a war. ● Mrs. Meir said Israel's relation with the administered territories will be determined by a political decision if and when there is a possibility of peace. ● Maintenance of occupied territories cost this year £132m, 11 times more than what the Defence Ministry estimated. ● Inaugurating the 13th aircraft industry factory with an investment of £7.5m in Southern Golan Heights, the Industry Minister, Bar Lev said that as long as there are no borders and as long as peace has not been achieved, new factories and settlements will be established in the territories administered by Israel and the reality will be stronger than any theory. ● Debate concluded on the Bill to grant compensation in 15-year instalments beginning in 1975 to about 70,000 Arab residents of East Jerusalem who left in 1948. ● A number of people from Lod and Ramallah arrested on suspicion.

**JORDAN.** The use of unified identity cards for leaving or entering the country has been abolished. Only passports will be used.

**KENYA.** Transport licences will no longer be issued to non-Kenyan operators. Kisumu mayor called on African businessmen to move to the main streets dominated presently by Asians.

**LEBANON.** The Grand Mufti, Shaykh Hasan Khalid, in his Eid al-Fitr sermon demanded that the Friday be declared a holiday, equalling the beauty of Muslims sharing the Sunday with the beauty of Christians sharing the Friday.

**LIBYA.** Addressing the Eid congregation, Col. Qadafi announced plans to establish seven desalination plants in the republic. He said Arab unity will be a source of strength for ourselves and for Muslims. We do not fear big Powers because God is greater than them, Qadafi said. We opposed Russia when India committed aggression against Pakistan and we did not fear anything because we thought it right.

**MALAWI.** President Banda said no Jehovah's Witnesses will be tolerated here as they allow religious freedom only for its own members and try to confuse and stop people from having any other affiliations in religion, in the Congress Party or Government.

**MALAYSIA.** Malaysia is to establish its first small nuclear reactor to produce isotopes for uses in agriculture and medicine. ● The Malaysian Communist Party clandestine radio "The Voice of Malaysian Revolution" which reflects the views of Peking, broadcast an appeal by the

"Maylayan Fraternal Islamic Party" asking Muslims to support the Communist Party and its liberation army. It said Islam could be used to encourage people to take part in liberation struggle.

**NIGERIA.** General Ejoor denied that there was any plan to demobilise ex-servicemen in the Nigerian forces. North Western State Governor Usman Faruq assured full protection and co-operation to the expatriate officers as long as they abide by government rules and regulations.

**PAKISTAN.** President Bhutto told a conference of Pakistan envoys to Asian countries that he had expected after the dismemberment of Pakistan there might be some change in attitude on the part of the British and other foreign newspapers. He said he did not dispute their right to comment but wondered whether they were entitled to utter complete lies about the situation in Pakistan. ● The government announced the recognition of N. Vietnam, G.D.R. and North Korea and the withdrawal from SEATO. TASS commented that the withdrawal is an indication that the people of the countries of South Asia want to decide themselves on the form of protection of their national interest. ● The current year's Annual Development Plan estimates an investment of Rs.4,150m in the public sector and Rs. 3,200m in the private sector. ● A 3 billion Rupees National Science Foundation is to be established. From 20 December Radio Pakistan becomes a statutory corporation—The Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation. ● Wali Khan said that the new experiment in democracy in Pakistan should be allowed to succeed. ● The Navy is to buy about six British Westland anti-submarine Sea King helicopters, one Sea King costs up to £900,000. ● An information delegation visited Moscow and discussed ways of strengthening relations.

**SAUDI ARABIA.** Project report on the proposed King Faisal Islamic University has been accepted. When established, the University will comprise the two existing Colleges of Jurisprudence and Arabic language, and a new college on "Principles of Religion". Meanwhile six instructors are being sent to Al-Azhar to obtain Masters and doctorates. At present there are 36 Islamic institutes in Saudi Arabia of intermediate and secondary level.

**SOUTH YEMEN.** Committees to prepare and supervise census in the country have been appointed.

**SUDAN.** President Numayri told the Sudanese Women's Union that the good and educated woman is the common denominator in every wise action and sound behaviour. Members applauded when Numayri said: "Every woman must abide by the teachings of the orthodox religion and its wise ethics . . ." ● Addressing the Socialist Union Central Committee President Numayri said the public service in Sudan was still primitive in character. He said he felt sad when he saw revolution's Ministers, except for a few that can be counted on the fingers, go to sleep most of the day after the works

**SOVIET RUSSIA.** A delegation of Muslims from Guinea visiting Russia said that they had been impressed with what they had seen and the allegations that all Mosques had been destroyed were the invention of the imperialists and colonialists. ● The Congress of Mother Heroines held in Makhachkala discussed the problem of bringing up children in a family. 1,007 Dagestan women have been awarded the title of "Mother Heroine" for bringing-up 10 or more children.

**TURKEY.** The area covered under the Land Reform Scheme is estimated at 32-37m donums of which 13m donums are owned by the State. After nationalisation, the land would be distributed to 534,154 families. ● Under the 3rd 5-year plan TL 10,000m have been allocated for land reform.

**UGANDA.** Lagos Radios said although methods vary, Amin's broad objectives are in main the goals of many other African countries. One may not agree with Amin but in the attitude of the Western powers, there is a lesson also for others.

**YUGOSLAVIA.** Three persons from Skopje were accused of criminal association against the state, recruiting people with the aim of destroying brotherhood and unity of Yugoslavia and causing Macedonia to secede from Yugoslavia, and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Kostadin Dimevski, shop assistant, to five years; Benda Eftimos, journalist and Tjordje Ordev, employee of Kultura Publishing enterprise, to eighteen months.

## PEOPLE

PAIGC Secretary-General Amilcar Cabral, called on President Bumadyan, Abd al-Aziz an-Najjar appointed President of Libyan Supreme Court for one year. *Russian Order of October Revolution* to Louis Aragon, French Communist writer. Abdul Mannan, News Editor *Morning News* Dacca arrested under Collaborator Ordinance. Lord Mountbatten, last Viceroy of India fined £20 for selling adulterated milk. Dr. A. M. Malik last Governor of East Pakistan, awarded life sentence under Bangladesh Collaborator Order

## DIPLOMATS

W. German Ambassador Dr. Hans George presented credentials in Cairo. Hasan Ali Hasan Salem, First Egyptian Ambassador to Muscat. Rashad Nuwaidat new Saudi Ambassador in Hague. Gen. M. Arief new Afghan ambassador to Romania.

## VISITS

Moshe Dayan to USA meeting with Rogers and visit to Pentagon. Sudanese Justice Minister Ahmad Sulayman to Algiers. Soviet Culture Minister Furtseva to Rabat. Yugoslav Federal Executive Council's President Dzemal Bijedic to Iran. President Senghor of Senegal to Nigeria. Spanish F.M. Lopez Bravo to Ankara. President of the Turkish Communal, Chamber Cyprus, Denktas to Ankara. Mauritanian Planning Minister, Cheikh Sidiya, to Peking. Bangladesh President Abu Said Chaudhry to India. Dr. Hatta former Indonesian P.M. to India. Tunisian F.M. Masmoudi to Libya. President Asad to Gulf. Soviet Defence Minister Grechkov to France. Libyan P.M. Maj. Jallud to Paris. McNamara, World Bank Chief to Somalia. Pakistan Finance Minister Hasan to Zurich for back-ache treatment. Pakistan Information Minister Mandana Kausar Niazi & Bangladesh F.M. A. S. Azard to U.K.

## DIED

Mulla Jan Mohammad, 82, on 29 October in Calcutta, Philanthropist and Chief of the Indian Khilafat Committee. Shakir Mahmud, member, Iraqi Communist Party Central Committee in car accident on 13 November. Dr. Adbus Sattar Siddiqui, 87 Indian Arabist on 27 July.