

# impact

INTERNATIONAL FORTNIGHTLY

ARAB UNITY  
ALGERIAN OIL  
PEOPLE'S ECONOMY  
AHEAD IN MALAYSIA  
ISLAMIC EDUCATION  
BOOK REVIEWS

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## Pakistan — facing the facts

Pakistan came into being on 14 August 1947 not as a result of any act of grace on the part of the then HMG or the Indian National Congress. There is already much in the Public Records to rebut any false notions in this regard. It was conceded to, only after it had become inevitable; that too was done as if with a vengeance.

With the new state coming into existence without even an administrative infra-structure, army stores and civilian funds blocked by India, the Hindu bankers and businessmen moving out and trying to scuttle the economy, and millions of Muslim refugees from India having been pushed into it, it was hoped that there was no chance for Pakistan to survive.

But it did survive, and its survival was as exceptional as its achievement. It was made possible only because of two reasons: the ethical and social quality of its ideals and the determination and tenacity of its people. It is necessary to recall this simple but easily forgotten fact of Pakistan's origination and survival, particularly at a time when its very foundations and premises have become a subject of questioning and doubt both because of external intrigues and internal dissensions.

Of external intrigue, there is no need to develop any special phobia, one only needs to be aware of it. It has been, and shall continue to be the fact of international politics. Which mini-power, not to speak of super powers, would not like to subserve or make use of nations willing to serve as *au-pairs*?

With Pakistan, there is a special reason too: although its association with Islam has meant no more than a token profession, yet the antipathies and hostilities it has aroused is significant to a degree which is not fully realised. Even this token allegiance seems to exceed the tolerance-limits of the liberal world—perhaps because of the role Pakistan has tried to play in the world forum on issues like independence of the Sudan, constitution for Malaya, right of self-determination for the Eritreans, justice to the Cypriot-Turks, Palestine refugees, Israeli aggression, occupation of Jerusalem, sacrilege of the Aqsa Mosque and the holy lands etc.

Last March, when it looked as if Pakistan was

going to fall apart, there was a kind of unconcealed glee that "*the militant faith of Islam, having achieved more than 1300 years after the death of the Prophet its most formidable political expression ever, is yielding to simple nationalism . . . is approaching its inevitable end.*" (Sunday Telegraph, March 14), Whether this joy was mean or justified is besides the point but, as far as Pakistan is concerned, it may better address itself to the realities within itself, and within its own competence.

The present crisis seems to have been given and acquired an exaggerated overtone of East Pakistani grievances and secessionist propensities but this is very superficial.

So far as the secessionist propensities are concerned, these are not in any way exclusive to certain people or group of people in East Pakistan. In West Pakistan too, there are not insignificant groups and individuals both in politics and in the establishment who would not mind pushing out East Pakistan so that they may become the master of at least what is now West Pakistan. East Pakistan, to them is turbulent, volatile and prone to be chaotic. Pakistan would be much better without than with them, and the never-ending squabbles about quota in the services, foreign exchange etc. Even economically too, West Pakistan would be better off without the Eastern wing, its pestilent economy and calamitous climate. Needless to say that this sort of thinking is either sheer stupidity or pure treason.

Yet, how-so-much microscopic and small this group may be, its very presence should be a matter of grave concern. It also seems difficult to say how much of the present disenchantment in East Pakistan with the ideal of one and strong Pakistan was original and what proportion was secondary and in reaction to the attitude of this group. An interesting fact to note is that the 'pushers' as well as the 'separatists' derive inspiration and support from the same external sources. Talking about West Pakistan, one also cannot ignore, the incipient nationalisms in Sind and Baluchistan and the not-so-dormant issue of Pakhtunistan in the North West Frontier.



### The question of injustice and grievances?

In saying that this is not the central problem, there is no intention to deny or gloss over the fact of injustice and the reality of the grievances of which we shall be speaking about in the later issues. What is more important, however, is the need to adopt an adult attitude to the problems of the country as a whole and not allow one's feelings and emotions to be exploited and worked upon in such a way as to become a paranoid. To be denied one's rights is persecution enough but to develop a persecution complex is only aggravating the malady. The people of East Pakistan are the major partners in the national polity of Pakistan and much would, therefore, depend on the balance of their perspective and maturity of their approach.

The central point about injustice and inequities is that it applied to Pakistan as a whole and not East Pakistan in exclusion. If East Pakistan suffered inequities it was because Pakistan itself has been groaning under the heels of modified feudalism, primitive capitalism and outside paternalism. The responsibility for continuing with this state of affairs should lie on the people of Pakistan as a whole and there is no sense in trying to differentiate between the tyrants and exploiters belonging to this or the other region.

The simple but the fundamental fact is that from the very early stages, the leadership took a road which proceeded not towards the ideals Pakistan had sought to justify itself by, but in an opposite direction. The system of education that so ensued had nothing to offer in terms of integrating the individuals with the ideology. In the beginning they were all Pakistanis: proud and patriotic; but, soon the fissures started appearing: they were now Bengalis, Punjabis and Sindhis etc. If the system of education went to produce an alienated society, the system of administration — bureaucratic, self-righteous and non-democratic — helped to rotate the centrifuge faster.

Because of the Muslim League infightings a constitution could not be framed until 1956. In 1958 this constitution was abrogated and the country came under Ayub Khan's dictatorship. The Muslim League was the party which had led the struggle for Pakistan. Once in power it did not show the capacity to tolerate any principled opposition. The malcontents and the dissidents who walked out from the Muslim League, too proved incapable of formulating and giving any positive lead on the issues and problems in an overall national context. Politicians who came to power on parochial slogans and by promising justice to their region sought to fulfil their pledge through an unbridled policy of nepotism and favouritism. What could not be achieved was easily blamed on the other nepot. This certainly was not the way of solving the problem of neglect and disparity.

The Muslim League dissidents (the Awami League, National Awami Party, Republican Party and their variants), instead of trying to give a positive lead and extricate the country out of the morass, found it

easier to divert feelings and emotions against the other regions. It so happened that the capital and the seat of political power came to be sited in West Pakistan. The fact of non-participation and alienation was more or less common to all the regions but while this small incidence served to restrain certain feelings of local nationalism in West Pakistan, in case of East Pakistan, it went to compound the fact of a pre-existing geographical distance. Had the capital come to be sited in East Pakistan, it was not unlikely for the parochialists in West Pakistan to have reacted in a more or less similar fashion. That underlies the fact that as far as the common man is concerned, the fact of exploitation and non-participation was common to all people, all regions. If it varied, it varied in degree not in quality.

The plain truth is that the Pakistan of Jinnah's promise was simply never established.

There are many factors and causes which are and can be cited as being responsible for the denial of Pakistan, the ideal, but it is difficult to say if the people of Pakistan, both in the East and the West, can escape their share of blame and responsibility.

Unlike West, East Pakistan besides being the majority wing was very much free from the constraints of a feudalistic set up. In their struggle to establish a just and democratic order, the patriotic elements in West Pakistan, therefore, looked for a lead and greater support from the East Pakistani politicians. The country would certainly have been saved from the miseries and tragedies of today if the COP (Combined Opposition Parties) were able to unseat Ayub Khan in the elections of 1964-65. Maulana Bhashani, one of the earliest 'champions' of the East Pakistani rights was the first to propose Jinnah's sister, Fatima to fight the Presidential election against Ayub. His party—NAP—was a constituent of the COP but he switched support to Ayub. Even the sum of money that passed in consideration thereof has been openly talked about. After Ayub Khan was able to rig through, the COP decided to boycott the elections to the national and provincial assemblies and continue with the struggle to achieve democratic participation. This was sabotaged by the Awami League.

No one would say that this was in any way designed to advance the interests of East Pakistan unless one argued that the intention from the very outset was to promote political crisis, heighten tension, deepen the feelings of separation and one day say good-bye. This is not throwing any blame but it is as much the duty of the East Pakistani masses and intellectuals as other Pakistanis, to take a dispassionate and realistic look at the stark realities of the Pakistan situation.

Pakistan can either be rebuilt on the principles of unity, fraternity and social justice or scuttled to sink into the deep ocean of history. National self determination is beautiful and double-edged: nations live if they are determined to, and commit suicide if they want to.

## Survey THE NEW ARAB FEDERATION/France & THE ALGERIAN OIL

### In search of unity

Apart from the mission and the rounds of Rogers, the focal point of attention and comment in the Middle East is the Federation of Arab States called into being by the Benghazi Agreement of April 19th between the heads of State of Egypt, Libya and Syria. There are several questions which this link-up raises: What were the factors which brought these three countries together? Why did the Sudan, which had taken an active part in the preliminaries not decide to join? Was the agreement hastily arrived at, or was it timed to coincide with certain developments in the political situation? What does each participating country stand to gain or lose from the Federation? What does the Federation as a whole hope to achieve and how? How is the Federation viewed by other Arab states, by Israel and by other countries of the world? And what are the chances of its achieving a greater degree of permanence and of realising its professed ideals?

The Federation has been placed in all kinds of historical perspectives. It is seen as a natural development from the Tripoli Charter signed between Egypt, Libya and the Sudan in 1969 providing for military, economic and political cooperation. It is seen in the larger context of recent, but abortive, attempts at Arab unity beginning with that of Egypt, Syria and the Yemen tried between 1958 and 1961. It is even seen in the context of a centuries-old Arab yearning for unity harking back to Umayyad times in the seventh century. It is seen (by the Tunisian Foreign Minister for example) as an endeavour aimed at achieving the aspirations of all Arabs and Muslims. It is seen as part of the fight against imperialism and Zionism. It is seen also as a step in the promotion of socialism. These last two are the factors which have taken on prominence and we may ask ourselves what does the Federation hope to contribute now in the resisting of Israeli aggression.

First, by the provision for close military coordination, the Federation will bring Libya directly into the Arab-Israeli war for the first time. The practical result of this may not be very decisive especially as France is now under pressure to stop the sale of Mirage jets to the Libyans.

Second, Syria is again brought out of obscurity, but one wonders how capable Syria is really to play anything more than

its hitherto very timorous and insignificant, but hardly quiescent role.

Third, the militant tone of the Benghazi declaration may have the effect of dissuading Anwar Sadat of Egypt from making any sort of overtures with Israel. Before the declaration, there were many indications that Egypt wanted to come to some kind of terms with Israel which meant continuing and developing the policy pursued by the late President Nasser. These indications of conciliation had become very pronounced recently. And probably feeling that the time was not yet ripe for the actual coming to terms, Sadat—to maintain Egypt's position as leader of the Arab world which must be done by championing the cause of the Palestinians—hastened to have the agreement proclaimed, pledging "no peace, no negotiations" with Israel and no bargaining over the Palestine question. At this very time, one may note, an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt was being discussed regarding the opening of the Suez Canal.

It is on this assessment of the political situation that one might say fairly that the agreement appears to have been hastily entered into. This haste is one of the reasons why the Sudan did not join the Federation. Although it has declared its willingness to do so "when conditions permit", the Sudanese leader Numayri really felt (according to the Sudanese paper *al-Sahafah*) that the Federation should have been established in stages. It is paradoxical that the Sudanese communist party should be among those resisting Sudan's entry.

All this bodes ill for the endurance of the Federation. And one may also see the insistence on socialism as being an obstacle. Certainly Libya's economy is far from being socialistic and Col. Qaddafi himself has made some embarrassingly unfavourable remarks on such matters as the communist block and Marxism. Whether he will prove to be accommodating to socialist ideas infiltrating from Egypt is difficult to say, but even before April there were many Libyans who were complaining about the increasing Egyptian presence in Libya in such a way as to recall the words of Shukri al-Quwatli, one-time President of Syria and vice-President of the U.A.R. until Syria seceded in 1961. He was one of those responsible

for that Union and, giving reasons for its break-up he said: "The Egyptian authorities accused even those Syrians as being traitors, reactionaries, and pro-colonialists who had quite sincerely served their country for about four decades. The Egyptians adopted policies of repression and high-handedness. The atmosphere frightened the Syrians, so much so, that they saw their lives and the means of their livelihood in danger. An oppressive bureaucracy... began to impose on the Syrians such alien ideologies which were clearly against our religion, history and culture... The Egyptian officers made an unprecedented loot of our wealth and resources."

Though the terms of the agreement are much looser than the 1958 Union and guarantees each head of state direct control over his own armed forces, the provision giving the unified military command authority to send troops from any member state to another to suppress internal disorder, brings to mind the horrors of the Yemen war. But it is unlikely that such a situation would recur and be allowed to develop.

Most other Arab states welcomed the move to unity, some with more fervour than others. Boumeddiene welcomed it as a sign that the Arab nation was "working persistently to rebuild its lost glory" and prayed to God for its success. Tunisia blessed any actions aimed at strengthening Arab ranks but was concerning itself with 'the building of the edifice of the greater Arab Maghreb.' Israel is reported to be not unduly disturbed but speaks of the rise of Qaddafi and his 'fanaticism' as introducing a mood of intransigence in the situation. The USSR greeted the Federation with fulsome praise since it is based on the principles of 'democracy and socialism' and open to all Arab countries that 'can absorb socialism.' Other socialist countries were just as enthusiastic.

Apart from the rhetoric—and that is something substantial in itself—which surrounded the proclamation of the Federation of Arab States, there is little of certain importance that one can say about the link-up and about how far it would achieve its goals of "victory, unity and socialism." The question as to how far it would progress even by September when it comes up for more popular ratification is still wide open to any answers.



## Survey

### neither oil nor wine from Algeria

Algeria is a new entrant to the oil-producers' club. The reserves are estimated at over 73,000 million tons. Production has shot up from 1.3 million tons in 1959 to 43.2 million tons in 1969. Earnings from crude petroleum go to make over two thirds of the country's export earnings.

It was because of the oil potential of the Sahara that France found it so difficult to disengage from North Africa. There even was a plan to establish the oil region into a separate Sahara Administration but it failed.

In any case, France has so far been the chief producer and importer of the Algerian oil. The industry, has been heavily concentrated in the hands of the French, in fact the French Government. ELF-ERAP and Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP) which own and operate the oil-fields in Algeria (over 66% of the total oil industry), are under the direct control of the French Government and are *not private corporations*. ELF-ERAP (production around 18 million tons) is state-owned, while CFP (production around 12 million tons) is state-controlled and the government holds 35 per cent shares. Over 10,000 French technicians are employed by the industry of which 800 hold key positions. With the oil Companies trying to maximize their profits and control without paying a reasonable price, Algerian dependence on France got very much built into the system.

The investment level being low, these companies transferred abroad a larger part of their net income. The ratio of transferred income to total net assets went up from 35 per cent in 1948-49 to 67 per cent in 1958-60, while during the same period in the Middle East, the ratio of net income to net assets rose from 61 to 72 per cent. This was the state of affairs when Algeria restricted the transfers to 50 per cent of the net profit.

Algeria has always been committed to a policy of nationalisation and it was natural for her to seek effective control of the oil industry, as well as an equitable share in the profits. Attempt was also made to integrate the oil industry with the rest of the economy and expand the oil relations.

The Anglo-Dutch and American owned companies were nationalised without any trouble. With France, the negotiations

went on for twenty months but finally broke down and President Boumeddiene had to announce on 24th February the take over of 51 per cent controlling interests in all French oil companies operating in the country. All their assets in natural gas and pipelines were also nationalised and required to be run by the state-owned oil and gas company, *Sonatrach*. The system of concession was abolished and the companies asked to pay up the tax-arrears outstanding since the last two years. A compensation of \$100 million was promised in lieu of the shares taken over.

Last summer Algeria was asking only \$2.85 a barrel, while the companies initially offered \$2.08 and finally came to \$2.55 per barrel. Oil was being retailed by these very companies for \$10 a barrel, but they were not prepared to pay another 30 cents. The position is that oil is a vertically integrated industry and the oil companies make profit at each step, from pumping to cargoeing and retailing. The French Government has now ended its special relationship with Algeria including that with the Algerian wine. A worldwide boycott of supplies of oil from Algeria has been called for and the prospective buyers warned of the 'danger' of buying Algerian crude until the dispute is settled. The case is to be taken to the International Court of Justice at The Hague and pressure is being brought to bear on Washington not to proceed with the proposed gas agreement. The World Bank and Export-Import Bank of U.S.A. have been asked not to extend financial cooperation to Algeria.

The real issues that have been raised in respect to the Algerian stand are precisely these:

- (a) unilateral nationalisation
- (b) too low compensation
- (c) an arbitrary and too high reference price.

As it were, all the Western economies are mixed economies with 20 to 30 per cent of their GNP originating in the public sector. France is no exception and even the French companies involved are *state corporations*. The objection to the principle of nationalisation, therefore, looks strange and simplistic. As to its being *unilateral*,

there does not appear to be any instance in history where a profit-maximizing foreign enterprise has ever offered to negotiate nationalisation.

Even in the capitalist economies, nationalisation is often forced upon a sector or a group of firms. Recently when the Conservative Government in Britain decided to 'take over' Rolls-Royce it allowed it to first go into liquidation and get cut down to size (i.e. reduced financial liabilities) before stepping to take it into its lap. Nationalisation by definition is bound to be unilateral in certain respects and there is no need to have double standards in respect of the 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' economies.

Another aspect of this 'unilateral' declaration which may be objected to is its suddenness. But this intention to nationalise was declared long ago. It has been in process and even the French companies have since been engaged in examining the various aspects of the matter.

The compensation figure are alleged to be too low. It has been said that the indemnity figure is so low that if the French companies have to pay their tax-arrears then they will not get back anything at all. Tax arrears are a liability and have to be met irrespective of whatever compensation may or may not be admissible. To bracket the two makes things appear rather suspicious.

The per barrel price agreed to between the Gulf producers and the Western oil companies is \$3.45 while the 'arbitrary' reference price said to be demanded by Algeria is \$3.60 per barrel. This is not in the least unreasonable, if one considers the fact that the quality of the Algerian oil is higher and it is available very close to the European terminals as compared to the sources in the Arabian Gulf.

In 1967 "When France's state-owned *Entreprise de Recherches et d'Activites Petrolieres* took over confiscated concessions in Iraq, ERAP agreed to finance a search for oil in concession lands once owned by Iraqi Petroleum Company" It then suited France to reap big rewards from its nationalised rivals in Iraq but it is 'unlawful' if the Algerians try to take over the fruits of their own soil. This seems hardly defensible.



## ECONOMICS

## Of people, not of things

JAVED ANSARI

Every age has its obsessions and we are obsessed with economics. We are being told by the press, by the "intellectuals", by the trade unionists, and by the politicians that the economic problem is the only, or at least the principal issue on which attention should be focussed. Economics is the morality of the twentieth century. We ask of societies and cultures, of organisations and institutions: "Do they facilitate growth, do they lead to development?" Growth and development are of course measured by rates of changes in the production indices. Today men disagree on all matters but one. A rapidly growing economy is to be the sole aim for all societies and all nations.

How are we supposed to achieve this goal? The science of political economy has been evolved to answer this question. Or at least this is what it claims to do. It is supposed to identify certain fundamental universal laws which govern economic behaviour. On the basis of these laws it postulates the nature of the relationship between different economic agents and then goes on to formulate a set of policy conclusions which eliminate contradictions and facilitate coordination within the economic system. If economic life is governed, according to these policies, it is expected that production will be maximised.

There are two main economic orthodoxies. The classical orthodoxy differs from the Marxist orthodoxy in its assumptions not its methods. Both orthodoxies insist that they have discovered a set of economic principles which hold true irrespective of the environmental settings. This remarkable similarity between the economic theory of capitalism on the one hand and the economic doctrines of Marx on the other, arise from the similar intellectual background that these theories share.

Classical economics was formalised by the liberal apologists of the 18th and 19th century in Europe. Those who revolted against the divine right of the King were, in those days, hard pressed to provide a justification for the de facto usurpation of these rights by a moneyed minority. In England, in France, and later in Germany and Italy, the protagonists of the New Order had united the oppressed under their leadership. The slogans of Equality, Liberty and Fraternity had promised a brave new world in which only the naive would be exploited and all men would share the fruits of their labour. Yet that brave New World did not come. The monarchies merely transformed themselves into plutocracies under the guise of either Bonapartism or liberalism. Economic institutions, political organisations

and social forms still reflected the interests of the small, privileged and moneyed minority. Concentration of power—both political and economic—reached unprecedented dimensions.

This led to an increase in the intellectual and moral frustration of creators of this system. Before endeavouring to justify their existence to society as a whole, they had to justify their existence to themselves. Political economy was an attempt on the part of the new elite to reassure themselves that they had created the best of all possible worlds. In the days of Adam Smith and David Ricardo there was a deliberate and explicit attempt to justify on social grounds the assumptions that the economic theory makes in an attempt to defend the moral bias of the main body of the economic doctrine. Ours is an age of the Ponglosses of Chicago and Massachussets to whom these value premises are sacrosanct and a refinement of the argument and an application of the teachings of the Masters are the only 'scientifically' useful tasks.

The Marxists have handled economic theory in much the same way. There was virtually no socialist economic theory (except in the most general and abstract sense) before 1917. Once the socialist system was established, socialist economists rapidly divided themselves into two groups: the technicians who manage the economy and the theorists who justify the existence of the economic power structure.

Both Capitalist and Marxist economics are based on an adoption of what is erroneously described as "The Scientific Method". On the basis of a set of assumptions, which embody the value preferences of the economists themselves, Economic Theory claims to identify the unique set of conditions which will maximise production. Given the assumptions as to the function that is to be maximised and the behavioural relationships, this is of course (tautologically) the only determinate solution to the system. Economic policy then tries to see where there is a major difference between the existing and the optimum, and then to remove this difference. Such an approach allows the development of an elaborate sophistry which conceals behind a facade of technical jargon and complicated rationalizations the real aims of the economic managers.

Modern economic life is of course being conducted with specific and well defined aims about which the economic manager (and the less naive of the economic theorists) are very clear. This aim, to put it simply, is to maximize the control of a small group of economic managers over the whole system. A centralization of the decision-making

authority is necessary if the Western way of life is to survive and flourish. Economic power must be concentrated in the hands of the group that is politically dominant and intellectually superior. Quite logically the West has since the 17th century created a technological infra-structure and a social super-structure which facilitates a continuous increase in the concentration of power.

Economic theory does not merely justify this state of affairs; an application of its policy formulations promote it. Marxism, as it is practised today has quite frankly given up its vision of the state that is to wither away. It demands that all authority should concentrate in the hand of the bureaucratic elite that runs the Communist Party. Similarly despite the idealization of perfect competition, an application of the principles of classical economics is the best method of developing monopolistic conditions. If we start from a position of gross economic inequalities and then on the principle of *laissez-faire* allow the rich and powerful to crush the smaller units, monopoly will of course grow.

Economic theory has tried to obscure these realities by talking of things not of people; of consumption not of consumers, of "savings" not savers, of "planning" not planners, of "social welfare functions" and "optimum allocation of resources". The men who take the decisions, who determine consumption, savings and investments, who formulate plans, who settle deals and fix the price of goods, of services and of money have preferred to remain anonymous.

Evidently the vast majority of human beings is sick of the tyranny that has so skillfully been imposed. There is an obvious need to formulate a systematic, consistent and *principled* position with regard to the whole set of the premises as well as the tiny exploitative minority. One must begin with a clear and unambiguous appreciation of the system so created and methods by which it is manipulated.

Such an attempt should aim at analysing economic trends and identifying the basic causes underlying these situations. The focus of attention may well be on developing a theory of economic exploitation, and discovering the economic relationships that have been created by the exploiters, and also the mechanics of coordination and complementarity of the economic institutions which foster and sustain these relationships. In short the emphasis should be on Man; man as an exploiter, man as the exploited and man as an instrument of exploitation.



## Looking ahead in Malaysia

Syed Nasir, vice-President of the United Malay National Organisation, the ruling party in Malaysia and Member of Parliament gave a special interview to IMPACT last month while on an official visit to Britain in connection with the recent five-nation talks between Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Britain—talks which have been described as 'desperate attempts on the part of Britain to maintain its presence in the Far East'. Syed Nasir is no stranger to Britain. He has visited the country at least five times, the first being in 1951 when he came to study the implementation of the 1944 Education Act in his capacity as Inspector of Malay schools. Later he was sent to Wales to study the bilingual problem there since 'we have these problems in our country.'

### To Malaysia's Advantage

Elaborating on the purpose of his visit, Nasir said that the New defence 'Arrangement' between the five nations was to Malaysia's advantage. In the previous Agreement, Britain was predominant. The new Arrangement was not obligatory but entered upon freely. No special rights were given to the British but 'we still allow them facilities in the jungle training Centre in Johore.' Any help needed was only in the event of possible external aggression. As regards internal defence 'we can look to it ourselves'. Asked about what specific external threats Malaysia faced, Nasir replied that there was none but hinted at possible Chinese aggression. About ideological threats he said: 'We still have militant communists on the Thai-Malaysian border and on the Indonesian border. There are not many of them. But they are militant. We must prepare ourselves. But at the moment there is no threat.'

The cooperation of the five nations was based partly on the fact of being in the Commonwealth, and also because of common interests in trade and defence. In addition, 'Malaysia and Singapore—geographically and economically—just cannot be separated. Also Australia and New Zealand are beginning to realise that they cannot separate themselves from Asian countries like Indonesia and Malaysia and are working towards a closer relationship with us.' On relations with Indonesia, Nasir said that Malaysia had a very close understanding with the Suharto government on various levels.

### Patani—a 'Domestic Problem'

Asked about the problem of Patani and the condition of the Malay Muslim majority there under Thai rule, Nasir said that the four states of southern Thailand have been part of Thailand for about 100 years. And although the people there, Muslim and Malay have—according to press reports—been struggling for in-



dependence because of alleged ill-treatment by Thailand with respect to education, social amenities and so on, the Malaysian government could not do anything about it because 'it is an internal struggle.' 'Surely', he went on, 'we are sympathetic to any people being discriminated against. But this is a domestic problem. We shouldn't interfere. Just as in our case if there is any trouble within the country, we naturally wouldn't like others to come in... unless we ask for help and assistance. We have an understanding between the Thailand and Malaysian Armed Forces regarding militant communists along the border providing for a joint operation to deal with the matter. Also, the relationship at the moment between the two countries is very cordial. Once we try to poke our nose in others' domestic affairs, then we would be having more trouble. At the moment Malaysia cannot afford to have any such involvement. The same attitude holds with regards to the conflict in Pakistan. With Muslims killing each other, we have been asked by various countries to condemn and so on. But we say, No! Our stand as expressed by our Prime Minister is, 'This is a domestic problem. Let it be resolved by the people concerned.'

As to whether people in South Thailand were actually being oppressed, Nasir said: 'That I don't know. Information is only from newspaper reports and individual Patanis. I myself have not been inside these states. I have been to Bangkok, but not to these states.'

Syed Nasir then went on to deal with the internal problems of Malaysia composed as it is of various races, each having its own traditions, language, culture and religion. He acknowledged that there were many problems which were exacerbated in the past because of mistakes committed by the previous government in taking things too lightly and 'sweeping things under the carpet.' Now however, 'these problems are being wisely handled by the government.' He said that the non-Malays i.e. the non-indigenous people had all the rights and all the privileges that they needed.

### Not a racial, but an economic problem.

Nasir argued that the crux of the present problems in Malaysia was not racial but economic. The industrial and commercial sectors had always been in the hands of the non-Malays. The Malays never had the opportunity to participate in those sectors. Nasir related this situation to the troubles of May 1969 and went on: 'Thank God, with the able leadership of Tun Abdur Razzak, who was then the Director of Operations in the Emergency Period, we are now back to normal and we have convened Parliament in February. We go back to the pre-13 May with renewed vigour and programmes to make practical the solutions to the problems by having a New Economic Policy.'

Questioned about the necessity of introducing amendments to the Constitution of the country before the NEP could be put into effect, Syed Nasir said: 'We believe that a country like Malaysia cannot just adopt and copy parliamentary democracy as practised in Britain or elsewhere. We have tried this since 1955. We have tried this for more than ten years and this was not possible in our community because the economic imbalance between the rural and urban areas and the gap between the haves and have-nots is largely unlike the conditions in Britain and the States. There are certain sensitive issues which have always been played up and capitalised on by the opposition parties who can only survive on these issues and have misused and abused this democracy without considering the security of the nation. So we found that these issues should not be discussed in public or even in Parliament because there are 1000 and 1 other issues which need to have priority. The Bill in question was supported by all the opposition parties except the D.E.P. and the P.E.P.'

Asked whether legislation held any promise for racial reconciliation, Nasir replied: 'This is just one of the means. First we must not allow unscrupulous politicians to use the people and excite their feelings by using sensitive issues like language and religion to flare up in the country. The other aspect of the problem is constructive plans to build up a progressive and strong economy for the country. Fortunately enough, our economy is very strong, very stable. In fact, for every dollar we have about \$1.15 gold reserve. Malaysia is one of the few countries in this position.' On the question whether he saw the banning of certain verses of the Qur'an from public rallies and meetings in the same light as the new legislation, Nasir replied: 'The thing is they are not barred actually because the Qur'an cannot be... The only thing we say is do not try to use the *ayats* just half of it—without considering the whole *ayat*. It is very



## Syed Nasir M.P. interviewed for Impact

dangerous. Because if you read an ayat which says that you can break your fast in Ramadan without adding the conditions under which you may do so—travelling, sickness, etc.—then this is very dangerous. And this has been done by opposition parties in order to get the votes of the people. Naturally, as you know, we are one of the countries in the Far East which promoted religion even up to international level.'

Syed Nasir was then asked about work in the missionary field. He said that there were many bodies working at various levels—among the masses, the intellectuals, the women, the non-Muslims etc.—but that the efforts of his society were directed mainly to 'our own Muslims etc who are under the influence of western cultures and materialism and who may go astray from the teaching of Islam.' He wanted to make Muslims realise the challenges being faced in the modern world. Although some government grants were received for this work, a major problem was the shortage of funds and of able personnel which they were trying to remedy by proper training methods. On the other hand, the Christian missionaries were working very hard. 'They have no problem of funds, no problem in personnel—men or women. They have international links. They have people here in Britain, in France, Italy, the U.S. They have got the funds.' As to government's attitude towards the Christian missionaries, Nasir said that no special facilities were given to them 'but it is enshrined in our Constitution that everyone is free to practise his own religion, so they are allowed. But they cannot promote Christianity among the Muslims. In fact we have found one or two who have been doing such missionary work and who were asked to leave the country.'

Asked whether there were any efforts to bring Islam to the Chinese and the animists, Nasir said that there were and these were proving successful: 'In Sabah particularly, this is really the sole work of the Chief Minister, Tun Mustafa, who is very active in this field. He himself has converted about three to four hundreds, many of whom are intellectuals.'


Asked whether he saw Chinese acceptance of Islam as hope for promoting national solidarity, Nasir said: 'Of course. But some people argue differently saying that in countries having people who profess the same religion, there was no such solidarity. But in a country like Malaysia, this would definitely be a factor.'

Syed Nasir then elaborated on his work on the development of the Malay language. He remarked that 'Malay was the *lingua franca* of that part of the world since the seventh century, and although the language has the flexibility to adapt foreign words, its development was arrested by the British.

Before independence, all the books were orientated towards British interests. Regarding history, we knew more about English history than our own and the history of our neighbours. About geography, we knew every little river, every little town in England but about towns in Indonesia and the Phillipines, we didn't know anything. Education should be from the known to the unknown, from the near to the far in expanding circles. We should know our own first and then others.' Nasir said that he definitely saw the development of language as being one of the most effective means for combating the effects of colonialism: 'We have to do a lot in the development of the language. To make the people realise that it was the official language and the national language needed a lot of convincing. But this has been done quite successfully even though there were some people who tried to prevent it. For example, in education we produced more than six million copies of publications including three monthly literary magazines, one on the popular level, one for students and another more sophisticated for scholars and people

learning the language in depth. I think we have done quite a great deal in changing the minds of the people to have a national language.' Nasir emphasised that this had to be done since Malay had become no more than a common language whereas 'in the sixteenth century we had books on philosophy, on science etc. until the Portuguese came and destroyed so many of our valuable publications. Talking of old Malay literature, there is probably more in London and Leiden than in Kuala Lumpur. We are very fortunate that Malay language is basically the same as the Indonesian language although the development took place at different levels and in different directions'.

Finally, asked if he was on the whole optimistic about the problems of Malaysia—both internally and within the context of its position in S.E. Asia, Nasir replied: 'Definitely. With the new drive of the Prime Minister and his colleagues and the programmes of the government, and the seriousness of those given various assignments, I am very confident that we are going to have a more prosperous Malaysia.'



"Melee" by Khalil Ibrahim, expressing the subtleties of the Malaysian scene



## MUSLIMS IN THE WEST


# The new exodus

A. W. HAMID


The coming of Muslims to the West in recent times represents a kind of movement of population unknown in Islamic history. This movement has introduced a new dimension to the centuries-old question of the relationship between Islam and the Western world. It is a dimension which is having and promises to have even greater and more momentous implications for the history of both the West and of Islam.

The contact between Islam and the West has been very old. One of the oldest and quite astounding indications of this is the coin of King Offa of Kent in the seventh century. That this was not followed up on a greater scale is indicative of the sporadic and tenuous nature of the contact. But Europe has always felt the presence of the Muslim world, although this was usually at a distance and clouded by feelings of uneasiness, mistrust and fear as first the 'Arab invasion' and later the 'Ottoman peril' threatened the southern and east-European frontiers of Christendom. Those were the times when the Muslim world was clearly in the ascendant and they too had a contempt for the 'Franks' which was not out of keeping with the dark and barbarous conditions obtaining in Europe then.

Then the roles were reversed and the world witnessed an upsurge of European imperialism and colonialism which extended its power and influence to many parts of the known and unknown world. In the beginning it was this naked imperialism and colonialism which brought Muslims to the West in conditions far, very far from humane. Among the slaves transported from West Africa to the West Indies and America, many were Muslims. And it is no accident that many 'Negroes' in those parts are coming to Islam in increasing numbers as part of a conscious effort to regain 'a lost heritage'. Indentured Indian Muslim immigrants in the West Indies, Malays in Surinam, and one might include



Courtesy: British Museum  
Gold dinar of King Offa of Kent (755-96 A.D.) showing Arabic inscription meaning 'There is no god but Allah alone and there is no associate unto Him' and on the other side 'Offa Rex'.



Eid scene in London: the exodus and the disorientation

Impact Photo: M. D. Arshed

those in South Africa, were among those who formed the first Muslim communities in the West in conditions which were less brutal than slavery, but often no less testing.

### The post-imperial relationship

Apart from the above, the movement of Muslims to the West in recent decades has been an entirely voluntary or at the most induced migration. In many essentials, it still forms part of the legacy of European imperialism. We find by and large people from a particular area leaving to seek opportunities in the 'metropolitan' countries of their erstwhile colonial masters. Thus we find Algerians, Tunisians, Mauritians migrating to France; Pakistanis, Indians, Kenyans, Malaysians, Nigerians, Cypriot Turks etc to Britain, Indonesians to Holland and Turks to Germany, although in this latter case because of a traditional German 'friendship' with Turkey.

Broadly speaking, this migration resulted from the continued underdevelopment of the Muslim world. This forced out the people to seek economic well-being in 'developed' but often distant societies. Many of those who have come are unskilled and find menial jobs as in the textile factories in the north of England or on the railways in Germany. Some of them, by dint of hard work, have been able to set themselves up as traders and businessmen. Others are professional people like the doctors and teachers who come to gain experience by working in the West. There is also a sizeable number of Muslim refugees in Europe and America, for example, Turkestani Muslims from Central Asia fleeing from Communist rule. In Germany alone these number about 35,000. Then there is a large number of Muslim students who are to be found in institutions of higher learning in various parts of

Europe, Britain, America and Canada pursuing by and large scientific and technological studies.

No proper statistics are available concerning the number of Muslims in the various countries of the West. But the number runs into millions. In France alone, there are over two million Muslims. In Britain, although the British Yearbook 1970 gives a figure of 1 million, other estimates centre around the more realistic figure of 300,000. In Germany, other parts of western Europe and in the United States, the figure runs into hundreds of thousands.

What then are the prospects of these Muslims who have come to live in the West? However diverse their backgrounds and objectives and however amorphous and scattered this body of Muslims may be at the moment, one thing is clear: they will not remain a shifting, volatile population. Pakistanis in Britain, for example, although they may have come with the intention of making a quick pile and returning after a few years, are settling down without knowing it. Their children are now born in the West. And this generation of youth coupled with the number of westerners who are accepting Islam (although at the moment few in number) either through inter-marriage or genuine conviction, would instil a greater degree of permanence to the Muslim presence in the West.

Beyond this, there is little that can be said with certainty. How far would this body of Muslims work for and preserve social cohesion and group action? How far will they remain true to the values of Islam? How effectively would they meet the challenges posed by a different environment?

There are many negative pointers. The vast majority of Muslims who come to the West come from an inadequate or indifferent Islamic background. There is very little

inter-communication between the various groups as for example as between the Pakistanis, the Turks and the Arabs in Britain (except on a student level, at times). And one would often come across more fervour in the celebration of seasonal or national festivals than of Muslim occasions like Eids. Often, reaction to the different environment is in the extremes. Pakistanis and some other groups are generally prone to isolation—whether from aloofness or feelings of inferiority but hardly from the more neutral feeling of being 'different.' Turkish Cypriots integrate far more readily and in this they are somewhat akin to the Arabs. There are however exceptions as with one group of Sudanese of the same tribe who came to Britain. They all lived in one house in Leeds, spoke, cooked, ate, and did almost everything in the same manner as they had done among the Sha'iqi in northern Sudan.

There are however quite a number of positive pointers. Associations are being formed to look after the religious and social interests of the community. In many of the main towns and cities, there is a centre or occasionally a mosque where at least the Friday prayer is held. In many colleges and universities, there are Muslim student associations whose activities are animated by the conviction that Islam is an intellectual force and way of life which is second to none. Various professional bodies are also being formed, as for example, among doctors in Britain and engineers in Europe. Various schemes at different levels are being put into effect to deal with the religious education of Muslim children. Trusts are being formed to tackle problems on a larger and wider scale. And although most people tend to think that there is a widespread and even total hostility prevailing on the part of the West towards Islam and Muslims, yet there are instances of help and appreciation from various authorities as for example the German government's assistance to Imams and the German railways' provision of prayer facilities on trains for its Muslim workers.

Despite this, it is true to say that the Muslims in coming to the West, have come to a society which knows very little of their beliefs and way of life, to a society which is mechanised and competitive—from which they can learn much and derive great benefit and at the same time be sucked into.

Keeping in mind the problems, can these Muslims—as some of them already do—look forward to the promise of a strengthened and invigorated Muslim community in the heartlands of the West? Can they see a development taking place in the West similar to the spread of Islam eastwards into places like Malaysia and Indonesia. Whatever, the answer, it is yet a long, long time away.

## Nota Bene

'SCRIBE'

The supposed aim of the Arab policy until June 1967 was to seek eviction of the squatter state of Israel. With the dramatic emergence of 'new facts' in June, the aim was set as removing the consequences of aggression.

Then came the famous resolution 242 passed by the Security Council on 22 November 1967 and the objective accordingly redefined as seeking the implementation of this resolution. The opening of the Suez Canal seems to be the aim now. What's next, could be anybody's guess. Perhaps forcing Golda to take a shopping trip to Khan Khalil.

Whether for reasons genuine or because of Kissinger-Rogers clash of personalities, the American public opinion has recently been a shade restive about Israel's real attitude to peace. These prevalent misconceptions have been effectively rebutted by Goldberg.

He has detailed at least five concessions made so far by Israel. Israel wanted: (1) direct negotiations but agreed to begin talking through Jarring, (2) negotiations at the Foreign Minister level but came down to ambassadorial, (3) discussions to be held close to the M.E. but agreed to commence in New York, (4) agreed and indefinite ceasefire but consented to unilateral Egyptian declaration, and (5) removal of missiles and sites but agreed to accept the U.S. Phantoms.

The baby is now more than three and as it should be, there is now a paternity dispute.

First it was Lord George-Brown who claimed to have fathered the Resolution 242. Then came Arthur Goldberg, ex-Judge of the U.S. Supreme Court, later U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and now only a Zionist. With due shyness and modesty he acknowledges that Britain and America did work together but as "impartial observers reported at the time that America's role was the primary one." Lord Caradon (previously Sir Hugh Foot) who then was the British Ambassador to the U.N. gives 'credit for that' to the Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov of the Soviet Union. The choice now is between believing the gentlemen or the midwife.

The significant point, says Goldberg, is "that it does not specifically require Israel to withdraw to the June 5, 1967 lines . . . it enunciates as a principle 'withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict'. The word 'all' does not precede 'territories

in the English text. This was not accidental but was the product of *negotiated design*". Moreover, the resolution is not self-implementing but depends ultimately on the agreement of the parties."

The important point, according to Lord Caradon was that it was accepted unanimously. More important, however, is the fact that it was not really read by the Arabs who have not found it necessary to read it even now. Although the word 'territories' is not preceded by the article *the*, the resolution still reads to say 'territories occupied in the recent conflict'.

Could it also mean the recent conflict in 1948, in the Goldbergian way, of course?

**Tunku Abdul Rahman**, Secretary-General, Islamic Secretariat, Jeddah and **Prof. Husayn Nasr**, Vice Chancellor, Tehran University paid a brief visit to London recently.

**Field Martial Ayub Khan**, former President of Pakistan has proceeded on a fortnight's visit to USA.

**Dr. Fazlur Rahman** the Muslim orientalist who was relieved in 1968 from the Directorship of the Islamic Research Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan, is being sued by the Government of Pakistan for over-drawing a sum of about £1000 from the public exchequer. Dr. Rahman now teaches at Chicago, USA.

**Sir Geoffrey Wilson**, 61, formerly of the Foreign Office and now in the Ministry of Overseas Development is to succeed Mr. Mark Bonham Carter as chairman of the Race Relation Board in the autumn.

**Mr. Bocar Ousman Semega-Janneh**, presented his Letters of Commission at Buckingham Palace as the new High Commissioner for Gambia.

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# World Opinion

## NO TEARS TO SPARE

In spite of the fact that it is an internal matter of Pakistan, the entire Muslim Press is repeating what the Government and the majority in the country say. It is printing the news received from the Government sources. It is dubbing a 'rebellion' as 'war of independence' and describing Tikka Khan as dead even though he is alive. It is describing Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as free even though he is under detention. Similarly, it is describing the efforts (of the Pak forces) to control the rebels as cruelty, brutality, violence and tyranny.

What more do you want from the Muslims? Should they go with arms and ammunition and fight against General Yahya Khan? . . . As we have no respite from lamenting our own dead, so we cannot spare tears for others. (*Jamiat Times*, Delhi, 9 April 1971)

## DEFIANCE IN THE FACE OF BEAUTY

If sentiment and ancient prophecy are to be invoked to justify military conquest, the world will find itself in a disorderly and dangerous situation. It was precisely to put an end to this kind of behaviour that the representatives of the nations gathered in San Francisco in 1945 wrote into the Charter of the infant United Nations the principle that "the acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible". There can be no special cases to justify a departure from this principle—and Israel's claim to sovereignty over Arab Jerusalem has no more solid basis than the fact that the Israeli army captured it by force of arms in 1967.

That Israel should feel able to persist in its defiance of the international community over Jerusalem is due to the special relationship it enjoys with the Government of the United States. Without American support, the Israelis would have to bow, in this as in other questions affecting peace and war in the Middle East, to international pressure. It is the earnest hope of Christians and men of goodwill in all countries that the American public will persuade its government to recognise its obligations in a matter of such vital importance and to act soon to restore a sense of proportion and of responsibility on the part of the present leaders of Israel.

If this does not happen and if Israel is allowed to consolidate its hold on Arab Jerusalem, then all the patient efforts of the peacemakers will have been in vain. The Arabs will never renounce their claim to a city which has been theirs for more than a thousand years. If the Israelis insist on keeping it, the conflict in the Middle East will be indefinitely prolonged. This is the most serious aspect of the controversy over

Jerusalem. Secondary to it is the thought that if the Israelis persist in "creating facts" in the shape of concrete apartment blocks crowding the immemorial hills around the Holy City, the damage they will do to the beauty and the character of Jerusalem will be irremediable. (Jerusalem in danger, *The Tablet*, London, 10 April, 1971.)

## IMPERFECTIONS

"Since the great proletarian cultural revolution, Party branches of the production brigades have firmly grasped education on the struggle between the two lines and brought the people engaged in the 'five trades' onto the socialist road. However, some Party branches had not fully understood the protracted nature of the struggles between the two classes, two roads and two lines. After achieving some results, they did not (?emphasise) the socialist education of the people engaged in the 'five trades'. Consequently, the tendency of going to other places for side-line occupation and commercial work re-emerged. (*Ideological work in Fukien*, *Radio Peking*, 19 April, 1971)

## LOGIC AND COWARDICE

One of the arguments used by St. Claire County whites against the ownership and operation of a cattle ranch in their community by Black Muslims is that they are "anti-Christian."

The fact that Black Muslims also practice all the usual forms of Puritan abstinence, are hard working, save their money, invest it successfully in restaurants and supermarkets and have become highly successful capitalists seems to count for nothing with the embittered whites of St. Claire County. They don't want any blacks owning a big, well run, cattle-raising operation in their midst.

Since the Black Muslims bought the 376-acre farm near Ashville, Alabama, in late 1969, those who dislike the facts have done the following deeds:

Killed two cows with rifle fire from neighbouring woods.

Poured acid on 12 new Ford cars owned by the local Ford dealer J Ray Wyatt who was half owner of the farm and who with his partner sold it to the Black Muslims for a reputed \$115,000. Mr. Wyatt has since been without much business.

Boycotted the other partner, dentist Robert McClung. They also deposed Dr. McClung from the presidency of the local chapter of the John Birch Society.

In early March of 1970, 30 cattle were poisoned, apparently from cyanide.

Now, again, in this month of April, 22 more cattle have been poisoned out of a herd of 90.

We must concede that there is a

touch of logic in the local John Birch Society deposing as its president a man who sells land to Black Muslims.

But there is just one possible label that can be put on the other deeds done at night, from the woods, or surreptitiously.

They were all cowardly. (A case of cowardice, *Christian Science Monitor*, London, 23 April, 1971).

## PROPRIETY, GUTS AND CREDIBILITY

The Mukti Fauj appears to have incurred reverses and suffered the demoralisation which goes with them, whereas the truth is only that unexpected "gains" which could never have been realistically aimed at have come to an end. More important is the loss of credibility which the Bengla Desh movement has suffered abroad and unfortunately on the eve of its proclamation last Friday, announcing the founding of the new republic. The same event, coming after some weeks of intense guerilla warfare, would have had a much better impact than it does in the wake of the "reverses" suffered after the "conquests." All countries hesitate to recognise a rebel Government if it suffers loss of credibility either through inability to consolidate and administer its territory or and even more through inability even to hold its gains. A neighbouring country hesitates even more if it fears that after extending recognition it will have to play host to an emigre Government. But better late than never.

India also faces a problem of guts and credibility. She has shown concern, but many countries must be waiting to see what else she will show. It should be obvious to everyone that what ultimately happens in East Bengal is a matter of serious interest to India; stability in the eastern region of this country will be variously affected depending upon whether a free Bengla Desh emerges—and whether under the leadership of the Awami League or some other force—or a cowed down and subjugated East Pakistan. Everyone also knows that India is not without some ability to influence the course of events.

The people and leaders of East Bengal have openly asked for India's help; formerly they did so as individuals but now as the Republic of Bengla Desh. How will the Government and the people of India respond? By the manner they do, other countries will decide whether to be more impressed by India's respect for legality, propriety and the principle of non-interference or for her guts, capacity and credibility as a major factor in the region. (Pran Chopra in the *Hindusthan Standard*, Calcutta, 24 April, 1971).

## THE SUN NOT YET SET

From this so-called new defence arrangement people can see that British imperialism, which is like the setting sun on the western hills, is still determined to wage a desperate struggle, to co-ordinate with US imperialism's aggression in South-East Asia, and to suppress the revolutionary struggle of the people of our country in order to safeguard its colonial interests. Moreover, it can also be seen that the Razak and Lee Kuan Yew cliques are the willing pawns of imperialism in continuing to sell out the interests of the people of our country and in rendering service to imperialism's aggressive schemes. (*Voice of Malayan Revolution*, *Radio Peking*, 28 April, 1971).

## SEX EDUCATION: RIGHT TO DEPRAVE

So the frontal attack on permissiveness has been launched—as was to be expected. It is particularly unfortunate, however, that it should come just when the beneficial effects of wider sex education and open access to erotica are beginning to be felt. For years they were prepared to tolerate a society where pornography was available to the upper middle-class and the aristocracy, but kept discreetly hidden from the public gaze. What they cannot tolerate, it seems, is the democratisation of sexual pleasure. (Full Frontal Hypocrisy, *New Statesman*, London 30th April, 1971).

## FREEDOM TO DEPRAVE

There is no good reason why the general privacy of one and all should be infringed by those who seek to make money or propaganda, or who derive other pleasure, from bringing sexual activity before the public gaze. If producers, promoters, actors, actresses, trained animals and others wish to indulge in the prostitution of their own or others' bodies by staging performances in theatres, clubs and cinemas which members of the public choose and pay to visit, that is one matter. If, however, such people intrude, through the medium of television for instance, into the homes of unwitting and unwilling strangers, that is another matter entirely and we have every duty to question the propriety, the taste, and the motives of those who thus intrude. Since the invariable justification of such intruders is that their intrusion may do good, they cannot argue that their efforts are quite without moral effect; and they therefore cannot assert that it is impossible for their activity to be corrupting. (Prostitution, Education and Masturbation, *Spectator*, London, 24 April, 1971).

## Reflections and Second Thoughts

C. H. Phillips & Mary Doreen Wainwright  
(Editors) 1970

### THE PARTITION OF INDIA

607 pp. George Allen & Unwin, London  
£5.50

The partition of the Indian sub-continent came about as a result of agreement between three parties: the Hindus, the Muslims and the British Government. The HMG agreed to Pakistan because they had to quit and had no longer the means or the capacity to suppress the Muslim determination to achieve separate freedom. For the Hindus too, it was a matter of bowing to the inevitable, though willy nilly.

The establishment of a state on the basis of 'religion' in this century was either unique or anachronistic. In any case it is understandable if it has not been possible to get over the 'event'; and indicative of this recent spurt of outside interest is the present compilation edited by the late Prof. C. H. Phillips & Mary Wainwright of the School of Oriental and African studies, London. Consisting of contributions from twenty eight academics, politicians and civil servants from these three countries, it provides a great volume of less formal background material on the partition 'phenomenon'. There is much to explain and help understand the subsequent attitudes, happenings and non-happenings.

The Hindu or the Indian attitude: unfortunately it has not been given any substantive treatment, perhaps because, it is much too self-evident. They never accepted the 'vivisection' of the country, they only agreed to the inevitable. There is some regret over the arrogance and misappreciation of the situation on the part of the Congress leadership particularly Nehru, for the reason that India might otherwise have stayed one and united. However, not one contributor has attempted to develop a perspective of objectivity even with the hindsight of history. Partition might sound bitter and distasteful but has subsequent history in any way proved or improved India's capacity to function as a united and harmonious polity? This failure to face the realities even after the lapse of more than two decades is striking and serves to explain the static pattern of the Indo-Pak relationship since 1947.

The British attitude, then as now, of sorrow, opposition and even contempt is

very much spelled out in the accounts and reflections of former members of the Imperial Civil or Political Services. There has been a fashionable theory going around that it was the British Government which wanted to divide and quit but the evidence provided here and elsewhere is otherwise and to the contrary. The aim of British policy until the end of 1946 has all through been to weave a native federation for India. So eventually when they agreed to accept the Muslim League demand, it was accepting it with vengeance. The British Government thought that Jinnah 'will soon realise that the Pakistan he is likely to get is not worth anything . . . .' (p.113).

As to the Raj establishment and the ICS attitude, it is not only the Viceroys and Governors or Imperial Civil Servants, who did not feel happy about Pakistan, this attitude was also shared by a great majority of the Muslim civil servants. In 1940 they 'regarded Pakistan as anything but a pipe-dream' and Taya Zinkin 'does not remember any Muslim ICS who was in favour before 1946'. (p.548). Many of these officers later rose to occupy very high and even political offices in Pakistan.

Lord Sorensen's account of his visit to India as a member of the Parliamentary delegation in January 1946 provides an interesting side-light on Labour's weakness for a united India. Even Prof. Bob Richards the Conservative leader of the delegation had to enquire if he 'had personally received any financial inducement from Indian sources to serve Indian political interests' (p.536). When he met 'magnetic' and 'resolute' Jinnah, he 'came to believe (that with his leadership) . . . there would be no deviation from unremitting determination to reach his goal.' but he 'still hoped that he would achieve this within a federation or confederation.' This was, because he 'strongly shared Congress antipathy to the formation of virtually a theocratic state.' (p.543).

The reflections of the Pakistani politicians and scholars are most interesting of them all. Here was an elite which agitated, negotiated and eventually succeeded in achieving Pakistan as a 'homeland for Islam and Muslims' but was never sure of what it really meant. It all appeared to amount to a feeling that where there was a preponderant Hindu bureaucracy it should be replaced by their own ilk and the Hindu control of business and industry be substituted by that of a new holy class. As to Islam and the current euphemism, 'Pakistan ideology', it meant

The revelatory culture

## Books

no more than a crescent and star flag, a national anthem and the freedom to start proceedings of the parliament with recitation from the Qur'an.

So whether it is Abdul Qayyum Khan or Ispahani or Dr. Mahmood Husain or even Dr. Ishtiaq Qureshi, the treatment of the Pakistan background is remarkably inadequate. There is a great deal of emphasis on Hindu chauvinism, of discrimination in services and political institutions, economic exploitation and cultural oppression etc. The Muslims are presumed to be a nation not because of any significant positivism or the quality of their ideology but because of continuously having been pushed around and harried by the Hindus. Ispahani attempts to provide an economic interpretation of the Pakistan movement but is unable to see the significance and relevance of the difference between the economic backwardness of the Muslims and a great number of the Hindu masses who were also oppressed, exploited and discriminated against but due to an altogether different set of premise factors.

Of all the Pakistani and semi-Pakistani participants, the 'Memories' of Raja of Mahmudabad serve to highlight the pathos of the whole drama. Born in a feudal family friendly to Jinnah, Nehru as well as the colonial establishment all at the same time, planning to join Sir Rabindranath Tagore's Shantiniketan, he allows himself to be persuaded to enter politics instead. (p.385). When he joined the Muslim League he 'hardly' realised that before long the League and the Congress would be poles apart.' (p.386). During 1941-54, he comes to advocate 'that Pakistan should be an Islamic State and even becomes founder member of an Islamic party which brings him into conflict with Jinnah'. Much against his conviction he cuts off from politics in order not 'to compromise Jinnah's position'. (p.388). However, this Islamic fervour too did not last long, for: 'now that I look back I realise how wrong I had been.' (p.389). In 1936 he was 'summoned to lunch with his excellency the Governor of the United Provinces' who asked 'if I was fully aware of the possible consequences of my action' in joining the Muslim League? 'I pleaded ignorance . . .'

This ignorance, lack of cognition of the national-self, easy-going attitudes and flexible positions perhaps serve to explain the subsequent predicament of the Pakistani nation.

(A.I.)



## War of the poor and oppressed

General Abdul Haris Nasution, 1969  
Fundamentals of Guerilla warfare  
324 pp. *Pall Mall*, London  
£2.25 (out of print)

Time and again it has been proved that in any conflict, if a weaker or poorer nation has got a strong will to resist aggression, it is indeed possible to eventually win.

A successful means to achieve this is by guerilla warfare. The first example of this kind of resistance after the second world war was the liberation of Indonesia from the Dutch colonial power. The latest example, of course, is the war in Vietnam in which France earlier and the USA later with all their military might were not been able to impose their will against a small, poor but resolute nation.

The impact of these events on the art of warfare has been great. Many studies have been carried out to understand the technique of guerilla warfare and to find effective means of bringing it under control both by Western military strategists and tacticians and the Communists. Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, the former Commander-in Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces is, however, exceptional in that belonging neither to the Eastern or Western bloc he has tackled the problem from a different angle altogether.

Nasution was the main architect of the Indonesian military resistance and guerilla warfare in the war of liberation against a well organised, well equipped and strong colonial power. Born in North Sumatra in 1918 he was educated at the Royal Military Academy at Bandung and commissioned in the Netherland Indies Army in 1941. During the occupation by Japanese Forces, he led civil defence forces in Bandung. Later on he commanded the crack Swiliwangi Division of the Indonesian National Army, which was formed by him from irregular troops. In 1948 he became the chief of the operational staff of the Armed Forces.

When the second police action was started by the Dutch, the author was Commander of the Army in Java. This is where most of the fighting took place and in fact the main guideline for the conduct of guerilla warfare was laid down by General Nasution himself.

Nasution first deals with the concept and ideology of guerilla warfare and makes it quite clear that war today has become a total war. Of necessity guerilla warfare is the war of the weak against the strong. This type of warfare cannot by itself bring final victory, it only saps the enemy's strength. This is a very important factor and must clearly be understood by all resistance movements. Guerilla warfare also does not mean that all the people are fighting. It must not consist of unorganised destruction and has to be of a systematic character. Such a war to be successful calls for unified leadership, not only at the national level but also down to the local level. Being an ideological and protracted war it should be able to draw wholehearted support from the people.

In dealing with the future planning of guerilla warfare, Nasution lays particular emphasis on organisation and training and elaborates on many useful, basic principles which can be modified to suit any other country or situation.

In the section on the methodology of a popular resistance movement, Nasution exemplifies and elaborates on the administration of the various operations under Java headquarters. Basic details of the various battles are given. This along with the instructions compiled and added to by Lt. Colonel Salamat Ryadi go to make a compendium on guerilla warfare.

One does agree entirely with Otto Heilbrum that the book written originally in 1953, does not merely contain variations on Mao Tse Tung but is the product of independent thought; and it is the independence of thought that should commend the most.

(Col. Khalid)

## The revelatory culture

Abdul Hasan Ali Nadvi, 1970  
Religion & Civilisation

120pp. *Academy of Islamic Research and Publications*, Lucknow (India). Rs. 5

Professor Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi, Rector Nadvat-ul-Ulama, Lucknow, is a well known Indian scholar. He has written on different aspects of Muslim thought and culture. Most of his original work is in Arabic and Urdu. It is to be welcomed that his works are now becoming increasingly available in English. The latest is *Religion and Civilization*, translated by Moinuddin Ahmad.

This brief but incisive work comprises the lectures delivered some years ago at the Jamia Millia, Delhi and deals with the essential questions of eschatology, cosmology and the resultant socio-ethical order. Like Sorokin, he classifies cultures into sensate and idealistic but unlike him develops his own formulation of the revelatory culture, articulated *par excellence*, in the Islamic faith and culture. After posing the fundamental questions he evaluates the sources of knowledge: sensory, intellectual, philosophic, dialectical and mystic. This is followed by an exposition of the three important types of civilization—materialistic, intellectual and mystic. The achievements and failings of each are briefly discussed. The author demonstrates that neither of them really meets all the needs of mankind. Besides, they all fail to answer the fundamental questions of life and existence. In conclusion, Nadvi deals with another source of knowledge: the prophetic, a source historically most important and revolutionary yet very often ignored in modern philosophic discourses. Thus the necessity and nature of prophethood is discussed and the message of the prophets delineated. One does get from this book a broad and overall view of the ethico-social order based on revealed guidance.

(Khurshid Ahmad)

## Briefing

**Heirs to the Past** by Driss Chraïbi, *Heinmann*, £1.25 (Dilemma of a Moroccan unable to root himself in the European environment even after 16 years)

**Trial** by Tom Hayden, 1971, *Cape*, £1.95, paper 70p. (A glimpse into the anger and hang-ups of America's black and white protestors, unified only in dissent)

**Born to Rebel** by Benjamin E. Mays, *Charles Scribner's*, \$10 (Autobiography of a distinguished Afro-American: proud, sensitive and keen to avoid any trouble)

**African Perspectives**, ed. Christopher Allen and R. W. Johnson, *Cambridge*, £5.25 (selected contributions on the history, politics and economics of Africa)

**White Niggers of America** by Pierre Valieris, *Monthly Review Press*, New York and London, \$7.50 (Cruel frustrations of a French Canadian who also happens to be an ideologue of the Quebec Liberation Front)

**The Appeal of Fascism: A Study of Intellectuals and Fascism, 1919-1945** by Alistair Hamilton, *Blond*, £3, 1971 (Fascism originated as a kind of socialism, only later becoming national. The study helps one derive his own conclusions as to the intellectual regressions it resulted from and the reactions it produced)

**Shipwreck of a Generation: The Memories of Joseph Berger**, *Collins/Harvill*, £2.50, 1971 (Berger, a former Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Palestine managed to survive 22 years of involuntary exile in Siberia and relates his experiences of the 'inside society')

**The Socialist Myth** by Peregrine Worsthorne, *Cassell*, 256 pp, £2.75, 1971 (Whatever the social objectives, there is no escape from authority and discipline. Whether it should be crude and manifest as in socialism or brute and not so manifest as in 'modified' capitalism, the dilemma remains unresolved)

**Maoism in India** by Mohan Ram, *Vikas Publications*, Delhi, Rs 22.50 (The development and portents of Naxalism are discussed in relation to the US and USSR 'responsibility' to foreclose a Maoist revolution in India)

**The Making of India's Foreign Policy** by J. Bandopadhyaya, *Allied*, India, Rs. 30 (A discussion of the aims and actualities of India's foreign policy)

**The Viceroy at Bay** by Lord Glendevon, *Collins*, £2.50 (An account of Lord Linlithgow's viceroyalty in India from 1937 to 1943)

**Diplomatic History of Modern India** by Charles H. Heimsath and S. Mansingh, *Allied*, India, Rs 30 (A summary of 50 years of India's foreign relations since 1919 based on Government of India documents)

**The Indian Political Service: A Study in Indirect Rule** by Terence Creagh Coen, *Chatto & Windus*, 304 pp, £3.15, 1971 (A subjective and informative account of the Indian Political Service: the quasi-diplomatic service of the Raj and the precursor of the foreign service in India and Pakistan)

**A Soldier Erect** by Brian W. Aldiss, *Weidenfeld & Nicholson*, £1.90 (fiction) (Life of a soldier in war-time India. Indicative of the recent obsession, one finds Pakistan referred to in 1944, three years before it actually came into being)

**East Pakistan: A Case-Study in Muslim Politics**, *Vikas Publications*, Delhi, 185 pp, Rs 20 (An Indian view of the distinctiveness and disenchantment of East Pakistan)

**The World of Late Antiquity from Marcus Aurelius to Muhammad** by Peter Brown, *Thames & Hudson*, £2, 1971 (A historical appreciation of the ages of belief and disbelief: illustrated and notional)

**The Vatican Finances** by Corrado Pallenberg, *Peter Owen*, £2.75 (Of Vatican riches and investments, from hotels to contraceptive pills)

**The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizman**, general editor Meyer Weisgal, *OUP*, £3.50, 1971

**Middle East Oil** by George W. Stocking, *Allen Lane*, £6.25, 1971 (An account of the discovery, exploitation and politics of oil in the Middle East)

**The Arabs**, ed. Ian Horne & Graham Tayar, *BBC*, 60 p (A background on the economics and politics of the Arab States)

**Forty Years in Kuwait** by Violet Dickson, *George Allen & Unwin*, £5 (Writing lightly about the decades spent in Kuwait)

**Wolves in the City**, the death of French Algeria, *Hart-Davies*, £2.95 (On the antics, aspirations and frustrations of the counter-liberation French settlers and servicemen in pre-independence Algeria)

**The Press and the Cold War** by James Aronson, *Bobbs-Merrill*, 308 pp, \$8 (A questioning of the relationship of the establishment press in America to the imposed and imagined interests of national security)

**BBC Pronouncing Dictionary of British Names**, ed. G. M. Miller, *BBC*, £2, 1971 (The BBC way of

pronouncing family and place names)

● Richard Crossman is working on the biography of Israel's first President Chaim Weizmann.

● Anthony Nutting is writing the biography of late President Nasser.

● *Azan*, Urdu weekly in the Indian held Kashmir has been banned from publication.

● The last issue of the *Daily Sketch*, London was published on 11 May.

**The Guardian**, London (nee *Manchester Guardian*) completed 150th year of its publication on 5 May.

**Mukti**, London, a new Bengali weekly started publication on 10 May.

**10th Anniversary Exhibition** on development and work of the Scout Hostel, Baden Powell House, Cromwell Road, London, SW.7. Open till July 12.

**Persia in the great war: an Exhibition** at the Imperial War Museum, covering Sir Percy Sykes's mission to South Persia and the Dunsterforce mission to North Persia and South Caucasia. Open till 1 June.

### REPORTING

## An Islamic Education for your children

REV. RAYMOND F. TRUDIGAN

"What religious education should your children have"?

"How should Islamic instruction be imparted"?

"How can parents help"?

These three questions were recently under discussion at a day seminar held at Imperial College, London, for Muslims in the south of England. The Muslim pupils, students, parents and teachers who attended were deeply concerned about the future of their faith in this country. From the discussion it would appear that the concern is not so much about a conflict with Christianity but the encroachment of secularism and permissiveness which was affecting the faith and practice of Muslim children.

Representing C.E.M. and "*Learning for Living*" I was the only Christian present and feel that an examination of the points made at this seminar raises questions for Christian educationalists and their relation to immigrants of other faiths in this country.

It was significant that the meeting had been arranged by the Federation of the Students Islamic Societies in the U.K. and Eire, (FOSIS), whose motive in drawing together such a group of Muslims could be summed up in their motto "*And hold fast, all together, to your covenant with Allah, and do not draw apart from one another.*" (Qur'an 3:103) which is one of the aims of the federation as it seeks "to foster and protect the interests of Islam. Speakers" included representatives from the Muslim Educational Trust and the Islamic Cultural Centre, as well as

students and pupils themselves.

To one accustomed to Christian gatherings of a similar nature, I was immediately struck by the number of school children present from the lower forms of the secondary school, and indeed their spokesman on the platform was only 13, although his speech showed a maturity far beyond this. Obviously times were set aside for obligatory prayers which were carried out according to custom with men and women separated. Many of the girls were wearing "the cultural veil" as it is described in their youth magazine, *Zenith* and members came from various countries and races including Africa and the West Indies as well as at least one "English" Muslim.

The burden of the speeches and discussion can be summed up in this quotation from the memorandum sent to the Secretary of State for Education by the Muslim Educational Trust.

"A really integrated society can be founded only on the principle of religious and cultural co-existence and of tolerance and co-operation between different groups, and not by supplanting or ignoring minority religions and cultural entities. The religious education of the Muslim children, therefore, assumes great importance, particularly in a society where education up to a certain age is compulsory. In such a system education must provide for the protection and communication of the cultural values of the minority groups, otherwise it would simply amount to the elimination of their culture.



When Muslims insist on making proper arrangements for the religious education of their children, they do not ask for any special favour. They only want that their legitimate rights are acknowledged and honoured. They are equal partners in building the economic prosperity of this country. They contribute their share towards the taxes in full measure. They are participating in all walks of life, not as "second-class" citizens, but as equals in a civilised society. Any attempt to impose on Muslim children that part of education which is based on a religious tradition to which they do not belong, or to deprive them of proper opportunities to have instructions in their own religion, would be against all canons of justice."

The answer to the question "What religion should your children have"? was quite clear. It should consist of instruction in the Qur'an; method and content of prayer and the application of Muslim standards of conduct to every part of the pupil's life.

The second question "How should Islamic instruction be imparted"? raised some differences of opinion. Some felt that this instruction should be given in the evenings and weekends and examples of what was already being done in London and elsewhere were given. Parents were to be encouraged to pay for the hire of halls and classrooms and students should be prepared to write simple material for instruction in their faith. Others felt that this instruction should take place in school time and teachers be appointed and paid for by Education Authorities where there were significant numbers of Muslim children. Facilities for Islamic instruction should be provided "exactly in the same manner and to the same extent as are provided to Christian teaching." Students should undergo training as teachers to be ready to fulfil this role in society.

"How can parents help"? had already been answered, but as well as giving money they were to be given information on the use of the conscience clause so that children could be withdrawn from Assembly and R.E. and given Islamic instruction instead. One sixth former, now a student, felt it was better to join in the Assembly rather than be regarded as "different". He was reminded from the platform that the Negroes of America had also followed the culture of the majority because they did not want to be regarded as "different", but were still regarded as "second-class" citizens. Nothing was to be gained by assimilation—but much enrichment was to be enjoyed by maintaining a cultural identity.

Important matters of food, clothing and attendance at Friday prayers were also raised and the difficulties of living in two cultures underlined.

As I left the group I could not help but think that here was a "Muslim Education Movement" in embryo, and that urgent "dialogue" is needed between such a group and ourselves. It would appear that not all participants were aware of current trends in R.E., and much time could be saved and understanding created by such a joint meeting.

For those of us who advocate the teaching of World Religions as a way of

providing "R.E. for all" and to build up community relations, it was a sharp reminder that a term's study of Islam will not satisfy the need expressed at this seminar and much more thought and work with Educationalists and pupils of the other faiths now represented in this country is urgently needed. A sign of hope in all this was the warmth of the welcome given to me as a representative of a Christian educational organization.

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## Islam and the modern World call for balanced approach

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By Staff Reporter

Dr. Husayn Nasr, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Teheran, delivered a stimulating lecture on 'Islam and the Modern World' at the Senate House, University of London on 21 April. Some of the top academics in the various schools of the university from philosophers to linguists heard Dr. Nasr making fundamental criticisms of the state of western orientalist studies on Islam and the Muslim world. Many of the classifications and categories employed by orientalists when writing about Islam were false, misleading and therefore dangerous, he said.

One such was the application of the terms classical and medieval to Islamic history and civilization which usage contained all the associations and overtones of a dying culture or one that had outlived its usefulness. Dr. Nasr observed that modern studies concentrated almost exclusively on 'change' in Islam and in the economic and social aspects of change. Anything of permanence was ignored even though that which was permanent and transcendent far outweighed the changes that were taking place. Often students who undertook research on obscure and unrepresentative phenomena were not to be blamed, but the various Foundations which sponsored them were. And this was more true in the case of America than in Britain.

Dr. Nasr then dealt with the possible reactions of Muslims to the political and cultural 'onslaughts' of the West. There were three possible reactions, he said: the first—an outright rejection of Islam

since the situation did not fit in with the promise of victory to Muslims which Allah guaranteed to them, This reaction was almost non-existent and even in the most secular country today, like Turkey, there were not many who became outright atheistic.

The second—an awareness that Muslims did not live up to the standards and teachings of Islam. From this awareness came calls for 'reform', but reform mainly of Islam. This was the rationalist school represented by such people as Jamal-uddin al-Afghani 'who has been excessively studied in the West'. Many of these were apologists and deformers of Islam rather than reformers. In this context, he pointed to the misapplication by Muslims of such terms as the 'Renaissance' of Islam. Islam did not need a renaissance.

The third—a recognition that inner reform of the individual Muslim life was needed as an essential prerequisite to meet the challenges being faced. This was manifested in the growth of many sufi orders and other movements particularly in places like North Africa and the Indian sub-continent. This third phenomenon hardly received any attention from orientalists.

For future Muslim attitudes to the West, Dr. Nasr noted with appreciation the growing number of Muslim scholars who had knowledge of the West as deep and as intimate as many westerners themselves. These were beginning to approach the West with more equanimity as opposed to a hitherto outright emotional rejection.

"One of the most striking problems following in the wake of decolonisation in East and Central Africa has been the situation and fate of its minorities." Thus begins the Report published by the London-based Minority Rights Group and written by Dr. Dharam Ghai, director of economic research, Institute of Development Studies, University of Nairobi, and Professor Yash Ghai of the Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salam.

Among these minorities, the Asians are the most visible but says the report "at no time have they been quite significant numerically, although their economic importance has been quite out of proportion to their numbers. On the other hand, they have seldom exercised much political influence. Never a dominant power in East or Central Africa, their capacity to determine historical factors has been limited. They have had no strong support from the governments of their countries of origin. They have had no ambitions of aggression and annexation. At the same time they have displayed a poor sense of history and limited vision."

Observing that "Many of the problems with which the newly independent African governments were concerned were a legacy of colonial times," the Report says that "colonial societies were organised on the basis of racial communities and... on the principle of segregation and discrimination... Racial tensions and communal rivalries were therefore stimulated at an early stage, although it is only fair to point out that the Asians too had a tendency towards social exclusiveness."

"The categorisation of people on racial lines strengthened prejudice, resulting not only in segregation and exclusiveness but also helping to produce stereotypes some deliberately cultivated. Hence the Asian was thought of as a *dukawalla* who cheated and insulted his African customers and was mean and secretive. The African was viewed as dull, unintelligent, lazy and dishonest. The European was seen as tough and aggressive, but as someone who has done much for the country. Racial attitudes in East and Central Africa have been strongly influenced by these stereotypes, and it is noteworthy that some of the anti-Asian speeches made today by African politicians in Kenya, Uganda and Zambia employ phrases identical with those which the early European settlers used in their anti-Asian harangues...."

Independence found the Asians "in the position of an unpopular minority. Their numbers were too small to be politically significant, and yet too large to permit an easy solution of their problems. While the British government was greatly concerned to secure provisions for the white settlers and civil servants, it displayed scant regard for the plight of the Asians, even though in terms of legal status, they were just as much the responsibility of the British."

The Report deals with the issue of citizenship on which the future of the Asians now hinges. Partly as a result of confusion about the implications of citizenship and partly as a result of understandable anxieties about the future, the response of the Asians was poor and this is where

DOCUMENTATION

**The Asian minorities of East and Central Africa**

the trouble began. The African governments quickly became irritated by the delay and progressively less ready to grant citizenship to Asians. Some applications filed within the prescribed period were not processed, and not a few remain unprocessed—seven or eight years later. Moreover some of the governments proceeded to amend their laws to prevent or restrict the acquisition of citizenship. Malawi, for example, introduced new legislations in 1966 whereby children born after 5th July 1966 no longer became citizens automatically but could become citizens only if one of their parents were both a citizen of Malawi and a person of African race.

The report goes on to analyse what it describes as the tangled nationality position of the Asian community, deducing that it is unlikely that material numbers of 'non-citizen' Asians will remain in East and Central Africa because of Africanisation legislation and policies.

The report deals with the legal position and the opportunities for emigration and shows why the status of British protected persons is anomalous both under international law and British law. It asserts: "Britain's international responsibility to her citizens, even though treated as second rate, under her own domestic legislation, is clear. If no other country wants them Britain has to take them in" and comments: "Though the legislation was not couched in racial terms, its effect was to introduce racial discrimination for the first time in British nationality and immigration laws."

The most significant question for the authors, however, is the future of the Asians who are local citizens of an African country: "Most, but not all of them, expect to continue to live there. Will they be allowed to carry on their pursuits and be treated on a basis of equality with the Africans? Will they continue in their communalistic ways or will there be greater integration with the other races."

The report answers these questions by assessing the prospects in the spheres of economics, education, politics and social relationships,

comparing the situations existing in the various countries of there gion. "Sometimes the official policy of equal treatment for Asian citizens gets blurred because when official threats or warnings are made or given to Asians, it is not always clear that it is the non-citizens who are referred to. Also, many statements of policy are couched in terms of "Africanization", which has similar terminological ambiguities and racial connotations."

For future prospects, the economic sector is crucial and "may well determine whether Asians will stay in Africa or not, as well as affect important aspects of Asian-African relationship." Changes in education render a little more difficult the acquisition of high educational and technical skills and the new emphasis on agriculture is less relevant for the Asian community which has always been and will continue to be highly urbanised."

In the field of politics, "there is less Asian participation. Perhaps it is not just a coincidence that the Asians in these countries are so highly involved in organisations like Lions and Rotary Clubs; feeling unable to participate in the national political system, they look to the activities of these organisations for excitement and prestige."

In the wide spectrum of social relations, "African leaders say that Asians must integrate themselves with the host society. Asians agree—so long as integration does not mean inter-racial marriages, forms of forced association or a threat to their own culture. There is thus a serious misunderstanding about what is meant by or involved in integration."

The report goes on to point out that the governments concerned have not given proper consideration to the role and place of the Asian and also that the Asians themselves have no clear ideas of the solutions needed. The main conclusion of the report is that there will almost certainly be a significant reduction in the size and economic importance of the Asian communities in East and Central Africa.

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MINORITY POSITION OF ASIANS IN EAST AFRICA

	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Total Asian Population	182,000	105,000	80,000
Indian citizens	24,000	5,000	1,000
Nationals	70,000	35,000	30,000
British passport holders	82,000	50,000	40,000
Stateless or status to be determined	6,000	12,000	9,000

From Appendix of Report



## NEWS BRIEF

**Islamic News Agency:** The Tehran Conference of the Islamic Secretariat has recommended the setting up of an International Islamic News Agency—IINA. An association of national news agencies as a preliminary to the IINA has been proposed; decision may be taken at the Muslim Foreign Minister's Conference in Kabul in September.

**Numayri's Denunciation of Communists:** The Chairman of the Sudanese Revolution Command Council and Premier, Major Gen. Jafar an-Numayri, has again attacked communists and described them as saboteurs.

**Indonesian Elections:** Hustings for Indonesia's General Election on 3 July began on 27 April and is to last up to 25 June. The Home Affairs Minister said that all parties should stress national unity, Pantjasila, and the 1945 Constitution. All parties must be vigilant about the possible comeback of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). A total of 3022 candidates are expected to take part: Nationalist Party 506, Indonesian Muslim Party 327, Nehdatul Ulama 397, Islamic Union Party 309.

**Chinese killed in South Yemen:** Several Chinese military experts were reported killed when an attack was launched on their camp in Nufud by *Fida'iyyin*. The voice of the Free South, reporting the news ended with: "Death to greedy communism and its atheistic agents."

**Jerusalem:** The Israeli Municipal Council of Jerusalem reaffirmed on 30 April its declared position that the whole of Jerusalem "is the capital of Israel for ever and ever" and that "this policy of the municipality has been put into practice."

**Arabs under Israel:** The Israeli Labour Minister expressed fears that the nature of Israeli society would be affected if more Arabs were allowed to work. Arabs already preponderated in the building trade which "could become an Arab trade". The situation, he said, was worrying. No more increase in Arab workers would be asked for. (*Israeli Broadcast in Hebrew*, 1 May 1971).

**Martial Law in Turkey:** Martial law was proclaimed in Turkey as from 27 April. The government has adopted sweeping measures to curb 'lawlessness'. The Istanbul Martial Law commander has announced a ban on articles, films and plays praising anarchist acts or the themes of which are robberies.

**Ban on Turkish papers:** The publication of the Istanbul papers *Aksam* and *Cumhuriyet* was banned for 10 days as from April 29. Other papers have also been banned. *Bugun* and *Sabah* have been banned indefinitely as from 1 May "because they violated the principle of secularism."

## Next Issue

### In the next issue

- ▲ Lessons from the 1967 Catastrophe
- ▲ To re-marry or not to re-marry—is that the question?
- ▲ The Fifth of June: how the planes were blown up

الإحرام - ٧١/٥/٥ - ٥



### ROGERS IN CAIRO

Look Mr. Riad . . . we can guarantee Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories . . . if you are prepared to guarantee their withdrawal from Washington . . . O . . . K? (*Al Ahram*, Cairo 5 May).

**Age of marriage:** The Congress of the General Union of Arab Women held in Tunis has recommended that the marriage age for women should be not less than 17 and for men not less than 20.

**Abortions after the law:** By the end of 1971, legal abortions in England and Wales are expected to exceed well over a quarter million. Since the passage of the Abortion Act in 1967 there have been substantial increases in totals each year—23,641 in 1968, 54,819 in 1969 and 83,851 in 1970. Among the girls aborted in 1969 two were aged 11, seven aged 12, in all 1791 under 16.

**No action against permissiveness:** Mr. Maudling,

the British Home Secretary said that he did not think it was for the government to take action against permissiveness and issue a rule whether the naked human body should be seen on the screen or the theatre stage.

**Change in E. Germany:** Erich Honecker has succeeded Herr Ulbricht who resigned as First Secretary of the East German Communist Party.

**New Islamic Centre in New York:** The Islamic Cultural Centre of New York is planning to raise funds for a new Centre proposed in Midtown New York City. The existing Centre is chiefly used for religious services.

## impact

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