

# impact

international fortnightly

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On the midnight of 14 April 1948 was proclaimed "the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine, to be called *Medinath Israel* (The State of Israel)". That was 24 years ago and since then the State which claimed its *raison d'etre* in the pogrom and persecution of the Jewish people at the hands of the European states, has itself grown into one of the most colonial and tyrannical powers in the history of the human kind. How it came to happen is a sad, unspectacular and oft-repeated story, but what deserves reflection is the now manifest nothingness and frustration surrounding the cause of the Palestine liberation.

The recent tragedy and fiasco at Israel's Lydda airport was just another unfolding of the drift and helplessness of the Palestinian cause. The upshot of the whole episode is the purported statement by one of the girl fidayeen, Therese Halase. Convalescing in an Israeli hospital, in good Hebrew she told Major-General Rehavim Zeevi, the head of Israel's central command: "Now that I have been given Jewish blood (from transfusion) I want to become Jewish... I have always liked Jews. Even El Fatah members said I was partial to Jews." As to the blowing up of the airliner, she said: "We would not have done it. It was just talk". Therese was an Israeli citizen who crossed into Lebanon last November without telling anything to her orthodox Greek parents in Acre and soon found or made her way into the Black September organisation. She went to Rome and then Belgium and did not know what passport she held. It was kept by "Zecharia" and "it is now learnt that an Israeli passport with that name was stolen in London six years ago". All this was disclosed in London's *Jewish Chronicle* (19 May 1972) by its Jerusalem correspondent. Coincidentally the correspondent had reported earlier on 22 April that "Israel is now alert to the possibility of a new terrorist offensive".

The above version could well be a doctored version but apart from the implicit probabilities and the inevitable futility of the exercise (for instance what would have been the position if the plane and the passengers were really blown up?), it was clear that there was something vitally amiss in the situation: lack of thought and lack of leadership!

No doubt the Palestinian situation is a

## Palestine — the burden of liberation

situation of singular deprivation and unparalleled tragedy. For over half a century they have been pushed around and used to their own game by various powers and forces, both native and outside. Much of the confusion, depression and nihilism can be traced back to this sad experience of history.

Except for the Crusader years, Palestine, since the very early period of Muslim history had been a province of Islam. Even during the Frankish rule, incentive and motivation for the liberation struggle came from their sense of being Muslims. Thus whatever the label of the political regimes and the racial complexion of the people, Palestinians felt always as a Muslim people. They had no other entity.

The displacement of the Ottomans from Palestine in 1917 and the subsequent establishment of the British Mandate was related to the Zionist scheme of an eventual take-over of Palestine, but the people of Palestine itself were least involved. The leaders of the revolt had made them believe that their fight was against Turkish misrule and for the establishment of the 'Arab' rights. Arabs had so far been a linguistic and broad cultural entity within the broader milieu of Islam but the logic of this split imposed upon them a kind of nationhood which paradoxically enough has so far stubbornly refused integration and consolidation. The emergence of Israel and the deepening of the Palestinian crisis is an essential concomitant of the phenomenon.

In the years immediately after May 1948, hope was raised that the Royal Arab might soon be able to overcome the tiny impudent Israel. Nothing like that happened and then came the Republican era.

The Palestinian cause acquired greater emphasis, there were talks on the one hand of preparation, consolidation and liberation, and on the other of negotiation, rehabilitation and repatriation. Little did any one realise or speak up about the precise implications of projecting the Palestinian cause as a cause of refugees seeking food, shelter and relief or that

of Israel agreeing to take back those who were willing to return and compensate the rest. It might have been realistic but it also amounted to offering recognition in exchange for repatriation and if that was so all that talk of war and liberation had no sense or meaning as far as the Palestinian people were concerned.

The disaster of June 1967 shook both the Arab governments and the Palestinian people. The Arabs could no more pretend ability to liberate, and found it expedient to throw it all upon the Palestinians themselves. Slowly and imperceptibly, the problem transformed from being an Arab to a Palestinian problem. The Palestinians who were aroused first as Arabs were told that in fact they were Palestinians and more or less on their own.

This verily is the Palestinian predicament and in a way explains why leadership and clear thought are so much wanting in their situation. But it only explains and does not justify.

Whatever may be the constraints, the odds, the handicaps and the mitigating aspects of the background situation, it is obvious that the liberation movement has so far failed to show progress on the very liberation scale. Even if one ignored that, their contribution could be measured in terms of attrition caused to Israel and/or arousing the world sympathy to their cause. But the showing on both the counts is negative. It has not been possible either to outstretch the Israeli economy or keep the merit of the cause alive. On the contrary, because of their sub-effective or hyper-effective nature, the operations have improved Israeli resilience and confidence. As regards, keeping the issue alive, it would seem that the result has either been an over-projection or trivialisation, counter-productive in any case. This did give an initial elation but produced an ultimate frustration.

The outlook of the most Arab states has certainly not been the same as that of the Palestinians liberation. All except Algeria accept the 23 November 1967 resolution of

## Survey

## ● THE VIETNAM CONVERGENCE

### Vietnam, the diabolical war

Mr. Nixon's defence of his Vietnam policy is a rigorous one. The United States in public and private negotiations, has offered to de-escalate the fighting and follow this by a ceasefire with a deadline for withdrawal of all American forces. It has also offered new elections which would be internationally supervised with the Communists participating both in the supervisory body and in the elections themselves. President Thieu has offered to resign one month before the elections and an exchange of prisoners of war would take place in a ratio of ten Vietnamese prisoners for every one American prisoner.

The North Vietnamese have rebuffed all these offers and refused to negotiate an end to the war and instead stepped up its military offensives in the South. In the face of this massive invasion three courses of action were open: immediate withdrawal of all American forces; continued attempts at negotiations; or decisive military action to end the war. The first course of action is the one which many Americans favour. This would be a very easy choice because he did not send over one-half million Americans to Vietnam but in fact brought 500,000 men home from Vietnam since he took office. Abandoning the commitment to Vietnam in this manner would mean turning 17 million South Vietnamese over to Communist tyranny and terror and leaving hundreds of American prisoners in Communist hands with no bargaining leverage to get them released. America would continue to pursue negotiations but, after four years of talks with North Vietnam refusing to negotiate anything but an imposition of a communist regime on South Vietnam, relying solely on negotiations would give an intransigent enemy the time to press on, on the battlefield. There was only one way to stop the killing and that was to keep the weapons of war out of the hands of the North Vietnamese. Hence the mining of North Vietnamese ports.

Observers see this latest American strategy, however, as an escalation of the war, fraught with great risk and of dubious value. Indeed the mining of Haiphong may have little effect on the war but the policy itself presents minimal risks to the Americans in Vietnam. With other American policies and measures like the Vietnamisation of the war effort and the development of automated battlefields, the tendency not to actually commit American lives in Vietnam reflects a lack of true faith on the part of the Americans in their "commitment" to Vietnam.

Maybe this is born of the feeling, however much there is refusal and unwillingness to admit it, that American interven-

tion in Vietnam and to a lesser extent in various other parts of Indo-China was a miscalculation and from there on absurdity followed absurdity. It has been some years now that Americans rejected the war as an important goal in American life and since the country no longer sees its future invested in Vietnam. Apart from the POWs America has no real interests in Vietnam and this fact is sharpened by the assertion that South Vietnam is useless as an ally—brought out by the manifest failure of the Vietnamisation policy. American bombings and the meeting of carnage with more carnage is thus seen as part of a mindless and diabolical response in a land where "everything that moves is enemy" belying Nixon's assertion that the United States in Vietnam "has exercised a degree of restraint unprecedented in the annals of war". The revelations of the Pentagon papers on Vietnam and the My Lai massacres underline the amorality and brutality of the Americans in Vietnam.

The continuance of the Hanoi war effort depends very much on arms support from the Soviet Union which, despite all its coming to terms with the capitalist world, believes in the expansion of communist power by means of wars of national liberation. It has been noted that over the years the Russians have grown more cautious and more selective, about the sort of revolutionary movements they are willing to give help to and want to be reasonably certain that their clients are going to succeed. America, on the other hand, no longer sees any communist led or supported insurrection or movement as a direct challenge to its way of life and to its former pretensions to police the world.

It is this mark of realism on both sides which has allowed the Nixon visit to Moscow to take place and which casts a sinister and callous shadow on the very painful and violent war in Vietnam. Both sides have far much more to gain from each other than support for one or the other sides in the Vietnam conflict can ever bring. As a footnote to this, in Nixon's justification of American policy in Vietnam he remarked that "an American defeat in Vietnam would encourage this kind of aggression all over the world—aggressions in which smaller nations, armed by their major allies could be tempted to attack neighbouring nations at will—in the Middle East, in Europe, and other areas world peace would be in grave jeopardy." It is a pity that there is no indication that this dictum would ever be put under scrutiny in the massive military support that America gives to Israel—the "small" nation in the Mideast.

the Security Council which means *status quo ante* and recognition of Israel. The liberation rejects the resolution. In order to be able to operate in Israel the fidayeen need bases in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Since this means inviting punishment or even Israeli occupation of their territories, these States find their national interests to be in conflict with those of the fidayeen. So the fidayeen stand virtually expelled from Jordan. In Syria they cannot make a single move without the approval of the authorities and in Lebanon it is just clinging to a fragile existence. A liberation priority—the Arab Front or the Israeli Front—was the logical thing but no tactical decision seems evident. In theory, the fight seems to be going on on both the fronts but practically on neither.

On strategy the movement seems to have based itself more on inapplicable and fashionable premises than on the realities of its own situation. A parallel is drawn with the Vietcong and the Vietnam. Vietcong have an inviolable operational base which practically extends to the full depth of China and Soviet Russia. Unlike Israel, here America does not find itself obliged to cross into North Vietnam. In the Middle East, Russia is committed to preserving the territorial integrity of Israel but in Vietnam her commitment is qualitatively different. Another fallacy, one suspects, lies in seeking parallel with the emigre governments, the allies had nurtured during the Second World War and which they finally got seated after the defeat of Germany but this again is a romantic misreading of the world situation.

The movement seems also to base its stipulations and projections on experience of the French and the Russian revolutions. It is perhaps felt that as Israel proceeds in its colonial and exploitative ways, it is bound to lead to an automatic revolt situation beyond any Louis or Czar to contain. But this ignores one important element of social change dynamics: the forces of change have to be active and present in the actual battlefield. Notwithstanding the European experience, a *true* revolution is basically a local phenomenon. It is neither imported from without nor transplanted, it evolves and grows in the local situation. As it is, the movement does suffer from a certain degree of exoticity and because of its emigre nature. Tomorrow or day after it has to be where the battle is.

All the dilemmas and predicaments of the Palestinian are not of their own making but none the less it is *their* responsibility to get out of the present state of confused thinking and muddled planning. Rightly or wrongly history has thrown the burden of their liberation on their own shoulders and now it would be for them to carry it to the final victory and not allow it to be hijacked.



# Survey

## ● JERUSALEM-DESTROYING HISTORY ● DJIBOUTI & MADAGASCAR



### Jerusalem: the unholy skyline

A five-star hotel of 24 or 26 storeys is proposed to be built on expropriated Arab land in the north eastern suburbs of the Old City. The hotel is to be built by the Hyatt House Corporation of the United States with Pan-Lon Limited as the contractor. It will have 490 rooms and the cost of building will be more than £2m. Despite protests against the scheme, it is expected that approval for building will be a forgone conclusion.

In addition to the ghastly block of flats which the Israelis so hastily erected to accommodate Jewish immigrants displacing the Arab population, the proposed hotel would completely ruin the panoramic view of the city "destroying the cumulative work of thousands of years of history and desecrating one of the treasures of the world" in which the complex of the Haram ash-Shareef with the Dome of the Rock that monument of Islamic art and architecture forming the resplendent centre-piece.

The proposal is one of the continuing Israeli attempts to obliterate the sanctity of Jerusalem and make the place a meeting place for mammon.

Those who oppose the project say that it is against even the Israeli stated policy that in the special area of the Old City and its surroundings "there shall be no compromise in relation to the preservation of its special character, its appearance and its comprising elements." But Israeli deeds frequently do not match up to their assertions. If the hotel is built, it would show that the Israelis have not really recanted (as there were some indications) after the world-wide protests against the apartment blocks and that there is a sort of unholy urge to destroy the spiritual

and religious character of Jerusalem.

### Vive l'Empire

The ending of British control in Aden and the birth of the independent People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1967 created new problems for Europeans in the western Indian Ocean area. Aden used to be a port of great strategic importance for the British in particular and was a key point in European naval and commercial strategy. With South Yemen from its inception extending its hospitality to the Soviet Union, European interests had the problem of finding a counterweight to Aden which would enable them to compete for advantages in the Mediterranean-Indian Ocean axis, especially if and when the Suez Canal opens.

They may have found this in European owned and operated Djibouti which is under direct French colonial control. Comprising just 8,500 square miles of desert type land in Africa's eastern horn, Djibouti is a spot which the French are very unwilling to give up. It lies just across the straits from Aden, sandwiched between Ethiopia and Somalia both of which countries covet it but for different reasons.

Somalia lays claim to the region on historical grounds — the existing boundaries between Kenya, Somalia and Djibouti being the result of an artificial and arbitrary carve-up by the French and former British and Italian colonial rulers. This carve-up has led to much and continuing bitterness in the whole area. In the whole of Djibouti the predominant group is the Issas who have language and other affinities with the Muslims of Somalia. These Issas form the main opposition to French control. The French meanwhile has been steadily building up a counterweight to the Issas from the other main indigenous group—the largely nomadic Afars who are politically and economically less sophisticated than the urban Issas

and more easily satisfied with colonial rule. In the referendum of 1966 the French rigged the elections in such a way as to make for an Afar and European majority and so perpetuate French control.

Afar and Somali nationalists' claim to the area are made more difficult to attain because of Ethiopia's interests. Ethiopia must have the area in friendly hands especially since its only outlet to the sea is inside Eritrea, the rebellious north-western province which it annexed and where a liberation front is fighting for independence.

French officials state that they would never fight to stay in Djibouti. But Djibouti with its deep water port and its commanding position on the Red Sea offers such enormous potential leverage strategically and commercially that it is difficult to see French and European interests abandoning the area lightly.

For the moment the situation is being kept very quiet but one other area in the Indian Ocean where the French are very much involved erupted two weeks ago. It is the huge island of Madagascar where the government of Philibert Tsiranana has been facing renewed onslaughts. In one violent weekend at the beginning of May some 35 people were killed and many more injured. Although Tsiranana's policy of cooperation with South Africa is a focal point of opposition, it is dislike of the French presence on the island which is behind much of the students' and workers' ire. There are about 33,000 French civilians on the island and another 4,000 soldiers and Foreign Legionnaires who help to keep the regime in power and control much of the country's economy. The Madagascans remember too the great revolt of 1947 in which the French were responsible for killing as many as 80,000 people.

# Survey

● SYRIA & IRAQ ● PAKISTAN PROHIBITION ● ARAB FUNDS

## Softening up Syria and Iraq

On April 15 the Beirut paper *Al Muharrir* which is known to have close ties in Syria reported a "wave of dissatisfaction in Syrian official and popular quarters" with the Iraqi treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union (See *Impact* No. 23). The paper said then that Syria had turned down several Soviet offers for a similar treaty recently and that such treaties contributed to "inter-Arab tensions".

Almost exactly a month later Syria was to sign a pact with the Soviet Union following the visit to Damascus on May 13 of Soviet Defence Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko. No details of the pact has been released but it is reasonable to assume that it is not as far-reaching as the treaty of friendship which both Egypt and Iraq have with the Soviet Union. Syria, it is said, is still reluctant to conclude such a treaty.

The Soviet News Agency *Tass* in a despatch from Damascus said that the Soviet-Syrian agreement was on military matters and observers believe that under it the Soviet Union would provide new equipment to strengthen Syria's small navy and growing air force. If the offers of naval help are confirmed what would be significant to look out for is Soviet assistance in building new bases on Syria's Mediterranean coastline which could give the Soviet Union a greater naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean.

Whatever the specific terms of the treaty, the invigorated Soviet activity in the areas could be seen as a general policy of 'softening up' the Middle East to get greater and even predominant control in the area, not merely for economic and strategic gains but in the ideological sphere as well. In this context it is interesting to note that the National Front which President Asad recently formed includes two members from the Syrian Communist Party—Khaled Bakdash and Daniel Nehmah.

Similar developments have taken place in Iraq following the Iraq-Soviet accord. In a cabinet reshuffle on May 14, President Bakr dropped three ministers and swore in five. Of these five two are communists. It is the first time that Communists have assumed cabinet posts. This has come after the Iraqi Ba'ath party, under Soviet pressure, professed its readiness to form a National Front with the Communists.

## Pakistan, one dry Frontier

Mufti Mahmood's swearing in as the Chief Minister of the NW Frontier province in Pakistan is perhaps a record in that it is for the first time in the post-independence history of the sub-continent that an *alim* (religious scholar) has come to occupy a high political office in the government. The only other *alim* in the category was Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Azad had aligned with the Indian National Congress as against the All India Muslim League and although regarded capable enough to preside over the Congress during the final years of independence struggle, on independence itself, he was given the sinecure portfolio of Education and Culture, a fact which he always resented. Mufti Mahmood's rise to power at the head of a coalition of his own party *Jamiatul Ulama* with the supposedly secular and left-wing National Awami Party of Wali Khan, while reflective of Pakistan's abnormal politics, is both a challenge and an opportunity. By accepting to be the Chief Minister, Mufti Mahmood and his party have taken over a task which would need their utmost in self-application and self-sacrifice. Whether they fail or they succeed would depend on many other factors, some beyond their control but no one should say that they did not know or that they did not try.

A good start has been made in that the manufacture, sale, drinking and serving of alcohol and alcoholic drinks has been banned in the province and a committee is to look into the question of Islamising the provincial laws. This is good but can be regarded only as a token step. Not to say that enforcing prohibition was by any means an easy or a simple task particularly when the other provinces have not so far decided to go along. For the present it is like asking the travellers to follow the rules and pay their fares when a number of seats are also available for free.

Alcohol is prohibited also in parts of India and Bangladesh which are secular states and naturally prohibition in Sarhad should have its own distinctive quality. There was great pertinence in President Bhutto's remarks when he told a British press reporter that he drinks wine and not blood of the people. While drinking wine and blood were equally abominable from the Islamic view point, and though drinking of the former leads to the drinking of the latter, it certainly was no virtue to abstain from alcohol but be an unjust person otherwise. Therefore, the action would need to be backed by other meaningful measures in other departments within

the provincial sphere. Moreover, government in Islam is less gubernatorial and more a matter of honest self-example, and it is here that their success or failure would finally lie.

## Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development

If economic development was a function of capital alone, the Arab world would have become the spearhead of an international development movement. But what it lacks is not capital rather the will to use the God-given resources in an efficient, optimal and equitable way.

For the last four years efforts have been going on to establish the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. Now after a gestation period prolonged because of political differences between the different governments and interests groups, the Fund is expected to start functioning from June 1972. The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development will have an initial capital of £36 million. Dr. Saeb Jaroudi, the Lebanese Minister of National Economy and Tourism has been elected as the first Chairman of the Board of Directors. The chief objective of the Fund would be to assist economic and social development in the entire Arab world through concentrating mainly on inter-Arab schemes. It will provide finance and expertise for projects that could have market beyond their physical locale and as such lead to greater cooperation and integration within the Arab world. The Fund would also try to integrate its activities with the decision-making process in the Arab countries and enlist the support of investors and organisations outside the Middle East.

There is a great deal to learn from development experience in both the developing and the developed countries. As it were, much of the much talked underdevelopment has been caused no less by the manner the various international development agencies are structured and the way they function as a tool of Western political and capitalist interests. Nothing would change in reality if the Arab Fund became another Inter-American or Asian Bank. A late start has its advantages too. Most crucial to the success of the Fund would be the quality and originality of its development strategy and above all its compatibility and mutuality with the social norms of the Arab society.



## KHALIFA KATIB'S TREATISE

## Three questions on science and Islam

M. HAMIDULLAH

Haji Khalifa Katib Chelebi (d. 1069 H.), author of the bibliographical dictionary, *Kashf az-Zunûn*, is a figure of international repute. A Turk, he mastered not only the Arabic and Persian languages, but also Latin (as he himself mentions in his *Kashf az-Zunûn*, s.v. Anûtiqâ). He was a versatile author, and in spite of heavy administrative duties, he always found time to write on subjects of great and general utility. He did not despise the rising Occident of the seventeenth century, even though it did not have the same predominance as in our own times. Haji Khalifa felt that the geography Atlas produced in the west must be made available to Turks, so that they remain abreast of all scientific developments in the world. He translated a good Latin book on the subject as well.

A small tract of his, in Turkish, has just been edited in the Journal of the Institute of Islamic Studies of the University of Istanbul, and merits to be known by a wider circle.

In the introduction to this *Al-Ilhâm al-Muqaddas min al-Faid al-Aqdas* he says: When I was studying astronomy, three questions occurred to my mind. I put them to the Shaikhul-Islam Bahâ'i Efendi. He replied to only one of them, in a manner little satisfactory. So I venture to compile here my own knowledge, according to my own humble lights, and the readers will judge:

1. In the lands of 90° latitude (Poles), where there is a day of continuous six months duration, followed by an equally long night, how should one perform the duties of prayers and fasting?

2. In a hadith the Prophet has predicted that before the end of the earth, the sun will rise from the West. Is that astronomically possible?

3. Is there a place, outside Mecca, where it is permissible to pray in any direction one desires.

In regard to the first question, he first refers to the opinion of former jurists, who have dealt with, though differing, with an allied problem. There are places where the twilight does not disappear until very late in the night or even until dawn i.e. the beginning of the time for the *Fajr* prayers. There is thus no indication of the end of the *Maghrib* and the beginning of the 'Isha. So when should one offer the 'Isha prayer? Halwâni (d. 600H), Burhânul-A'immâ (d. 536H), Zahîrûddin al-Marghînânî (d. 448H) etc. are referred to and Haji Khalifa suggests that when the usual day and night phenomena, i.e. dawn, sunrise, sunset and twilight, etc., are determinable during the course of the twenty-four hours, some other means should be devised to compute the timings for the five obligatory prayers. The continuous presence or absence of the

sun for six months precluded any other possibility, and the blessed Prophet, in the famous hadith on Dajjâl has directed us to do so—for Dajjâl will last on earth for only 40 days, the first of which will be as long as a year, the second as long as a month, the third as long as a week, and the rest like your present days; and when it is as long as a year, do not treat it as one single day but compute.

Haji Khalifa has referred only to jurists. Otherwise, Mas'ûdi (d. 345H) and Birûni (d. 440H) had already described the phenomenon of the long day and long night on poles (cf *at-Tanbih wa'l-Ishrâf* and *Kitâb al-Jamâhir* respectively), though they did not deal with the theological implications which he studied.

However, there are certain other questions as well. Even if one uses the watch for knowing the hour of the day, which time of the sunrise for instance must one adopt: That of the equator? That of Mecca or Medina? That of some other place? The difference is great. Further, even much below the lands of 90° latitude, the problem has to be faced. For:

On 72° North for 85 days from 9 May to 4 August,  
70° North for 72 days from 17 May to 27 July,  
68° North for 52 days from 27 May to 17 July and  
66° North for 17 days from 13 June to 29 June

—the sun never sets, according to the British Almanac. A little below this point, the day may be of 23 hours and say 50 minutes duration, and the night only of ten minutes, within which time the *Maghrib*, *Isha* and *Fajr* prayers must be performed and also in Ramadan the *sahûr* of the fast must be taken.

Haji Khalifa does not show knowledge of the two equinoxes, when even at the poles there is a day of 12 hours and a night also of the same length. He mentions only the five daily prayers but what about Friday? Would it occur only once in 7 years? What about 'Id, Hajj and Zakât, which being annual in nature will happen or be liable only after 354 years? There have been classical jurists who have opined: No sunset, no maghrib prayers; so one need not pray or fast at the Poles. Haji Khalifa refutes this.

Let us add a new argument. Let us send such jurists to the polar province for government service, and tell them: You will get your monthly pay after 30 days, that is in 30 years; you should also eat and sleep only once in our one year, because that will be only one day.

Although these questions have now been disposed of in a more satisfactory manner, it goes to the credit of Kâtib Chelebi to

have taken a 300 year lead.

The second question concerned the rising of the sun from the West. Our author cites a classical astronomer, Taqiuddin ar-Rassâd, to affirm that the axis of the earth which is slanting will continue to become more and more slanting, until in about 91,000 years the true pole will overlap the present equator and in 180,000 years the North Pole will reach the South Pole, and at that moment one would say that the sun is rising from the West.

Yet the argument is not convincing. *First*, because in the Prophetic prediction the changing of the sun's position is only for a few hours: it will rise once from the West and after midday will again set in the West whereafter it will rise and set normally. If the axis goes upside down, it must be a durable change. *Secondly*, if the North Pole goes to where the South Pole is, it is just like the inhabitants of the North Pole going and settling on the South Pole. The rising of the sun from the West, depends not on from which part of the earth we look at it, but on the direction of rotation of the earth i.e., when instead of the present West to East rotation it rotates from East to West. That can take place only when some celestial body, bigger and more powerful, collided with the earth. When that happens, the earth will stop moving and its inhabitants will be thrown out, like when a bus or train stops suddenly. According to the law of gravitation, the earth must fall on a body bigger than itself. Will that be the sun? In the description of the hereafter, the Prophet says: Then the sun will be at a distance of about a lance over our heads, and the heat so intense that our brains will be liquified and boil in our craniums.

The rising of the sun from the West is no more a curiosity. Otherwise when the earth turns on its own axis, its speed at the equator is over 1,600 kilometres per hour, and as one descends towards the poles, this speed decreases. So if one flies, at the equator, say 1,700 kilometres per hour from the East to the West after the sunset, the traveller will soon find the sun rising from the West, because the speed of the plane is faster than that of the sun. Again if one flies after the sunrise in the westerly direction, he will see that the sun is setting in the East.

The third question concerned the antipode of the Ka'ba. To pray inside the building of the Ka'ba, one may turn in any direction: all is *qibla* there. Outside, one takes the shortest possible distance between one's standing place and the Ka'ba. But just at its anti-pode, the Ka'ba is equidistant in all directions. Haji Khalifa places it "between the shores of China and Peru". Since Mecca is at about 21°N of the equator, the antipode will be at the same distance in the south of the equator, more precisely near the Hawaiian islands.



## PAKISTAN

## Experiment in Nation-Building\*

KALIM SIDDIQUI\*\*

It is hardly necessary for me to show that the nation-building effort in Pakistan has so far failed. This has led some commentators to go to the other extremes and say, as David Loshak does, that "Pakistan was never a nation" (1). The implication of Loshak's verdict is that the twonation theory was wrong and that British India should never have been divided. In other words, the claim that is thus made amounts to saying that there was only one nation in British India—the "Indian nation". Logically this does not make sense: If Punjabis and Pathans, on the one hand, and Muslim Bengalis, on the other, are so diverse in their ways as not to form a nation in Pakistan, how can their diversity allow them to become part of a single "Indian nation"? After all, by simply calling them "Indians" rather than "Pakistanis" their diversity does not disappear.

It may be argued that the geographical identity of "India" was the unifying force which was destroyed by the 1947 partition. This is the notion of the "historic unity of India". Hugh Tinker has clearly shown that this concept is no more than a "vision . . . realised in socio-religious terms in the grand design of Hinduism". There is, in fact, nothing "historic" about it. Tinker points out that "the hundred years of British rule formed the only time when India was effectively linked together as an entity" (2). If anyone should have a sense of "historic unity" on the subcontinent, it is the Muslims, for they dominated the subcontinent for several hundred years before they were displaced by the British.

These confusions arise from the habit of thinking of "nations" in terms of geography. This is, of course, the European experience. But is it universal? In my opinion it is not. Hans Kohn says that nationalism ". . . is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness . . ." (3). Geography is relevant to any particular nationalism only if it is the dominant factor in a people's state of mind and consciousness. On the South Asian subcontinent geography has never been such a factor.

The idea of nationalism on the subcontinent is less than a hundred years old. It was imported from Europe by the British and by a handful of "natives" who acquired western education. It first gained wide currency with the formation of the Indian "National" Congress in 1885. Conceptually the idea of nationalism was alien to the subcontinent. This is why the "National" Congress had to be formed by an Englishman encouraged by a British Viceroy, with the express purpose of strengthening the *raj*. If the idea of nationalism had been capable of uniting the people of British India as a whole—that is, if there had been such a thing as "Indian nationalism"—the British would be expected to suppress it. In their history of the "National" Congress, Satyapal and Probosh Chandra, both Hindu authors, point out that the motive behind the founding of the Congress "was not the liberation of India from foreign yoke but to make the British rule strike firmer and surer roots . . ." (4). The British sponsorship of nationalism in India shows that as late as the closing years of the nineteenth century there was no such thing as "Indian nationalism".

If there was no nationalism on the subcontinent, then what was there? The answer is that there were two dominant "cultures" in the geographical entity known as "British India"—Hindu culture and Muslim culture. The Hindu culture had little political content, whereas the Muslim

culture was almost entirely political. The Indian Mutiny of 1857 was, in at least one of its aspects, the revolt of the Muslim political culture against the intrusion of an equally powerful British political culture.

After the abortive Mutiny, Sayyid Ahmad Khan tried to cross the Muslim political culture with British political culture in the hope that the offspring would be largely Muslim in flavour, with the infusion of western culture providing it a degree of political legitimacy in the British *raj*. He perhaps hoped that the apolitical Hindu culture would thus remain subservient to the new, westernised Muslim political culture on the subcontinent.

From the Muslim point of view, Sayyid's analysis was right, and so was the prescription; where he made a mistake was in the strategy he followed. If, while persuading the Muslims to acquire western education, he had also clearly stated his purpose and thrown the Muslims in the politics of the *raj*, the result might have been different. Instead, Sayyid banned Muslims from participation in politics, including participation in the "National" Congress. The chance of Muslim political culture influencing the British-induced political change in the subcontinent was thus lost.

On the other hand, the Muslims who acquired western education did so to such good effect that they began to regard parliamentary democracy of the British type as "Islamic". The western educated Muslim became entirely alienated from the Muslim political culture in British India. The result was that the Muslim League became a party of the westernised Muslims, with little or no following among the general mass of Muslims in British India.

## Popular Participation in Politics

In the first two decades of the twentieth century there was no political framework in which the masses of British India could participate. There were two parties: the largely Hindu "National" Congress and the Muslim League. The Hindu masses of British India, comprising three-quarters of the population, not being Indian "nationalist", took no part in the Congress. The Congress was merely a party of those Hindus who collaborated with the grand design of the British to involve a western educated Indian middle class in legitimising their colonial rule. The Muslim League was also a party of Muslim nobles, landed gentry, and lawyers who merely wanted a share in the patronage bestowed by the British upon their loyal citizens. Neither the Congress nor the Muslim League represented the Hindu or Muslim masses.

It was Gandhi who first realised that there was no such thing as "Indian nationalism" in British India and that the "National" Congress could not be turned into a mass party without religious symbolism. His saintly act of Hindu revivalism and call to *Ramraj* was an open admission that nationalism in India was politically impotent. He was, of course, right. By giving the "National" Congress a Hindu image he immediately turned the tables on the British. To be fair to Gandhi, he also tried the same tactics with the Muslims of British India. His leadership of the Khilafat Movement struck the most sensitive chord in the Muslim political culture on the subcontinent, and Muslims flocked to the Congress in large numbers. For a brief period between 1920 and 1922, Gandhi had mobilised both the Hindu and Muslim masses against the British. This was a negative phenomenon, and inherently so contradictory that it could not last. For, if the Muslims of British India regarded the Caliph of Turkey as their ultimate religio-political authority, to whom they owed allegiance, then they could not possibly agree to live in a Gandhian *Ramraj*. If the Muslims wanted a Caliph, then such a political authority could not

be raised through a Hindu dominated "National" Congress. Indeed, this contradiction led to more Hindu-Muslim conflicts, and the Muslim masses deserted the Congress as soon as the Turks themselves abolished the Ottoman Caliphate.

The Muslims of British India, when they deserted the Congress, did not go into the Muslim League either. They simply went back to their mosques and villages, where they sulked and waited for a new cause to inspire them. In other words, they waited for the Muslim political culture to find expression—a role the Muslim League did not then perform.

## The Pakistan Movement

In the meantime, the Muslim political culture in British India found expression in the poetry and writings of Iqbal. In 1929-30 Iqbal and Rahmat Ali attempted to give it a territorial flavour by calling for one or more Muslim States to be carved out of British India—one of them to be called Pakistan. The Muslim League, however, took no notice of these proposals and remained wedded to a "nationalist" position. Jinnah had been an outstanding exponent of Indian nationalism, which had its roots in English Liberalism. Jinnah and the Muslim League leadership were not products of the Muslim political culture—they were products of western education who regarded nationalism as the ultimate weapon in politics. This is why for over a decade Jinnah ignored Iqbal's precepts and Rahmat Ali's "Pakistan". This also explains the absence of the word "Pakistan" from the Lahore Resolution of 1940. Two years later, when Jinnah was forced to adopt "Pakistan" as the name for the new State he was demanding, he took care to define Pakistan as the "Lahore Resolution" and referred to Rahmat Ali and his friends as "some young fellows in London". This is also why, to this day, official histories of Pakistan and the Pakistan Movement make no reference to Rahmat Ali.

What had happened, of course, was that the westernised Muslims who had been jilted by their westernised Hindu friends in the "National" Congress now found a second "nation" in India—the Muslim nation, with the geographical boundary of Muslim majority areas in British India as their justification for "nationalism". Jinnah then did exactly what Gandhi had done in the 1920s—he shed his Savile Row suits and acquired Muslim symbolism. This new image of Jinnah and the word "Pakistan" immediately appealed to the Muslims. The support for the Pakistan demand was in many cases stronger in those areas of British India where the Muslims were a minority than in areas which were to become Pakistan. This was because the Pakistan demand was perceived as the expression of Muslim political culture which was stronger in areas closer to the former seat of Moghul power than in other parts of British India.

The State of Pakistan, therefore, was a product of the Muslim political culture on the subcontinent as a whole and not merely an expression of territorial nationalism on the part of those who lived in Pakistan areas. Indeed, at the time of partition, in 1947, there was a Congress Government in office in the North-West Frontier Province and a referendum had to be held to decide whether the Pathans wanted to join Pakistan. In Kashmir, the Muslim League had little following, and in the Punjab, Jinnah had had difficulty in dislodging a Unionist-Congress coalition. Territorial nationalism, therefore, was not a basis of the Pakistan State. This fundamental truth about Pakistan was not grasped by the leaders and rulers of Pakistan. They assumed that because the State had been created it would generate its own geographical nationalism. Acting on that false assumption they proceeded to build—if they proceeded to build anything—a European-style nation-State. They

\* Presented to Institute of Commonwealth Studies Seminar "Nation Making and Breaking in Southern Asia" on 16 May 1972.

\*\* Dr. Kalim Siddiqui is a member of *The Guardian* editorial staff and lectures on Behavioral Political Science at University of Southern California's Programme in Britain.



**“The implication is that the two-nation theory was wrong and that British India should never have been divided. In other words, there was only one nation in British India—the “Indian nation”. If Punjabis and Pathans, on the one hand, and Muslim Bengalis, on the other, are so diverse in their ways as not to form a nation in Pakistan, how can their diversity allow them to become part of a single “Indian nation?” After all, by simply calling them “Indians” rather than “Pakistanis” their diversity does not disappear. . . ”**

ignored the Muslim political culture that had given rise to their State. The Muslim League leaders had been the polyglot products of western education and Muslim aristocratic upbringing. Muslim aristocracy had been as corrupt as its Victorian counterpart in England. The two combined to produce a bunch of corrupt half-educated half-wits who became the rulers of Pakistan. Once Pakistan had been created, the State was virtually taken over by a handful of Muslim civil and military officers who had been hired tools of the British and men who had given Jinnah and the Muslim League no support. These bureaucrats had long been alienated from the Muslim political culture and had no understanding of the aspirations of the Muslim masses. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, the two leaders who were at least sensitive to the needs and aspirations of the masses, died early, leaving the people of Pakistan at the mercy of a most outrageously greedy, corrupt, alienated, and ruthless group of men. These men formed a powerful ruling class which was swelled by the robber barons of industry and commerce, the feudal landlords of Sind and the Punjab, and the powerful military oligarchy created by the country's enormous defence spending and American military aid after 1954.

This tightly knit ruling class began to run the State of Pakistan as a private estate. This was precisely the principle on which the British *raj* had been run. The Pakistani ruling class, therefore, did not need to foster new political, economic and social structures and relationships which might extend participation to the masses. To this day Pakistan has been ruled as if nothing had changed in 1947—partition was a turning point where Muslim history failed to turn.

**The Nation-Building Tasks in Pakistan**

The tasks of nation-building in Pakistan had a peculiar meaning—it did not mean “modernisation” in the accepted sense; it meant the operationalisation of the concepts inherent in the Muslim political culture which had given rise to the State of Pakistan. Because of the origins of Islam, the political achievements of Prophet Mohammad and the early Caliphs, the historical role of the Muslims as rulers, civilisers, administrators and conquerors, politics is deeply rooted in the genius of the followers of Islam everywhere. The political, economic and social concepts of Islam remained operational in some form or another for many hundreds of years while Muslim expansion continued through North Africa to Spain in the West, in the Balkans in Europe, and India, China and Indonesia in the East. The Ottoman Caliphate, despite its corruption and social alienation, drew much of its legitimacy from its origins in the distant past. So much so that right up to the 1920s the Muslims of British India regarded the Ottoman Caliph as their rightful ruler.

This brings us to another important distinction between Hindus and Muslims in the British *raj*—their living together on the subcontinent for nearly 1,000 years did not create among them that common historical experience which is said to be an essential ingredient of a common national identity. The Muslims of the subcontinent regard the history of India as part of a glorious past of Muslim expansion and domination. The Hindus, on the other hand regard the history of India as one long chapter of their failure to assert themselves against alien invaders. Doctrinally, it is difficult for the Muslims to accept “infidels” as rulers (5). Neither does the Muslim political culture accept dictatorship in any form, whether that of a “democratic” majority or of an oligarchy as in Pakistan.

In its positive aspects, Muslim political culture has deep emotional dimensions, involving the passions of loyalty and community identity. In relating emotions, rational considerations and

ethical values, their political culture has coloured the Muslim people's expectations about the reality of politics and has instilled in them shared ideals as to what their public life might be. Muslim societies have always been participatory political communities which were dynamic internally and acted as collective entities externally. This was achieved because the Muslim political culture provided a socialisation process in which classes identified by their economic role played no part. Muslim political societies, particularly those of the early Caliphs of Islam, were classless egalitarian systems to a much greater extent than those aspired to or achieved by modern “socialist” societies. Muslim political culture provides interlocking links between economic, social and political performance and is achievement orientated.

This is, of course, the description of operational Muslim societies of a distant past. In the political culture of Muslims in British India only the memory of that past has survived. This memory was brought into sharp focus by the two shocks of having first lost the governance of India to the British and then the prospect of having to live as a minority in a Gandhian *Ramraj*. This danger of becoming a permanent minority reactivated the Muslim political culture. It was articulated in the Pakistan demand, which also gave it a territorial manifestation. But while all the concepts of Muslim political culture had survived to inspire the followers of Islam, the operational institutional structures of former Muslim societies had been destroyed without trace. In the intervening centuries the emergence of capitalist-social and communist-proletarian democracies, together with a new technology of production and social engineering, had made the re-operationalisation of the concepts of Muslim political culture that much more difficult. It could still have been achieved in Pakistan—for without it Pakistan made no sense—had the Muslim League leadership understood its task. Influenced by western education, they equated capitalist-social democracy with Muslim political culture and called it the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan”. Not surprisingly, Pakistan soon became a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, shorn even of the top dressing of social democracy in a parliamentary system. The revolt in East Pakistan was against this development and not against the original concept of Pakistan.

It is important to realise that even the Awami League in Bangladesh is trying to appeal to the Muslim political culture of Bengal. For without it the present international boundaries of Bangladesh make no sense. The logic of Bengali nationalism pure and simple would mean a united Bengal. That is not desired by the people of Bangladesh, or indeed by the Hindus of West Bengal. Bangladesh is still a Muslim State, and without its Muslimness it could not exist.

The civil war in Pakistan and the Indo-Pakistan war have not disproved the “two-nation theory”. If anything, they have confirmed it. To prove that Hindus and Muslims are one “Indian nation”, one would have to persuade the people of Bangladesh to rejoin India. What has happened is that the failure of the Muslim westernised elite in Pakistan to articulate the Muslim political culture into a set of institutional structures capable of supporting a modern State had led to secession by one part of it.

The experience of Pakistan has exploded some of the myths widely held and discussed in contemporary political science, specially that branch of our discipline which purports to concern itself with the problems of the under-developed countries. Some of the conclusions which may be drawn from the experience of Pakistan are:

1. that it is a mistake to treat the traditions and sentiments of a people as obstacles to economic

efficiency, social change and political development;

2. that the presumed greater efficiency and rationality of authoritarian government is a myth;
3. that the so-called “modernising elite” is the largest single obstacle to political mobilisation, economic development, and nation-building in new States.

**Notes**

- (1) See, for example, David Loshak, *Pakistan Crisis* (London: Heinemann, 1971).
- (2) Hugh Tinker, *India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis* (London: Pall Mall, Second Edition, 1967), p.2.
- (3) Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1944), pp.10-15.
- (4) Cited in Abdul Waheed Khan's, *India Wins Freedom: The Other Side* (Pakistan Educational Publishers, Karachi, 1961), p.4.
- (5) Anil Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism* (Cambridge U.P., 1958), p.158

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## AFRO-AMERICANS &amp; THE JEWS IN AMERICA

## Romance between the mismatched lovers

S. S. MUFASSIR

The lengthy, prolific love affair between liberal and Marxist American Zionists and Afro-American intellectuals and civil rights activists is showing symptoms of strain and possible dissolution. In America, Jews have been a prominent fixture of organisations, efforts and movements seeking integration and assimilation of minorities into the mainstream of society. For example, the first guiding lights of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) and the National Urban League were men like Arthur B. Spingarn, Felix Frankfurter, E. B. Seligman and Julius Rosenwald. Jewish Marxists attempted to involve large numbers of black writers and theorists with the American Communist movement during the 1930's and 1940's by patronising them and arranging for the publication of their works.<sup>1</sup>

Many Jewish lawyers defended civil rights workers during the 1950's and Jews were very active in all aspects of the popular civil rights movements. Of all the American whites, Jews have gained respect as the most liberal, the most open to social integration and intermarriage (as between whites and blacks, not religiously) and the most fervent in their support for minority causes. However, starting from the later part of the 1950's, there has been a slow but steady decline in the quality of the relationship between blacks and Jews in America, eroding much of the early fellowship, creating mutual suspicion and even bitterness. Prestigious Zionist publications like *Commentary* have featured anguished articles blasting "Black Anti-Semitism", accusing militant black leaders of Jew-baiting and Jew-hating. A great deal of the violence in American cities from 1965 to 1968 was directed against the property of Jewish "ghetto merchants" and "slumlords"—businessmen who took money from the black impoverished ghettos for enrichment of the white suburbs where they lived.

Jews have continued to abandon the major urban areas of the North and are "rapidly joining the (white) exodus to the outlying suburbs"<sup>2</sup> thus abandoning the goal of integrated neighbourhoods while leaving behind "an increasingly black neighbourhood". For such reasons certain militant blacks have portrayed American Zionists as the foremost capitalistic exploiter of the oppressed rather than a friend, arguing that even the financial or moral support Zionists have long given to minority causes has been less than altruistic since the Jews as a minority group in

America have likewise benefitted from any legislative or social change that has eased the plight of blacks.

The problem became really acute when in recent years the black nationalists, *en masse*, came out in vehement support for the goals of the Palestine Revolution. Zionists bemoaned this loudly. They were also concerned that so many black nationalists, following the example of Malcolm X, were accepting Islam. It was different though that they were in no way desirous of welcoming them into the folds of Judaism. As late as March, 1972, the National Black Political Assembly (see *Impact*, no. 21) passed overwhelmingly a resolution condemning the continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories in the Middle East and voiced support for the Palestine revolutionaries, as well as for the African revolutionary movements. All this raised Zionist fears that now that ingrate Afro-Americans are supporting the Arabs rather than the Israelis, they will receive scanty interest on their "investment" in the black cause.

"Hell," the Bard declares, "hath no fury like a woman scorned," and liberal Zionists are behaving like rejected lovers. Not merely did they leave the crumbling, plundered cities to blacks, fleeing from the very integration they had preached for years, but they have actually fought, physically and legally, with blacks for control over the school systems in parts of New York. Jewish support was petulantly withdrawn from organisations that adopted a policy of support for Arab rights, until they "reformed". This tactic was played among others, with the Black Panther Party and the Blackman's Army of Liberation. For example, an effective programme to rehabilitate drug addicts by the latter group, operating out of Washington, D.C., was forced to close down when the Jewish Anti-Defamation League brought charges of "anti-Semitism" against its director, Ahmad Hassan Bey, for accusing Zionists of misusing black Americans for their own interests. The suit's notoriety caused a Government agency to stop its funding of the programme, leading to its demise.

Certain black leaders and elected officials whom the Zionists still count as friends were given tours of Israel and fed mountains of propaganda detailing the "wonderful extent" to which the Zionist State has "helped" African nations to develop industry and technology as well as how much Israel has done to "better the condition" of the poor, miserable Arabs in Israel for whose poverty and misery Zionism is directly responsible. The propaganda must have been potent, for no sooner had the

Black Political Assembly passed its resolution castigating Zionism, the "Congressional Black Caucus"—a group of the twelve black Americans elected to the Congress, who, it must be noted, have a substantial Jewish constituency—issued a resolution of their own affirming support for Israel and commending the Jews for their contributions to civil rights.

Mr. Roy Wilkins, present head of the NAACP, wrote from Jerusalem in a column in the newspaper *Afro-American* (March 28, 1972, p. 4) that "there is no discrimination against Arabs within Israel. In fact, Arabs in the newly-annexed territory enjoy a higher standard of living than they did previously . . . Israeli educational, professional and technical teams have been sent to many nations in Africa . . . Small black groups who preach a subtle (and often blatant) anti-Semitism will find no support for their racism among African nations who have benefitted from this spread of know-how."

This spectacle of an old-line (some would say frankly, anachronistic) black leader accusing other blacks of "anti-Semitism" because they disagree with the methods and ideology of Zionism shows how deeply the brainwashing has proceeded. Of course, from its beginning in 1909, the NAACP has relied heavily on Jewish support, so perhaps Mr. Wilkins is merely repaying an old, old debt—at the risk of his own credibility. After all, it was just a few months ago that members of some 200 black Americans, who had immigrated to Israel, claiming to be "Black Hebrew Israelites" were arrested and ordered to leave the Zionist State, and these same erstwhile black Americans who had tasted first-hand the fruits of "democratic" Israel accused the Zionist government of racism, exclusivism and hypocrisy.

Nor was it long ago that a group of Oriental Jews, styling themselves "Black Panthers" after the popular U.S. organisation, hurled similar charges against the Zionist government for oppressing darker-skinned Jews of Arab and African origin. All this makes Mr. Wilkins' remarks the more ridiculous, an obvious attempt to assuage the hurt Zionists feel over rejection of their claims by American blacks at large.

The romance between the mismatched lovers has degenerated into open war on other fronts as well. Jewish authors of some "Black History" books invariably attempt to portray the vast and glorious Arab/Islamic contributions to the African past as one of exploitation and slavery, only. It is common to find in such books wholly unsubstantiated assertions that "the Arabs destroyed the civilizations that

1. *Black World*, March 1972, pp 8-10

2. *Newsweek*, March 13, 1972, p 101; also *January 10, 1972, p 43.*



were developing in Africa," or "the Arabs were the most notorious slave traders in Africa", *ad nauseum*. The volume of this vituperation at this time bespeaks calculated design. Afro-Americans know better, of course. History books written by blacks themselves (African or American) relate positively that Islam in Africa provided "a bond of union that cut across ethnic considerations (and) Islam was a powerful factor in nation building in West Africa";<sup>3</sup> "The Mohammedans gave frequent evidence of their respect for these black nations";<sup>4</sup> "Between the Africans of these empires (ancient Ghana, Mali and Songhay) and the Islamic Arabs there flourished a commercial, religious and cultural interchange which included matrimony between Arab and African and the development of education in African universities."<sup>5</sup>

The Zionist character assassination of the Arabs is noted widely in history books, popular magazines, movies, television, newspapers—all the media. Never is it even whispered that Jews also participated in the evil slave trade for capitalistic reasons, though it is well documented that there were *Sephardim* and *Ashkenazim* who underwrote slave shipping and trading "enterprises" in 18th century America.

A Jewish friend once challenged me in this vein:

"I can't comprehend your preoccupation with Arabic culture and your defence of those terrorists (the Palestinians)!"

"My concern", I rejoined, "is with justice".

"But what have the Arabs ever done for blacks in America? Look, we (Jews) have been shoulder-to-shoulder with you all the way. But name me just *one thing* the Arabs have done for civil rights in this country."

"To be frank, I can think of nothing of a material nature. But this is not the issue. Because you have helped us in a just cause is no reason why we should uphold Zionism in an unjust cause! Because you have helped us gain a measure of freedom from white oppression does not obligate us to help your oppression of the Arabs by Zionism." My logic fell on deaf ears.

While virtually accusing American blacks of "adultery" with the "whore" of Arab Nationalism, American Zionism is now de-emphasising Black-Jewish coalition and stressing Zionist self-interest. It has become an introvert. The romance has gone sour because blacks now realise that Zionists have always placed their own interests first, even to the point of abandoning the thrust for racial equality and stifling black self-determination.

It appears that too many blacks have become *too independent* for their Zionist mentors.

3. *A Thousand Years of West African History*, J. F. Ade Ajayi, Ibadan Press (Nigeria), 1965.

4. *The Negro*, W. E. B. DuBois, Oxford U. Press. First published in 1915.

5. *Black World* magazine, February 1972, p 34.

## PATANI

# After the Thai military coup

DENNIS WALKER

From 1969 onwards press reports have persistently spoken of widespread unrest and outbreaks of fighting in Southern Thailand where up to 3,000,000 Malay-speaking Muslims live. Can the Muslim insurgents banded in the "National Liberation Front for the Patani Republic" wrest the four Southern-most provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, Patani and Satun from Thailand's monarchical rule and unite them with Malaysia?

As far back as 1959 the Thai government claimed to have "uncovered a separatist organization which had collected money and weapons in preparation for a revolt scheduled for 1961". After surfacing in 1967, the Patani "National Liberation Front" went over to the offensive in early 1969 against Thai garrisons and settlers in the Muslim South. The Thai government began to dispatch reinforcements of marines to the Muslim border provinces. By mid-1970 it was obvious only decisive military action could contain the lawlessness spreading throughout the South and the Bangkok regime asserted that it was sending its troops to fight "bandits". Concern in Bangkok at the failure of these "suppression campaigns" was shown in the visits of Kamchat—Inspector General of the Ministry of the Interior—to the South and by the tour of Police Chief Chamrat who named the enemy as the Muslim secessionist movement which aimed to separate the Southern-most provinces of the country from the Central Government's administration. An Australian correspondent John Hoffman reported (13 November 1970) that "Malay separatists and Communist guerrillas have now gained the upperhand over Thai Government forces in almost the whole area between the isthmus of Kra and the Malaysian border". In December 1970 the Thais counter-attacked throughout the South. The Thai troops arrested 300 Muslims as guerrilla sympathisers, claimed killing one Muslim insurgent leader and captured arms factories and training camps which were alarming evidence of the growing scale of the Muslim revolt. However, the press of neighbouring countries noted that no Muslim leaders were captured and that generally the rebels had evaded contact.

The Muslim uprising results from Thailand's attempts to "assimilate" the Muslim Southerners by forcing the Thai tongue and ultimately the Buddhist faith on them; from the influx of Government-sponsored Thai settlers into the South which often leads to the displacement of the indigenous population; and from the rapacity and neglect that have characterised the attitudes of Thai administrators to the Muslim peasantry. No mercy is shown by either side. Being uneducated, outnumbered and outgunned the Muslims use stealth and ambush. Muslims who collaborate with the Thais are assassinated: e.g., a village headman was gunned down by Muslim "bandits" while returning home from receiving His Majesty the King in Narathiwat" (*Bangkok World* 27 August 1970). Four policemen and two informers were gunned down in deep jungle a few weeks later in Narathiwat while pursuing rubber-plantation bandits" (*Ibid*, 11 Sept. 1970) the same day; the Thai Undersecretary of State Puany Suwanarat said "that separatist motives were behind bandit activities in the South".

The Thai answer to Muslim unrest has been displays of military force, designed to intimidate the civilian population that harbours the insur-

gents. The August Taksin exercises of 1970 were most notable for their psychological warfare against the Muslim population. Airforce planes dropped leaflets inviting the inhabitants of Yala, Narathiwat and Patani provinces to observe the "assault" in which "live ammunition seared through the jungle near here before the invited guests", besides a massive artillery bombardment and a large scale beach landing at Panara by the Thai Navy, Army and Air forces. However, the Thai forces lacked the courage to assault the nearby stronghold of rebel leader Bapak-Idris before which these impressive "shows of strength" were surrealistically situated! (*Ibid*, 15 Aug. 1970). The reason for Thai reluctance to engage the Muslim resistance emerged later. A later appeal by Thai settlers for more Marines to be reassigned to the South revealed "the notorious bandit Bapak-Idris has nearly 1,000 followers operating in groups of 50 each throughout the three provinces... Bapak-Idris is no ordinary bandit but has political motivations. At his headquarters there are rations sufficient for many months, a group of 50 defenders and an arsenal of modern weapons. He had inspired murders of Thai policemen and the abduction of wealthy Thai merchants (*Ibid*, 11 Sept. 1970). Exactly one year after the Taksin exercises, in August 1971, governors of Muslim provinces requested an extension of the military's "suppression campaign". In Patthalung province, the medical teams the Thai government was tardily sending out to Muslim villages to reduce discontent had to be accompanied by strong detachments of police and military—giving the impression that Thai communities in the south were huddled in garrisons and ventured forth into the hostile countryside only with military protection (*Ibid*, 31 July 1971).

The strength of the Patani Muslim resistance derives from the fact that it is a people's army. It fights for and with the support of the long-downtrodden Muslim peasantry and fishermen who, through the struggle for their country's independence have found a new sense of pride in the face of economic hardship and the open contempt of their Thai rulers. "Our armed forces are a *national army*; being a People's army that is fighting for freedom it can never commit any action that is unjust, or would degrade women or children. Our army will never commit any plunder of property and possessions; it will never destroy or disrupt the means of livelihood of our people so long as these be legal and legitimate in the laws and teachings of Islam. The Liberation Army will respect the customs, traditions and way of life of the masses of the people besides offering its full cooperation to them." However, for a full-scale attack to finally drive the Thais out of "Patani" (the South's historic name), the rebels admit they would need arms and training from outside but in the meantime continue their hit and run attacks against the Thai forces.

The Thai military's coup of 17 November 1971 that unceremoniously swept aside the country's facade of parliamentary and democratic institutions has opened the way for Muslim secessionists. Almost daily battles rage in the South as the Thais try to crush the Malay Muslims once and for all. In the middle of February, 1972, for instance, they threw in 1,000 police and military troops into a bid to surround and capture Bapak-Idris and his followers in Raman district, Yala province. But the Muslims were able to fight their way out through the Thai ring.

# Textile Industry — a brief survey

H. G. M. RAJAH

The textile industry is in a state of recession throughout the world. Every country producing textiles is taking steps to protect its industry. Recently the United States—with the most efficient textile industry—put quotas and restrictions on textiles from Japan and the Far East. Britain which was earlier considering abolition of the quota system, decided not only to retain it but impose an import tariff.

The British Textile Industry once dominated the world, and Lancashire was a household name in all world markets. In the nineteenth century, Britain was the biggest exporter of textiles. In the twenties, the labour force in the industry was 710,000 compared with less than 100,000 to-day. Export declined from 6,800m. sq.yards in the 'twenties to 256m. sq. yards in the 'seventies.

The textile industrial areas are becoming depressed by rapid mill closures. In 1971, 59 mills closed down and further closures are on the way. Mills are, indeed, closing week by week. In the last decade 564 mills closed down. The situation looks grim.

What are the reasons for such a dramatic situation? Is Britain less efficient or is it that Britain cannot produce cheaper fabrics whilst others can. It is being claimed by officials of the Textile Industry that other countries do not produce cheaper, but they are dumping their goods in order to obtain foreign exchange. Dumping is possible because of government subsidies. Such subsidies do not exist in the United Kingdom.

The British Textile Industry is highly sophisticated, mechanised capital intensive and highly productive. The problem of being out-competed, it is said, is due to unfair competition from foreign countries practising dumping. There might be some truth in this, but cost-pull inflation is one of the major reasons that makes Britain non-competitive in the World Market.

The basic cause of trouble of the British Textile Industry is laid at the door of cheap imports—a fact, but the decline should also be attributed to the stagnation of the economy as a whole. The cotton and allied industry has been affected not only by the general stagnation and massive increase in imports in the seventies but also by the swing to knitted, i.e. man-made fabrics.

Imported cotton textiles have continued to enter the United Kingdom in larger volumes. In 1971, imports of woven cotton cloth totalled 498 million square yards compared with 365 million square yards in 1970, these imports coming mainly from Pakistan, Hong Kong and China, mostly in the form of grey cloth. Imports of woven cotton goods have also increased,

coming mainly from Hong Kong and Portugal.

Cotton textiles importation is under quantitative control, no such control, however, exists in the case of man-made fabrics. In 1971 imports of woven man-made fabrics totalled 183 million square yards compared to 132 million square yards in 1970. These have come mainly from Hong Kong, Austria, Portugal, West Germany and the United States.

It is being said that the industry is declining and that the volume of imports has reached disastrous proportions. The industry is advocating stricter Government controls, otherwise they feel the industry will soon wither away and Britain will have to depend for its needs of textiles on foreign producers. This will cost the British Balance of Payments a sum in the region of £500m both, visible and invisible.

This so-called "Death of Textiles" will bring unemployment not only to the industry but also to allied industries such as Textile Engineering Industry. Liverpool and Manchester docks are also bound to be affected. Indeed, the picture, as it is, looks grim in Lancashire and the North West as a whole.

In a report published last week in London by the Trade Policy Research Centre, it has been urged that declining industries should be given government help to make the necessary adjustment rather than be protected from import competition by tariff and quota restrictions. This is also the demand of British textile industry which is not scared of fair competition. In terms of quality and delivery dates, given a fair chance, Britain can compete with any other country.

Activity in the Cotton and allied textiles industry in Western Europe is also feeling the effect of a similar recession. This is attributed to the rise in raw cotton prices and to cheap imports. Cotton and allied textile industry is feeling the brunt of the depression due to a rapid rise in the use of man-made fabrics. In Europe, too, one can hear of impending closures and a rise in unemployment in the industry.

Recession in the United States textile industry seemed to show an arrest in the early part of 1971 but came back later in the year. The decline here too is due to the shift to man-made fabrics and the over-capacity in polyester fabrics.

Cheap imports from Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan is another factor causing decline of the U.S. Textile Industry. These countries have now been persuaded by the U.S. Government to impose restrictions on the export of textiles to the United States.

Though Japan's textile industry is

were developing in Africa", or "the Arabs were the most notorious slave traders in Africa", and museum. The volume of this vituperation at this time bespeaks careful design. Afro-Americans know better. of course. History books written by

running to full capacity, but restrictions imposed because of appeals by other countries, the textile industry as a whole is not in a happy situation. Redundancies and decreased dividends depict the difficulties of the industry.

The Indian sub-continent is also having its share of trouble. Indian mills are running below capacity and exports have fallen. Pakistan's textile industry has been adversely affected by the war in East Pakistan. The disruption in East Pakistan caused major loss to textile companies. Uncertain policies and lack of industrial discipline are adding to the trouble of Pakistan's textile industry. The quota system imposed by Britain has limited the growth of the Pakistani textiles in the British market and now being no more in the Commonwealth, Pakistan will not enjoy the Preferential Tariff. Pakistani mills now face a serious competition in the British market.

If the Western countries impose further restrictions in order to protect their own industries, the developing countries whose textile industry is yet in a nascent shape may face a serious set-back.

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## Science & Society

### Timber for better environment

The Munich College of Technology has embarked upon a new field of study, Structural Biology which deals with the effect of building material on human biology.

In this age of glass, steel and concrete, the value of timber as a building material has often been underestimated, both in regard to the beneficial environment it creates and in the advantages it offers to the architects and engineers as a structural material.

Results of the experiments conducted at Munich now show that headaches, sleeplessness, reduced working efficiency, blood circulation disorders and even some infectious diseases may all be related to the destruction of the natural atmospheric field of direct current by such building materials as reinforced concrete structures. Timber on the other hand helps maintain the natural electrostatic field in the room atmosphere, does not accumulate static electricity, produces only minute quantities of radio-activity (concrete, steel and even bricks have much greater radioactivity), regulates the moisture content of the air, enhances the supply of oxygen, absorbs and reduces noise, and maintains a pleasant surface temperature. In other words, the organic structure of timber complements the structure of the human body.

Timber had lost its structural value due to its unpredictability in stress-grading. Until now since the assessment of its stress strength was always done by eye—by weighing up factors like slope of grain, the size and position of knots etc.—engineers have treated timber with caution. Now it is known that the best timber can withstand stresses up to 20,000 lb. per square inch they have used it to take stresses up to only 800 p.s.i. If timber can properly be stress-graded it provides an attractive alternative to metal or concrete in terms of weight as well as size.

Plessey's subsidiary in Australia and Phoenix Timber Co. in Britain, in conjunction with the Forest Products Research Laboratory at Princes Risborough have investigated mechanical techniques of stress testing by loading a number of timber boards to destruction. One important factor that emerged out of these studies was: the moment at which timber begins to bend under a load is closely related to the point at which it will break, and so, by measuring one, it is possible to estimate the other accurately. The result is that Plessey has now developed an electronic

### IMPACT science report

machine that can grade up to 400 ft. of timber an hour.

Since timber is now seen as a material that has been seriously underloaded in the past and has been very uneconomically used, immediate advantage of machine stress-grading is that it can now be used where precise loading requirements must be met. Machine stress-grading will also broaden the market for laminated timber beams which are known to be stronger and more versatile than solid timber and will have an even stronger claim to use in structural engineering.

● *Science* magazine (March 31, 1972) reports an unusual finding concerning advance detection of eruption of volcanoes. While carrying out a routine magnetic survey of the summit area of the Kilauea volcano (Hawaii), Drs. G. V. Keller, D. B. Jackson and Antonio Rapolla noticed their equipment behaving in an unusual fashion which they could not explain at the time. Some twenty three days later the volcano erupted.

The three scientists now speculate that the nature of the strange activity of their equipment can be understood in terms of molten rock movement beneath the ground. These could have resulted in fluctuations in the magnetic field detected on the surface.

Further work will prove the usefulness of this lucky discovery. When fully developed, volcano eruption warning devices could be fixed permanently and relatively cheaply in regions where volcanoes are a threat to life and property, thus providing a fore-warning to take the necessary precautions.

● The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment starts in Stockholm on June 5. The Conference will be discussing various aspects of pollution of human environment with a view to developing new concepts to combat its effects. The Conference will last for two weeks and will be attended by scientists, social workers and government ministers.

● The Egyptian Medicine Research Institute for Tropical Areas has produced a new nematocide compound for treating ancylostoma and ascaris diseases. It is taken in the form of pills containing a substance which kills intestinal worms with one dose equal to 10 milligrammes for every kilogramme of body weight.

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## The Media

### Boring, futile and reactionary

Until recently, women were assumed to have a sort of traditional interest in home, family, fashion and beauty, etc. and these used to make the ingredients for a successful women's magazine. But in the galloping social revolution of the post-War II years, the formula had come to lose its usefulness. In America established magazines like *Vanity Fair* and *Harper's Bazaar* (now *Harper and Queen*) were and still are losing a lot of money. Others like *Vogue* and *Town and Country* were also going downhill. So the American ingenuity added 'sex' to the old allure-mix and produced *Cosmopolitan*. With circulations soaring over a million, the magazine\* came to Britain last March. The 300,000 copies of the first issue were sold out on the first day of publication. The second issue was reprinted within a week. English *Cosmopolitan* is a faithful reproduction of the American. Over 60% of the editorial contents come straight from the US. A thick (around 150 pages) glossy magazine with a good whack of colour, *Cosmopolitan* carries articles on men; 'Fashion and Beauty', knitting, cooking and men, (Bachelor of the Month); then there is decorating, psychology, latest happenings in the world of art, and more men ('The irresistible male'). Also we have the horoscope, sex quiz, fiction, 'the complete novel', and interviews (with such hard hitting questions as "What do you look for in a wife?" Answer: "What a daft question?" Does anyone go out with a shopping list headed qualities I look for in a wife?) and yet more men (Cosmo's Playboy). The outlook of the contents has remained unchanged and constant throughout the subsequent issues.

Cosmo is out to make good little standard middle-class Americans out of its readers, with a very important additional quality of giving them a liberated view of sex and allied matters. It preaches with breathtaking seriousness an entire life-style—invented, artificial and a projection of fantasy. It addresses its readers as though they had a lavish taste in all that is 'good', were world-travelled, impeccably dressed, suave, sexually unsatiated, and experts on everything 'from agepeman to zymurgy'. Cosmo girls are middle class, go to work, earn a great deal, and are independent. They are in touch with the current happenings. But above all, they are over-interested in men: how to hook them, how to keep them and most important, how to throw them back into the sea. This is the Cosmo outlook.

*Cosmopolitan* are between 20 and 35, come from lower middle class and working class backgrounds; girls and women who work as secretaries, shop assistants, behind the sewing machine, on the factory floor; married women in the suburbs who would thank anyone to know the latest on how to hang on to their husbands. These are the ordinary daughters and mums whose ideals and desires *Cosmopolitan* has set out to exploit.

The catalyst that speeds up *Cosmopolitan* sales is sex. The leading articles have direct bearing on it: 'Why I think these men would make good lovers?', 'The Irresistible Male', 'Stanley Spencer—Great Artist, Bizarre Lover' etc. Then there is the confession type approach: 'I was a sleep around girl'. And the now essential ingredient for any sex magazine: the M.D. Department, information and psychology in disguise: 'On the Couch'. Plus the straight-forward info articles (the American *Cosmopolitan* has serialised all the best-selling sex manuals). The remaining segments of the editorial contents, too, are dipped in sex. A simple travel feature becomes 'Go where the men are', 'A lover's guide to Paris'. A personality is subtitled 'Cool Man-Eater'.

The domestic scene also receives a new about turn. Recipes are combined with pictures of way-out do's (parties), or the love-sick duo. If Cosmo reveals a room set there is always a man in it; in a suitably rude pose and/or gestures.

Underneath the microscope *Cosmopolitan* is boring, futile, reactionary and downright insulting to everyone, above all to women who are supposed to read it. Its purpose is not to enlighten and inform but to make its readers feel unsure about themselves and insecure in their surroundings.

One does not have to stretch one's imagination to see that the values propagated are also shared no less by pornography. Notably, the enactment of fantasy, the equation with materialism of a sort of dubious femininity reducing sex to an animal quality and finally a complete unconcern about the concomitants and the consequences. There is nowhere any humanising suggestion that men and women just do not behave like this.

\**Cosmopolitan*, monthly, Edited by Joyce Hopkirk, The National Magazine Co. Ltd., London SW1 20p.

In reality women and girls—who read

Z. Sardar

### ESSAY COMPETITION

on

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## An exciting and original study

**Studies in Early Hadith Literature** by M. M. Azmi, *al-Maktab al-Islami*, Beirut, 1968, xx + 506 pages (including 164 pages of Arabic texts)

The Prophet's Sunnah is unanimously considered by Muslims to be the most important 'source' of Islam after the Qur'an. *Hadith* being what the Prophet said, did, or agreed to, constitute the repository of the Sunnah. Muslims therefore took great pains and care to collect and record the *hadiths* in a manner which has no parallel in human history. Realising the importance of the Sunnah for Islam, Western orientalisks, barring a few exceptions, have made *hadith* the target of a continuous onslaught with the view perhaps of attaining a long-cherished objective of weakening Islam.

Western criticism of *hadith* literature began with Sprenger who charged that a great many *hadiths* had to be considered as forgeries. G. Weil, W. Muir, and R. P. A. Dozy were not so sceptical, but nevertheless stated that at least half of the *hadiths* in Bukhari's collection were not authentic. Goldziher who was the most vehement of all in his criticism of *hadiths* crossed the limit and alleged in the second volume of his *Muhammadanische Studien* that scarcely a single *hadith* could be proven to be the genuine words of the Prophet or a reliable description of his behaviour. He developed the hypothesis which he failed to establish, that the *hadith* literature is a reflection of the religious, historical, and social evolution of Islam during the first two centuries of its existence rather than a true representation of the Prophet's sayings or acts. After about sixty years, Schacht tried to furnish the roots for this criticism by alleging that *isnàds* (the chain of transmitters of *hadith*) had a tendency to "grow backwards" and that before Shafi'i's time the Sunnah was tantamount to the general practice of the Muslim community.

Dr. Azmi's work, one of high and scrupulous scholarship, subjects Schacht's theories to penetrating criticism and shows the weaknesses inherent in them. His book consists of two parts. The first, comprising eight chapters and five appendices, surveys the literary activities of pre and early Islamic Arabia, discusses the question of whether or not the recording of *hadith* was permitted by the Prophet and examines the whole corpus of early Hadith literature along with the learning and transmission of *hadith*. The writing materials, the problems of authorship and other related subjects are also discussed followed by two extremely useful and crucial chapters on the beginning and authenticity of *isnàd* and the reliability of *hadith*.

In these chapters Dr. Azmi subjects some of Schacht's fundamental theories to a scholarly analysis and so successfully refutes them that he shakes their very foundation and, with them, the fundamental assumptions of the orientalisks' criticism of *hadith*. In Part Two, there is an edited version of Suhail's manuscript along with the manuscripts of Nafil and al-Zuhir.

Among the questions which the author specifically examines is the contention that *hadith* were only orally transmitted for about a hundred years and that the Prophet prohibited the writing of *hadith*. He critically analyses the *hadiths* forbidding the recording of *hadiths* and convincingly establishes that these are at best weak according to criteria established by *hadith* scholars. There is no authentic *hadith* forbidding the writing of *hadiths*. On the other hand, he points out clear evidence to show that the Prophet approved of recording the *hadiths* and that the Prophet's disapproval of recording *hadiths*, if expressed at all, most probably implied the writing of the Qur'an and the *hadiths* on the same sheet. In this connection he examines the pre-classical *hadith* literature, and over a span of more than a hundred-and-fifty pages, covers the literary activities of the Companions and their successors with regard to *hadiths* up to the year around 150 a.h. He shows that during this period books began to appear in large numbers which, in later periods, were utilised by the classical authors and edited with the utmost care by Bukhari, Muslim and others.

The most illuminating and rewarding part of the book is chapter VI where he subjects to a thorough analysis Schacht's "projecting back" theory of *Isnàds* and his sweeping claim that *isnàds* constitute the most arbitrary part of *hadiths* and were often put together very carelessly. Azmi conclusively establishes that the system of *isnàds* was in vogue from the very beginning although scholars became more serious about it after the first civil war in the history of Islam (between Ali and Mu'awiyah) when the first fabrication of *hadiths* began in the political sphere. Scholars then realised more acutely the need to be more cautious in selecting their authorities. He shows that Schacht's study encompasses works belonging mainly to the legal science, for example the *Muwatta* of Malik, *al-Umm* of Shafi'i, and the *Muwatta* of Shaybani, but from his study of these basically legal works Schacht made generalisations about the entire corpus of *hadith* literature. The flaw lies in the fact that a jurist did not have to give full *isnàds* to support his verdict based on *hadiths* which were well-known and generally accepted at that time. *Hadith* is an independent and complete subject by itself and

it was unscientific on the part of Schacht to study the subject of *hadith* from legal books. Conclusions drawn in this manner about *hadith* literature and *isnàds* are, therefore, not only unreliable but also mischievous. Besides, the author points out, Schacht did not even take the trouble of carrying out a satisfactory investigation of the *isnàds* of a significant and scientifically selected sample of legal traditions to support his sweeping generalisations. Schacht picked from among the thousands of *hadiths* transmitted by scholars, only the weak ones and formulated his theory on the basis of these. Discussing the *isnàds* of a representative sample of *hadiths* from Suhail's manuscript (which constitutes an appendix to Dr. Azmi's book) he has shown that the care and precision exercised by scholars in the transmittal of *hadiths*, the chains of transmitters of several *hadiths* belonging to various provinces in different parts of the Muslim empire, and the rare occurrence of a fictitious *sanàd* combined with the high probability of its being detected, renders Schacht's claim untenable. Azmi has selected six examples to show the errors of Schacht's, the absence of thoroughness in his study, and the weakness of his "projecting back" theory of *isnàds*. It would be senseless to reject the whole corpus of *hadith* literature prepared after years of toil and labour by upright, sincere and competent scholars because of a few unconvincingly (perhaps seemingly) argued and not thoroughly examined examples of Schacht from legal books where *isnàds* were generally not fully cited because it was not necessary.

Dr. Azmi then examines the authenticity of *hadith* in chapter VII. Here he discusses the early legal activity as depicted by Schacht and critically examines his examples of forged *hadiths* showing, with an unusual mastery of the subject, the weaknesses, pitfalls and inaccuracies in Schacht's study and, therefore, the untenability of his conclusions about the authenticity of *hadith*.

Dr. Azmi's study is an important contribution in an important field. It is a work of the highest value done, as the late Professor Arberry noted, according to the exact standards of scholarship. With such recent works as Professor Hamidullah's commentary on the *Sahifah of Hamman ibn Munabbih* (the earliest extant work on *Haddith*) or his *Al-Watha'iq as-Siyasiyyah* (a collection of documents and treaties of the Prophet), "Studies in Early Hadith Literature" must rank as one of the most exciting contributions in this particular field in modern times. The book is strongly recommended to all students of Islamic studies.

Dr. M. Umer Chapra

# Through the Middle East labyrinth

## The Middle East—Temple of Janus

by Desmond Stewart, *Hemish Hamilton*, 432 pages, £4

It is difficult to criticise this book in the sense of finding fault. Mr. Stewart writes, as always, with clarity, wielding his pen with a surgeon's skill as he sets about the decades within the territorial confines of his subject. He guides the reader through the labyrinth of Ottoman politics, European intrusions, zionism and burgeoning nationalisms with a text as valuable as any wool from Ariadne.

I am not sure that "The Middle East" is best used here as the title (although we all by custom now include Libya and even the Maghreb within its scope), because while Janus faces both ways, the Middle East, for most of the period covered by this book, was comfortably ensconced beyond the Levant—a name forever linked with Byzantium, Phoenicia and Egypt. But that is a quibble.

It never fails to astonish one that in our British schooling, we almost totally ignore the recent history of the Eastern Mediterranean, and the events and personalities, that have had so great an influence upon our national life and fortunes; particularly since we Europeans have contributed a number of the leading "dramatis personae". Mr. Stewart's book therefore fills a melancholy gap with lucid exposition. If I seem to detect some notes of personal asperity creeping in towards the end, then that is surely an author's licence and prerogative.

For all who read his book, the mental images of the great and the craven, the benign, the meek and the treacherous, who people its pages come vividly alive. But I could have done with some maps. It may be flattering of publishers to assume that the reader has no need of them, but the face of the land alters all too swiftly, and it is not easy, for example, for me to mentally rebuild the Qasr el-Nil upon the site which I know all too well to be occupied by the Arab League HQ and the Hilton Hotel. But this is a book of erudite scholarship and compelling elegance.

Alistair Duncan

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## Economic and Social Consequences of Nuclear Energy, edited by Lord Sherfield, Oxford University Press, £1.00.

A brief and readable collection dealing with topics such as how energy is produced by releasing some of the binding energy of nucleus, development of the atomic and hydrogen bombs, nuclear power programme and factors which determine the suitability of a power plant, potential uses of nuclear energy outside the military and power fields, moral aspects and sociological consequences of nuclear energy, etc.

## Global Politics of Nuclear Power by Mason Willrich, Pall Mall, £6.25.

Willrich, who is professor of Law and Director of the Centre for the Study of Science, Technology and Public Policy at the University of Virginia, describes the factors which determine and govern the future of civilian nuclear power in a country—special reference is to US.

## The Green Revolution by Stanley Johnson, Hamish Hamilton, £2.75.

Stanley Johnson describes his book as "a personal view of United Nations at work". The book outlines what is being done and what can be done to increase world food production. As such it deals with much more than wheat, maize, rice, barley, cocoa, coffee, oil seed, cattle, fertilizers and what have gone in agriculture; it is about people, about UN and specialized agency advisers working with local teams. And it is all written in the crisp style of a thriller.

## Stories from the Dole Queue by Joe and Tony Gould, Maurice Temple, £2.00.

First-hand accounts from men and women who are out of work; the subjects range from the long-term unemployed and the virtually destitute to middle-class people, who to their own horrified surprise find that unemployment today can hit them too.

## Science and Survival by Barry Commoner, Pan/Ballantine 40p.

A note of warning against the dangers of the new technology: long-term effect on the environment and threat to human existence.

● *Light of Islam*, only Islamic magazine in the Burmese language, published by Maung-Ko Ghaffari, 37 Kandawgalay Rd, Rangoon, Burma.

● *Light of Islam*, edited by Haj Ibrahim T. Y. Ma, well-known Chinese Muslim leader. In English and Chinese with particular emphasis on explaining Islamic teachings to Chinese-speaking people, the magazine deserves all material and moral support. Published from 60, Robson Heights, off Jalan Robson, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

● Move is afoot in Ceylon to bring out a Tamil edition of *Muslim World*, weekly organ of the World Muslim Congress published from Karachi.

● *The New York Daily News Rider* is an alternative three-days-a-week paper for New York. The "Rider", while an accurate description for the function of the paper is not its title: this is provided by the cover date, with issues actually called 5 April, 13 May, and so on.

# Briefing

As a corollary to New York's daily press it intends to "report the news from a non-establishment frame-of-reference, using alternative criteria of determining facts . . ."

● *Pravda*, the official newspaper of the Soviet Communist Party was awarded the Order of the October Revolution on its 60th anniversary "in recognition of its contribution to the education of the working people in the spirit of Communism."

● *Far East Problems*, a special journal of Russian Sinology published by the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

● *Chronicle of Current Events*, the underground two-monthly periodical of dissent in Soviet Russia completed 4th year of publication. Publishers so far remain undetected.

● The Sixth Conference of Writers from African and Asian countries would be held next year in Alma-Ata.

● The first international symposium on prehistoric religions will take place at Valcamonica, Italy, on September 18/23, 1972, under the auspices of the "Union internationale des sciences prehistoriques" and the "International Association for the History of Religions". The symposium aims at measuring present day knowledge of prehistoric religions and promotion of more frequent discussions between experts.

Andrew Schonfield, Director, Royal Institute of International Affairs is to give 1972 Reith lectures on BBC Radio 4 under the title "Europe—Journey on an unknown destination".

## Reports

*The Press and the People* Press Council Report for 1971. 50p from Press Council, 81 Farringdon Street, London EC4.

*National Council for Civil Liberties, 1971 Annual Report*, 20p from 152 Camden High Street, London NW1.

*National Corporation for the Care of Old People, 1971 Annual Report*, 10p from Bedford Square Press, 26 Bedford Square, London WC2.

*Institute of Development Studies, Fifth Annual Report*. University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RE.

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**WORLD OPINION WORLD OPINION WORLD OPINION WORLD OPINION**

**Asian Security, Russian concern**

It is natural that in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union problems of Asia and relations between Asian States occupy a most important place. After all, almost two-thirds of Soviet territory is on the Asian continent. Our country is historically closely connected with many Asian States and develops economic co-operation and other good-neighbourly relations with them. It is enough to recall such countries as India, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Ceylon and many others. The USSR has established genuinely fraternal relations with the socialist States of Asia, with the Mongolian People's Republic, the KPDR and the DRV . . . Together with the fraternal socialist States, the Soviet Union is actively and resolutely campaigning against the imperialist policy on the Asian continent. The countries of socialism are actively supporting the progressive ideas of co-operation and mutual trust between the countries of Asia, and of joint solution of complex international problems. . . .

It is becoming increasingly clear that the real road to security in Asia is not the road of military blocs and groupings, not the road of pitting one State against another, but the road of good-neighbourly co-operation of all interested States. It is only on such foundations that real security and well-being of peoples can be guaranteed. Collective security in Asia, said Comrade Brezhnev, must in our view be based on such principles as rejection of use of force in relations between States, respect for sovereignty and inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs, broad development of economic and other co-operation . . . (Boris Grachev: Benefits of a Collective Security System in Asia, *Moscow home service*, 11 May, 1972)

**Self-determination to ensure the success . . .**

. . . In an attempt to discredit the Leninist nationalities policy of the CPSU and damage the friendship of the Soviet peoples, bourgeois ideologists play on the fact that the Bolsheviks, who had proclaimed the right of nations to self-determination, established a single multi-national socialist state on the territory of pre-revolutionary Russia. They present this as some kind of "contradiction". The formation of the USSR, however, was precisely the result of the implementation by Soviet power of the right of nations to self-determination, an expression of the will of the free peoples, their voluntary decision to form a state union based on equality.

As is known, Lenin and the party staunchly upheld the right of nations to self-determination. Shortly before the October Revolution, the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the RSDLP (B) in its resolution written by Lenin, emphasised that "to deny them this right, or to fail to take measures guaranteeing its practical realisation, is equivalent to support-

ting a policy of seizure or annexation."

At the same time, it is impermissible from the viewpoint of Leninism, to confuse the question of the right to self-determination with the question of the expediency, or otherwise, of the secession of one or other nation.

Marxist-Leninists never absolutised this right. They used it to ensure the success of the socialist revolution and . . . (Ivan Pomelov in *Pravda*, Moscow, 20 April)

**"Biharis"—the one affliction**

The Biharis of Bangladesh suffer from one affliction worse than the polluted, congested, panic-stricken misery in which they now live: they are utterly friendless . . . The chief reason for pessimism about a population transfer remains Mr. Bhutto's unwillingness, despite his frequent outcries about the mistreatment of the Biharis, to admit any sizeable proportion of them into Pakistan . . .

Sheikh Mujib obviously bears a major responsibility for the Biharis and, come what may, he will have to make a place for a good many of them in his new state. But President Bhutto also owes something more than expressions of concern to this community whose loyal support for Pakistan landed them where they are today. And Mrs. Gandhi, who justified her bisection of Pakistan by humanitarian outrage at the slaughter of Bengalis, needs reminding of that humanitarianism now.

If Pakistan has managed to support 400,000 Bengalis it can hardly argue that once the Bengalis go the same number of Biharis would be an unupportable burden. And if India could give temporary refuge to 10 million Bengalis, it can surely assimilate some thousands of Biharis in their former home. This is the argument that foreign governments should be pressing on the three leaders of the subcontinent, reinforced with offers of resettlement aid. ("The swept-aside people", *The Economist*, London, 13 May, 1972)

**Bangladesh perspectives**

Given time, the communists could have liberated East Pakistan from the corrupt, reactionary rule of Yahya Khan, which was not firmly established and which had no support from the native bourgeois class who were also being discriminated against. The communists had, in fact, liberated certain parts of the country. But India came in with the violently anti-communist Awami League exiles to reverse the process . . .

The revolutionaries in East Bengal are grouped in two parties: the Communist Party (M-L) under the leadership of Mohammed Toaha and the East Bengal Communist Party (M-L) under the leadership of Comrade Alauddin and Comrade Martin. Already, the two parties are . . . discussing the necessity and possibility of merging into one party which, basing itself on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought will carry on

the struggle for the complete emancipation of the people of East Bengal . . . As it is, they are now working in close union and co-operation.

This has so unnerved the present government that they are indiscriminately hitting out at them in Noakhali and Pabna. Till now scores of innocent people have fallen victim to their treacherous attacks. But the revolutionaries have regrouped themselves and have established red terror to deal with this menace.

The revolutionaries are operating in Chittagong, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Noakhali, Pabna, Jessore, Khulna, Faridpur, Rangpur, Dinajpur, Khustia, Rajshai, Dacca, Mymensingh, Shytleh, Barisal (16 out of 19 districts). Their main strength and mass base are in Pabna, Noakhali, Jessore and Khulna. Hence the repression in these areas is prominent. (Sadeq Ali: "Bangladesh", *Liberation Struggle*, London, May 1972)

**Common Market**

When they have some particularly dirty deal to put across, our rulers invariably trundle out the Queen.

Just as the television advertisers use a pop singer or a film star to advertise a hair cream or a deodorant so the Tories are using royalty to sell the Common Market . . .

Though Parliament has not yet passed the legislation on British entry into the Market, Heath has sent the Queen to France to give both the British and French people the impression that entry is now inevitable.

President Pompidou, whose referendum on British entry backfired in his face, also hopes that, even in republican France, the royal razzamatuzz may divert some attention from his policy of low wages, high prices and more unemployment . . .

As French Communist leader, George Marchais, has said: "Mr. Heath's Government resembles Mr. Pompidou's like a brother."

The "entente cordiale" of their rulers needs to be challenged by the international solidarity of the workers. (*Morning Star*, London, 16 May 1972)

**Contradiction dialectics**

Society has always developed through contradictions. With the emergence of classes they assumed the character of antagonisms, which have since been linked with social progress. Marx likened progress to an idol who insisted on drinking his nectar from the skulls of the killed. "The very moment civilisation begins", Marx wrote, "production begins to be founded on the antagonism of orders, estates, classes, and finally on the antagonism of accumulated labour and actual labour. No antagonism, no progress. This is the law that civilisation has followed up to our days". (*The Poverty of Philosophy*) . . .

Not until socialist society is fully built does the basis for class antagonisms disappear altogether. However, this does not make society entirely homogeneous. There remain social

distinctions between the working class and the peasantry, and between these two classes and the intellectuals. They are due to unsurmounted essential distinctions between town and countryside, between mental and physical labour. However, socialism rids these social relations of the antagonistic imprint they bear in an exploiting society. Contradictions of this kind no longer necessitate polarisation of their extremes, with the struggle between them leading to hostile collisions.

Half a century ago Lenin foresaw how deeply the character of contradictions under socialism would change in comparison with those under capitalism. On reading the sentence "capitalism is an antagonistic, contradictory system" in Bukharin's book, *The Economy of the Transitional Period*, Lenin wrote in the margin: "Absolutely wrong. Antagonism and contradiction are not one and the same thing at all. The former will disappear while the latter will remain under socialism."

"Believe me", Lenin wrote to Maxim Gorky, "the philosopher Hegel was right: life proceeds by contradictions, and living contradictions are so much richer, more varied and deeper in content than they may seem at first sight to a man's mind" (V. I. Lenin, *Coll. Works*, Vol. 34, p. 403). These words express a general law of dialectics valid also for socialism. Life breeds contradictions which are not always predictable. All the more important is it to discern them in time and take them into account in practice.

(Grigory Glezerman: Contradictions Under Socialism, *World Marxist Review*, Prague, March 1972)

**A tendency to use the "Koran"**

President Sadat's recent speeches within Egypt have increasingly shown signs of worry about Egyptian society and of the need to reaffirm religious faith. Much of the tone of his words is aggressively bellicose. But they also bear the traces of an Islamic fundamentalism, by which he hopes to bolster morale and help to explain the nature of current Egyptian society. The most dangerous feature is a tendency to use the Koran as divine, historical evidence that Jews are untrustworthy. (Anthony McDermott in *The Guardian*, London, 8 May, 1972)

**Diet of worms**

The University of London bulletin quotes a university internal newsletter, as follows:—

"As there have more than once been complaints to the Catering Officer about the presence of worms in cod steaks served by his Department, it would be appreciated if those who read the following explanation could make it known as widely as possible.

"The worms—*filaria bicola*—are perfectly edible and in no way connected with the freshness of the fish". (*Financial Times*, London, 15 May, 1972)



# news brief • news brief • news brief • news brief • news brief

**BANGLADESH.** Sheikh Mujib said he is ready to hold election any time to test the popularity of his government. He called upon the people to frustrate the designs of imperialist agents who were creating mistrust and confusion. Enemies of socialism were active in various guises, he said, but he will not allow the growth of any foreign ideology on the soil of Bangladesh. He also warned the extreme Left and Right-Wing forces who have joined hands to disrupt the country's friendship with India and USSR. The P.M. said his dream of "Golden Bengal" can be fulfilled only when the people will extend the fullest co-operation and work hard.

- A national jute conference has recommended the nationalisation of both the internal jute trade and the export to foreign countries.
- Export earnings during the last three months amounted to Taka 600m (£29m).
- Chittagong oil refinery has resumed full production.
- Bangladesh is to buy 100,000 bales of raw cotton from India, 20,000 from Russia and 30,000 from Brazil.
- Full production will begin within three months in 57 nationalized jute enterprises.
- Yugoslavia is to undertake capital investment works to the tune of \$42m for sinking of wells and electrification work.
- India is opening 3 more offices in Comilla, Rajshahi and Chittagong.
- Indian aid to Bangladesh so far amounts to over \$156m.
- Water transport system linking Bangladesh with West Bengal has been restored.
- Calcutta has now been linked with Dacca, Narayanganj, Barisal and Khulna.
- Gauhati in Assam has also been linked with Jaganathganj and Sirajganj.

**EGYPT.** President Sadat told the People's Assembly that he did not want a single Soviet soldier to fight their battle. We will fight our own battle of liberation, he said. He denied that he was seeking a confrontation between the great powers.

- Cairo radio has started a new Hebrew service.
- The USSR is helping in the construction of an aluminium complex to produce 100,000 tons of aluminium a year.
- Australia has contracted to supply 1m tons of wheat every year for the next three years.

**ETHIOPIA.** Foreign Minister told Parliament that a border agreement with Sudan was reached 70 years ago and talks on demarcation of the boundary had been going on for many years. The boundary would only be clearly known when marked in accordance with that agreement and at no cost would they cede an inch of their territory.

**INDIA.** Four persons were killed in an anti-Muslim riot in Mandapur in Bihar. Rumours said a Muslim had yoked a cow to his plough. After Hubli, Tellichery and Gulbarga, this was the 4th anti-Muslim riot in recent months.

- Soviet Union is supplying India 50 tanks of the T-76 type. These high efficiency tanks had so far been supplied only to orbital states.
- Defence Production at the 38 ordnance and public sector undertakings of the Ministry of Defence rose to a new height at Rs3,140m during 1971-72.

**INDONESIA.** In a ceremony attended by F. M. Adam Malik, the Soviet Ambassador Mikhail Volkov presented clothes, food and medicines to be given to political detainees on Buru Island and elsewhere on humanitarian grounds.

- Sixteen thousand political prisoners on Buru Island have expressed readiness to stay there with their families and work on development projects.
- Commenting on reports that a Conference on Malacca Strait sponsored by New York University will be held in London, Mr. Malik restated that the Strait is not an international waterway and any decision taken would not be binding, since each country has taken its own stand.
- Gerakan Pemuda Islam (GPI)—Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement, concluded its 2nd Congress in Solo (Central Java) on 27 April. The 5-day Congress elected Ahmed Djuwaini as President.

**IRAQ.** President Bakr announced ministerial changes to include two members of the Iraqi Communist Party and two nationalists. It was described as a "major step towards the establishment of a progressive national front."

- Romanian architects are to design the People's Assembly Hall.

**ISLAMIC SECRETARIAT.** King Faisal has donated \$40,000 to cover the foundation cost of IINA—International Islamic News Agency. Mr. Ali Abdullah said they expected to start the information service within ten days. It has also been decided to hold a meeting of news agencies and information officials of the Muslim world in Kuala Lumpur towards the end of July.

**ISRAEL.** Vatican sources said there is no fundamental objection to their recognition of Israel, but they were waiting for peace to be established.

- America is to give Israel \$50m to help bear the burden of defence against communist aggression. An additional \$2m are to be paid to help transport Soviet immigrants from Europe to Israel.
- Mrs. Meir said that there is no prospect for permitting civil marriage in Israel; it might be divisive to Jewish life.
- Jewish Defence League staged a silent demonstration near Knesset building against the activities of missionaries in Israel.
- Immigration has increased by more than 53% in the first four months of the year; immigration from France, however, continues to dwindle.
- An opinion poll showed that 70.6% Israelis were satisfied with President Nixon's ME policy. Another 23% were more or less pleased.

**JERUSALEM.** Mayor, Teddy Kollek announced that Jerusalem would be divided into boroughs like London.

**JORDAN.** Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are believed to be seeking reconciliation between Jordan and Egypt.

- A new airport in Aqaba financed by an interest-free British loan has been opened.
- Dinar has been devalued to equal \$2.8.

**LIBYA.** Muslim economists and intellectuals have issued a call for Arab States to free themselves of economic and cultural dependence

on foreign countries. Col. Qadhafi told a Congress of Islamic scholars in Beida that "man-made laws should be rejected and the law of Allah should prevail".

**MALAYSIA.** Tun Razak said they had agreed with Indonesia to divide the Strait of Malacca. He said that innocent passage would be allowed but it would be for the foreign ships to give prior notice and assure their innocence of purpose.

**NIGERIA.** Canada is to grant a loan of about £1.7m to purchase Canadian manufactured and semi-manufactured goods required for certain sectors of the Nigerian development plan. World Bank would give a loan of £4.5m to the Nigerian Livestock and Meat Authority.

**PALESTINE LIBERATION.** The Black September organisation have announced that they are getting ready to hijack all aircraft carrying Jewish immigrants and force them to land at the airports of Bahrain, Kuwait and other Arab States.

**PAKISTAN.** President Bhutto is to embark on 29 May on a tour of a number of countries of the Middle East and Africa including Turkey and Ethiopia.

- Afghan government has asked Pakistan to explain statements by certain Pakistani authorities about relations between the two countries.
- Rupee value in terms of gold has been re-fixed at 0.0744103 grams fine gold per rupee i.e. 11 Rupees to one US\$.
- Sindhi is to be made the official language of Sindh. With Baluchi as the second language, Urdu has been declared the official language of Baluchistan.
- Punjab C. M. Meraj Khalid said they also proposed making Urdu the official language of the province.
- A memorial in honour of the late President Sukarno of Indonesia is to be constructed in Rawalpindi.

**PHILIPPINES.** Thirteen Muslim farmers were reported gunned down during the last weekend of April by 'Christian' bandits in the Zamboanga Del Sur province.

**RHODESIA.** Commander Philips, Chairman of former Republican Alliance which was dissolved last month, launched the new Right-wing Democratic Party.

**SAUDI ARABIA.** The Ministry of Haj and Awqaf has established a Department to popularise the Islamic message. Literature valued at SR 0.5m is to be produced.

- Saudi Arabia has donated \$35,000 to the Islamic Association of Taiwan for constructing a mosque and buying land for a Muslim cemetery.
- Prince Salman inaugurated the annual exhibition organised by the women Renaissance society in Riyadh.
- Education Minister, Prince Khalid Ibn Fahed announced plans to eliminate illiteracy within the next 20 years.

**SOMALIA.** To mark the third phase of the Scientific Socialist campaign a soccer tournament between two girl sides took place in Afgoi on 9th May. Organised for the first time in Somalia, the match was intended as "fun to amuse the public".

- Soviet Union is to aid land reclamation in Juba Valley. The project envisages a dam, hydro-electric

power station and a 50Km irrigation canal system. Aid is to be extended also to fishing industry, reconstruction of radio stations and several other projects.

**SOVIET RUSSIA.** Compared with 6 in USA and 4 in France and Britain every Soviet citizen makes an average of 20 visits to the cinema in a year. The reason for the growing attendance is "the high ideological and artistic level of Soviet pictures".

**SUDAN.** Libyan newspaper *Al-Balagh* denounced Joseph Lagu, South Sudanese leader for saying that the 4m South Sudanese opposed Sudan joining the Federation of Arab Republics. This, the paper said confirmed Lagos' anti-Arabism and that the southern movement was working in agreement with the imperialists.

- Under the Judicial Authority Law of 1972 courts in the Civil and Shariah sectors are to be merged into a single authority.

**SYRIA.** An agreement has been signed with the Soviet Union providing for more military assistance to the Syrian navy and air force.

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.** Occidental Petroleum Corporation has donated \$25,000 to the Islamic Cultural Centre in New York.

**ZAMBIA.** Mr. Chomba, Secretary General of the Zambian National Council of Commerce and Industry said that naturalized Zambians have not co-operated sufficiently despite continuous appeals by President Kaunda and the Indian High Commissioner.

**PEOPLE**

- Abu Bakr Awadallah, Vice President Sudan, resigned.
- President Asad awarded honorary doctorate by the state-run Damascus University.
- Brig Abdul Aziz Masoud promoted Major-Gen and appointed Director-General Saudi Intelligence.
- Dr. Taslim Elias, Federal Chief Justice appointed Chairman of Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.
- Christopher Kolade appointed Director General, Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation.
- Bulent Ecevit, 47, elected leader of the Turkish R.P.P.
- Ismet Inonu, 87, resigned.
- Mian Rafique Saigol new Managing Director of Pakistan International Airlines.
- Dato Haji Abdul Talib, 61, C.M. of Malacca to retire.
- Allal Fassi, 63, President of the opposition Istiqlal Party, improved and out of danger after heart attack.
- Israel Yeshayahu, 52, elected Israeli Speaker.
- Brig. Matawera, first African Chief of the Malawi Army.

**VISITS**

- Somali President Siyad to China.
- President Sadat to Iraq.
- Marshal Grechko to Syria and Egypt.
- Tunisian Foreign Minister Mohammad Masoudi to Tripoli and Malta.
- Austrian F.M. Kirchschiager to Cairo.
- Libyan Oil Minister Mabruk to Sofia.
- Prince Muhammad Ibn Abdul Aziz to Paris for medical check-up.
- Soviet Mufti Babakhanov to Beirut, awarded "Order of Cedars".
- President Suharto to Japan.
- Tun Abdul Razak to Indonesia.
- Shahed Hosain and Aslam Azhar Pakistan's Radio and TV chiefs to China.
- D. P. Dhar, Indian diplomat to Dacca.
- Gen. Manekshaw, Indian Army Chief to Nepal.
- Mrs. Gandhi to Sweden, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in June.
- Meshbahzadeh, publisher of Iranian newspaper *Kahyan* to Moscow.
- Lord Lloyd, Vice-Chairman of the National and Grindlays Bank (40% share in the Addis Ababa Bank) to see Emperor Haile Salasse.

**DIPLOMATS**

- Liu Chun, China's first Ambassador to Turkey.
- Tai Pei-Chen, China's Charge d'Affaires in Senegal.
- Ahmad Zafar Al-Kaylani and Abdul Aziz Sa'ad Al Rashed new Iraqi and Qatar ambassadors in Jeddah.
- Abdul Hamid Abdul Razaq Byijan and Yousef Mohammed Munnayes new Kuwaiti ambassadors to China and Libya.
- Commander Philemon Quaye designated Ghana's ambassador to Liberia.

**DIED**

- Abbe Fulbert Youlou former President of Congo in Madrid on 6 May.