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June five, five years after

When anniversaries become a ritual, it simply means that all is not well. So is the case with Fifth of June, which has come and gone for the past five years but without any reminder and without any reflection.

There is one curious but remarkable fact about the date itself.

What had happened on Fifth of June 1967 was not an original event. It was merely an extension, a continuation-process of something which had taken place earlier in May 1948: the colonisation of Palestine. But that's no more the issue. The problem now is not the basic colonisation but in Arab euphemism, the consequences of the June aggression. It is towards this end that Arab strategy has been ever since applying and re-applying itself. No wonder, to no avail?

In the first place, isn't it time now to ask, as to why the Arabs had to go into an adventure, the leadership knew well they were not prepared to take on. Many explanations have been offered but the most truthful was that by the late President Nasser himself when he accepted total responsibility and resigned on 9 June 1967. It was not necessary to accept the resignation and it was not accepted, but it was important however to have started mending and rebuilding that system and strategy which had failed so demonstrably the test of time.

In his 9 June speech President Nasser had said that the crisis began in the first half of May when Syria and Russia told him that Israel planned to invade Syria. Indeed, on 10 May, General Rabin, the Israeli Chief of Staff had said that his forces might attack Damascus and overthrow the Attasi regime. Clearly this threat was either real or announced with a view to provoke Arab over-reaction so as to justify the Israeli action. President Nasser admitted later that they did not want war, they were not prepared for it, and that the Israeli attack was an "arranged plot". This made things all the more incomprehensible. Why had the Gulf of Aqaba to be closed to Israeli shipping? Why was the United Nations'

Emergency Force asked to be removed? Why that brinkmanship? Why then accepting the Russian and the American advice not to fire the first bullet? Why at all to walk into the Israeli trap? These posers still need to be faced in depth, in truth and in all self-sincerity.

One has to accept that the continuing and deepening of the Middle East stalemate signified the failure both of the system and the leadership in the Arab world. What makes it more serious is that this is not a static equilibrium, the disequilibrium is dynamic.

Soon after the June defeat, the Khartoum summit of the Arab Heads of State decided on a policy of 'no war no peace'. A realistic formulation in the context of the then prevailing situation, but no one had stipulated it to continue so long as to become a non-policy. 'No war, no peace' now meant continuation of the Israeli occupation. It was then assumed that with Arab diplomatic and oil pressure and the continued closure of Suez, America and the Western nations would feel obliged to force Israel into withdrawing from the Arab territories. The diplomatic and economic leverage, mis-coordinated and misapplied as it was, failed to produce the desired results.

The benefits of the Suez closure are reaped now by the tanker trade and pipe-line industry. The only countries who pay for the closure in terms of increased costs both for their exports and imports are the less developed countries. In 1966 the volume of Russian traffic through the Canal was only 7 percent, so it is not their economic interest which is affected by its closure. On the other hand pro-Israel argument in the West has been that the reopening of the Canal only meant providing better access to Russian political interests and marines in areas East of Suez. Russia on her part has managed to expand politically, militarily and trade-wise despite the closure. As far as Israel is concerned with a complete control of the Gulf of Aqaba, she is not at all interested in the Canal.

Romantic hopes were pinned also on

the ability of the fidayeen at least to create enough pressure for Israel to abandon intransigence and seek compromise. The central pivot of the whole strategy has, however, been to try to apply alternately and simultaneously pressure on both Russia and America so that they force Israel into implementing the Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. Russia and the USA, in fact all the big Powers, are already committed to Middle East settlement in accordance with Resolution 242, yet the fact that both the super Powers have chosen to indulge in prevarication instead of fulfilling their self-assumed obligation reflected only on the factuality of world politics. When in 1957, Israel hesitated to withdraw from Gaza and Sharm al Shaikh, John Foster Dulles threatened use of economic sanctions and within four weeks the Israelis withdrew. No doubt the pro-Israeli lobby in the American society and administration is now more entrenched than in 1957 and Nixon is not so much free a President as Eisenhower was, but the U.S. still can actively help in the solution of the problem provided it wanted to. The question is why should it so want? The Arabs control neither votes nor pull money strings inside America. In the comity of nations they have a weight but it remains unasserted and unfelt.

Russia was an ally of Egypt and Syria, also in 1967, but Israel went to war in full knowledge that the Soviet Union was not going to interfere. Like any other imperial power, Russia has used Arab helplessness to obtain for herself economic, political and military foothold in that region. In the immediate context, her interest lies not in the solution but in the continuation of the crisis. The routine treatment given to the Middle East problem during last month's Moscow summit is a recent example. The only thing "positive" to come out is the requirement that the US acts so that Israel gives an affirmative answer to Jar-ring's memorandum sent in February 1971.

Is then the recovery of the Arab rights an impossibility? Dr Murad Ghaleb, the Egyptian Foreign Minister sounded the right note when he said the solution lay not in Moscow but in their own hands. But the question: is who and what prevents them from being themselves, from asserting their destiny?

Survey

COOPERATION IN THE MAGHRIB • MOSCOW SUMMIT

Maghrib — a favourable climate

The visit of President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia to Algeria was another small step towards Maghrib unity which is again becoming a prominent issue. Especially since last year, the Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian governments have been exchanging delegations and concluding various agreements in specific fields, showing that they are more than theoretically committed to strengthening the ties between them.

In his speech in Algiers on 22 May, President Bourguiba said: "While we have rich prospects of co-operation with regard to internal issues such as economy and culture and social benefits—these prospects ought to embrace the political fields also, both Arab and international."

By speaking merely of "prospects of co-operation" at this stage, President Bourguiba (like the other Maghrib leaders) is underlining the attitude of caution with which the unity moves are being made. This attitude is unlike the one taken by the rulers of Libya, Egypt and Syria in the formation of their Federation of Arab Republics which initially contained more agreement in form than in substance.

The attitude of caution on the part of the Maghrib states is a recognition both of the common interests and the differences which would make or mar the unity attempt. The factors making for unity seem to be comparatively small in relation to the obstacles which have to be surmounted.

These countries of course have a common culture based upon their Muslim antecedents but it is doubtful how much this would count in the present phase. Then there is the fact that they form one geographic entity with concerns for the safety and independence of the region. President Boumedienne has recently been expressing much concern on this point as a result of growing inter-power rivalry in the Mediterranean. He believes that all states bordering the Mediterranean should come together to ensure that the area becomes a lake of peace and tranquility, and not the battle ground of the big powers. It is also felt that the coming together of the Maghrib states would facilitate a commonly advantageous policy towards certain external issues, like the future of the Spanish Sahara, the position of North Africans working in Europe and the relationship between the Maghrib States and the European Economic Community. Progress on some of these issues has created a favourable climate for further co-operation. In the beginning, for example, there was a deadlock over the question of Spanish Sahara when Algeria refused to recognise Moroccan claims on the area. Now all

the states have agreed that the solution lies in holding a referendum for the people of the Spanish Sahara to decide their own future.

On the debit side, the problems are numerous indeed. On the broad plane there is as yet no conception of the precise nature of a unified Maghreb. This is probably as it should be. Any attempts to bring about a rigid unity on the political (whether it should be a federation or confederation etc), economic and other planes would probably end in shambles. If labels mean anything, the fact that Algeria is a "revolutionary" democratic state, Morocco a "reactionary" monarchist one and Tunisia somewhere between the two—could cause any amount of strain. So far as economies are concerned, the fact that Algeria is working towards state control of all aspects of trade except retail and welcomes foreign investments (only if it is in projects laid down in the Government's plan and if the Government has control over all plants established) may cause some difficulty to Morocco and Tunisia who both allow private enterprise and foreign investment to play a major rôle in their economies. Some Algerians see greater economic integration as being detrimental to Algeria which is the strongest and most wealthy of the three. Despite these major differences, the tolerance which exists among the leadership of the three countries is a major factor making for calm, and constructive relationship.

Economically the Maghrib states are not important to each other. Trade between them is minimal. The same agricultural products—olive oil, cereals, citrus fruit and wine are produced in all three states. There are, however, one or two areas where there is cooperation. Tunisia and Algeria are working together to exploit the oilfields which they share at Al-Borma, and Algerian gas may be used to process iron ore from the Nador deposits in Morocco.

So far the three countries have failed to agree on a common policy towards the EEC but talks on labour and employment exchange in the Maghreb have gotten off the ground. Significant improvements have also been made in the field of communications. In 1971 a road linking Wadi Suf in Algeria and Gafsa in Tunisia was opened and work began on the Trans-Sahara highway. There already exists some cooperation on essential services and on a cultural level, like in medicine and broadcasting.

However limited may be the present scope of cooperation and however divergent are the Maghreb states in outlook and method, the fact that understanding and peaceful intentions have replaced tension and conflict augurs well for the future of the area.

Moscow Summit: from ideology to pragmatism

The summit meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev was of course important not only for the Soviet Union and America but to peoples all over the world. The results of the summit showed a move away from confrontation to peaceful co-existence and even cooperation. These results do not represent a radical new departure but instead confirm trends which have been noticeable for some years now—trends which are altering the balance of world power and which should cause smaller nations to think deeply and seriously about their existing alliances and alignments. The paralysing thought is that even if they do begin to think now, the big Powers would still be a jump or several jumps ahead.

For the world as a whole, the most spectacular and potentially the most significant achievement of the summit was the conclusion of the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems and the agreement on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear weapons. The limitation of their ABM defences to two 100-missile systems each would incidentally have the effect of giving back the nuclear armouries of Britain, China and France their deterrent value. It remains to be seen what sort of control could be put on the escalation of the arms race. The levelling downs of big powers' armouries could perhaps provide incentive for smaller nations (like Israel and India which have already started) to build up a nuclear armament capability.

For Russia and America the shared interest in the limitation of arms would be reinforced by closer cooperation in science and technology. The two sides also agreed to expand the areas of cooperation—in space, health, in the protection and enhancement of man's environment—and to establish more favourable conditions for developing commercial and other economic ties.

There would be people in America who still have fears of the "Commie" threat who would find cause for deep disquiet in this development of American relationship with the Soviet Union. No one knows whether Nixon's attempt to reduce tensions on the big Power level would be rewarded by a second term as U.S. President. It would be interesting too to note what effect this accord with the giant of capitalist imperialism would have on the leadership of the Soviet Union and those within and without who are committed to the greater expansion of communism in the world.

Whether a tussle develops or not within the Soviet Union, the Moscow Agreement should demonstrate to smaller nations

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● BAHASA MALAYSIA BAHASA ● IRAQI NATIONALISATION

that it is the height of folly to place too much dependence on the goodwill and support of a big Power. Undoubtedly the big Powers have an interest in keeping themselves alive and at (relative) peace with one another. When it comes to the existing situation the only place where the interests of the Big Powers and the Third World appear to converge is in the exploitation of the latter by the former.

That it could even be suggested, let alone believed, that the meeting of the two collaterals in Moscow could bring about peace in Vietnam or the Middle East is a measure of how much the destinies of smaller nations have slipped out of their own hands and of how much power lies in the grasp of the Soviet Union and America. Still, there is a faint and nagging suspicion that the coming together of Moscow and Washington was made possible by a feeling of shared vulnerability.

Indonesia-Malaysia — towards the common language

On 23 May the Indonesian Minister of Education and Culture Mr. Mashuri, and his Malaysian counterpart, Enche Hussain Onn signed an agreement which provides for greater educational cooperation between the two governments. The agreement is one of the latest indications of the growing cooperation between the two countries since the signing of the Normalisation Agreement in August 1966 which brought an end to the period of *Konfrontasi*. The agreement between the two ministers underline the fact that Indonesia and Malaysia are bound by strong ties of tradition, culture and history. It deals specifically with language development and cultural exchange.

The two governments have agreed to adopt a common spelling of the Malay-Indonesian language and to set up a permanent committee to synchronise its terminology and grammar. On the question of cultural exchange, the Malaysians put in a request for 180 Indonesian teachers for Malaysian schools and an exchange of students between the two countries. The Indonesian Department of Education has so far promised to send 75 teachers. The Indonesian Minister said that he expected the agreement would "bring about welfare and peace for the two countries and a closer relationship."

Meanwhile the Malaysian government is going ahead with plans for the "development of Malay language education" in Malaysia. Some of the changes in the educational system so far announced are:

1. From 1972 the General Paper for Higher School Certificate (HSC) candidates in the Malay stream will be in *Bahasa Malaysia*, the national language. At present the paper is set in English, but in the new scheme a section on the "Use of

English" will be included which a Malay candidate must pass before he can obtain a full certificate.

2. By 1975, all primary school classes which are at present being conducted in English will be conducted in Bahasa Malaysia. The process of transformation was started in 1968.

3. In 1978, examinations in all Lower Certificate of Education subjects will be conducted in Bahasa Malaysia.

4. In 1980, examinations in all Malaysian Certificate of Education subjects will be conducted in Bahasa Malaysia.

5. In 1982, examinations in all Higher school Certificate subjects will be conducted in Bahasa.
6. By 1983, all first year university courses will be in Bahasa Malaysia.

In announcing these plans, however, the Minister of Education said that English would remain an important second language at all levels.

Not everyone in Malaysia is in agreement with government policy on these language matters. Certain sections of minority groups see the proclamation of Malay as the national language and the maintenance of English as an important language as a deliberate attempt to discriminate against Chinese, Tamil and other languages of national minorities with a view even to the gradual elimination of schools where tuition is in Chinese or Tamil.

Whatever be the basis for these accusations, it is to be hoped that this new emphasis on language would have some positive effect on some basic problems as for example, reducing the illiteracy rate among the peoples of the area. In Indonesia, where we began, about 20% of adults between the ages of 13 and 45 are illiterate. There are anti-illiteracy courses in operation and the traditional ones are being modified so that the participants could be taught more about their respective occupations as well as to read and write.

Iraq—nationalising the IPC

The Iraqi announcement to nationalise the western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company has come as no surprise. The conflict between Iraqi government and IPC goes back to 1961 when General Kasim nationalised 99.5% of the company's concession area (this included North Rumailah fields which through Soviet help came on stream last April). Successive Iraqi governments have since refused IPC's demands for compensation. Oil in North Rumailah was discovered by IPC but was nationalised before the company had a chance to exploit it. (BP, Shell Compagnie Francaise des Pétroles, ESSO and Mobil each hold 23.7 per cent shares in IPC and Gulbenkian has 5 per cent. The value of the assets of IPC is stated as £136m; this does not include the claimed value of the oil reserves)

In 1969, Iraq entered into an agreement with Russia to exploit these oil-fields.

Russia extended a loan of \$142m and technical assistance for the development of a national Iraqi oil industry. In 1979 North Rumailah out-put is expected to reach 40 million tons a year.

The coming of the North Rumailah oil-fields into production added to IPC resentment and from March this year it reduced oil production from 60 million tons a year to almost a half from her northern fields. At this output rate Iraq stood to lose £120 m a year in oil revenues. The object was to put pressure on the Iraqi government in the compensation dispute.

Iraq depended heavily on oil revenue which constitutes 85% of its foreign earnings. She also lacked machinery and capability to market and transport her oil and so IPC expected her to yield. Iraq probably fortified by the new 'Treaty of Friendship' with Russia and expecting solidarity from the OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) gave an ultimatum to IPC to either agree, unconditionally to raise production in the Northern fields to full capacity or 'face the consequences'. It seems IPC too preferred a showdown rather than conceding.

The Iraqi decision to nationalise covers only IPC and not its two subsidiaries, the Basrah Petroleum Company and the Mosul Petroleum Company. The BPC, with its outlet in the Gulf is producing about 33 million tons a year and the MPC a mere 1.2 million tons. Out of an anticipated revenue of about £420m for the financial year 1972-3 from the three companies, IPC would have provided over £250 million to Iraqi Government. Not to cut away from all oil revenue is probably the reason why Iraq did not take any action against BPC and MPC.

The oil from northern fields amounts to just over 10 per cent of Middle East crude oil production and over 3 per cent of the total world production. At the moment oil production throughout the world is out-stripping the demand from the main industrial countries of the West and so long as the demand increased only at a slow rate, the loss of the Iraqi supply can be made up from other sources. Again at the moment tanker rates are at their lowest, so much so that it is cheaper to ship oil from the Gulf round the Cape to Europe than to ship oil from the Mediterranean terminals to Europe. How Iraq is going to face the after effects of nationalisation depends on the support she gets from OPEC, Russia and other East European countries.

International oil companies may try to make up the loss from other OPEC sources provided the OPEC does not step in to prevent Also, Iran is not an unlikely alternate source.

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ISRAEL TERROR • PAKISTAN & BANGLADESH • UNCTAD-III

Lydda again

All said and done, it is clear that the killings at Lydda airport were not only senseless and unjust, these were in no way useful to the Palestinian cause. Whether mercenaries or revolutionaries, they were no friends of the hapless Palestinian people. The cause of liberation requires cool courage and not showy, ephemeral militancy. No matter the fallacious analogies of other situations, a revolution, to be true and successful, has to be an *in situ* affair. Credit must be given to Israel for seeing to it that, despite cyclical shows of bravado, the Palestinian Movement has been made more and more an exotic affair, alienated from its own self and drifting from one nothingness to another nothingness.

Credit has also been claimed by PFLP which had earlier this year decided to abandon hijacking of Western planes and instead strike at Western interest in the Middle East and abroad. Yet the question remains as to who were these Japanese. Were they dedicated mercenaries or inspired Left-Wing revolutionaries? Whose game were they playing? One can really say nothing certain about this. Talking about Left-Wing militancy one seems, however, to have forgotten the Zionist content of, and involvement with Bolshevism earlier and socialism now. It is a situation where no one knows and no one is responsible, and there is none who would refuse the credit. Herein lies the real danger.

But what lesson for Israel? No doubt in the short run such exercises will serve their game in creating a certain world sympathy, inviting more support from World Jewry and side-tracking from the main issues. Yet it is the long-term implication which needs to concern all sensible elements in the Israeli society and World Jewry. Never in history has usurpation, aggression and over-reaching brought anything but ultimate misery to all those who have refused to accept the moral imperatives of human behaviour. Of all people, the Israelis know better what happened to their own tormentors and a simple change of rôle cannot reverse the logical course of history.

After you!

Published elsewhere, the interview with Tunku Abdul Rahman, Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference, brings to focus once again the state of avoidable and pointless drift in Pakistan-Bangladesh relations. There should be no regret and no surprise if outside agencies have been unable to help, some because they cannot and others because they would not. The common sense approach would have been the direct and mutual approach,

but what is common sense is not always common.

Pakistan maintains that until Bangladesh has shown itself as an independent state and not something as a sub-sovereign extension of Mrs. Gandhi's new Empire, it would be unrealistic to accord recognition. Then comes the implied condonation of the Indian aggression. So, before they decide to recognise they would like to speak to Sheikh Mujib, but strangely enough Pakistan expects India to make such a meeting feasible. Yet polemics and arguments apart, Mr. Bhutto has left it to be understood that Pakistan has decided to recognise Bangladesh. The matter in question, therefore, was not recognition itself, but its timing. It could come after President Bhutto's Middle Eastern and African tour, or it may follow the summit in Delhi on 28 June. The very merit of such a strategy is however, of a doubtful value. One may feel satisfaction at the rather sooner-than-anticipated emergence of anti-Indian feelings in Bangladesh and an increasing challenge to Sheikh Mujib's leadership. But how does it help the cause of reconciliation with Pakistan? During these months of drift and bitterness, who-soever might have gained, it was not the cause either of the prisoners of war or the Biharis or the pro-Pakistan Bengalis.

Bangladesh on her part, like a child, seems clinging to "recognition first" policy. To what tangible purpose one may ask again? Little do the policy makers in Bangladesh seem to realise that an over-assertion of independence could be taken to betray a lack of it. For one thing, Bangladesh should feel confident that Pakistan was in no position to come back and annex her. Any threat to her existence, could now come either from within or from areas contiguous to her. Similarly, the Muslim States, whether they were right or wrong in supporting Pakistan, were not in any way enemies of Bangladesh and any refusal to talk to them is bound to injure her own interest. Many of them have already started feeling that Bangladesh affairs, at least foreign affairs, are being run by India, a feeling shared also by a number of African and Commonwealth states.

UNCTAD lessons

UNCTAD-III has come to a frustrating end. Six weeks of debate, discussion, admonition and persuasion have yielded precious little. It is clear that the developed countries, particularly America and Britain are not prepared to increase their official aid to the LDC's (their official aid/GNP ratio is about half of the required minimum set for the second development decade). No improvement is in sight for better

trade access to the markets of the developed countries. No agreement could be arrived at even for price stabilisation of primary commodities. Linking of the SDR's to development has also been over-ruled by the developed countries. Unctad-III could not even maintain the erstwhile semblance of agreement, albeit a phraseological exercise designed to conceal more than to reveal. If anything is more clear, it is the gulf that separates the rich and the poor—not merely the wealth and the amenities but in dramatically different attitudes, aspirations and ideals. The failure of UNCTAD-III only means that those who claim to lead the world today have no perception of the dangers inherent in this niquitous situation.

The countries of the Third World too have a lesson to learn. The strategy of dependence upon the developed countries deserves re-examination. Fundamental thinking, is required about the LDC's model of development. They have advertently or inadvertently accepted the Western or the Soviet models without examining their own needs, potentials and traditions. The juxtaposition of the Western development ideals and modes over an alien socio-economic landscape has led to frustrating experiences. If development is to mean economic expansion, social welfare and reduction in foreign dependence, then a new model for development will have to be developed through indigenous experience. The Muslim countries would be rendering a service to the Third World and also to themselves if they took such an initiative.

Pakistani scholars — Over-priced foreign exchange

While the merits of the recent Pakistani decision to devalue her Rupee from a parity of Rs. 4.76 to Rs 11.00 to one US dollar need a more detailed examination, there is one aspect of the matter which is of immediate and urgent concern to Pakistani students studying abroad on their own expenses. In Britain, Pakistan normally allowed an average of £860 per annum in foreign exchange to obtain which they used to pay about Rs. 10,000 but with a 240 per cent devaluation they are now required to pay Rs 20,600. The devaluation may increase Pakistan's exports earnings, but it would not improve the Rupee paying capacity of the parents or guardians concerned. The question of education outside Pakistan itself needed thorough examination, but the problem of those who are already abroad deserves immediate attention. One hopes that its urgency would not get lost in the proverbial world of red-tape.

TEN YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE

Algeria — the beginning of a success story

A. H. MAJID

"Like a body that has dozed too long, Algeria is gradually restoring life to its cramped limbs, recovering its energy . . . arising and resuming its march forward . . ."

These are not merely the lyrical words of the propagandist. The metaphor, of Algeria as a body once asleep and now stirring, captures the cool dynamism and the zest for building which many a visitor to Algeria now notices. After ten years of independence and disadvantages of enormous proportions Algeria has emerged as one of the most remarkable countries in the developing world, one which has attracted the admiration of and provided the sanctuary for revolutionaries in many parts of the forgotten world.

In 1962, after eight years of bitter and bloody conflict with the French, Algerians gained their independence. But the taste of political independence did not make life immediately sweeter. After 130 years of colonialism, Algeria, four times the size of France, was transformed into a land whose people had virtually no say in the political, economic or cultural running of their affairs. Right from the beginning the French declared: "We must hinder as far as possible the development of Moslem schools, or zaouias (in Algeria) . . . we must in other words, aim at the moral and material disarmament of the native population."

This policy, translated into practice, meant for example that Arabic became a foreign language in Algeria, just like Spanish or English; it meant that education especially higher education, was French from the outset; it meant potential leaders in Algeria were divorced from the 'values of Algerian society'; it meant that agriculture and other aspects of the Algerian economy were run down to develop Algeria as the wine growing province of France.

On top of all the problems created by French misrule in Algeria lay the ravages of war—eight years of the most barbaric 'defence' by the French army and government of the idea that *algerie* was *française*, that there was but one country, France, with one language, French. The colonialists were so blinded by their own complexes that they could not see why the natives should reject the 'honour' of being assimilated. But the natives did reject it; French chauvinism lost as the war cry rang out—*Algerie musulman!*

For the first couple of years after independence, much of what the patriots had fought for appeared to lay prostrate on a sickening abortion table. Ben Bella pursuing a flamboyant foreign policy sought to rub shoulders with the more famous leaders of the Third World, was falling



"Even as we have conquered our political independence and are struggling for economic independence, we want to recover our personality of which the language is an essential component". President Boumedienne

increasingly in the Soviet lap and by 1963, one year after independence, was having armed conflict with Morocco over border disputes. He appeared to be less concerned with the task of domestic reconstruction.

Then, on 19 June, 1965, came the coup which toppled Ben Bella and which was led by war veteran Colonel Houari Boumedienne who immediately went about setting an example to his people of dour hard work, unpretentiousness and realistic moderation in the face of tremendous odds. In his years at the helm of Algerian affairs, Algeria has seen tremendous changes in several sectors—education, public health, public works, the administration of wilayas, decentralization, a cautious development of the tourist industry and so on. A visitor to Algeria today is brought to the sharp realisation that not all Arabs have the notion that Time merely runs, as the saying goes in the Arabic language—as against the English expression that Time flies. There is an urgency and a dynamism which have caught on to many of the builders of Algeria—young and old alike.

This is the third year of the Algerian Four-Year Plan—an ambitious plan which caused some concern, even consternation in the beginning because of its emphasis (45 per cent of total investment) on heavy industry and the comparatively little attention that seems to be given to agriculture. But those concerned with the plan point out that agriculture is developing at the same rate as that of population increase i.e. 3 per cent and that much of the heavy industry (mechanical engineering, metallurgy, steel, petrochemistry, etc) would in the long run guarantee a faster growth rate for agriculture by providing machines, means of transport and even fertilisers.

With oil, which provides Algeria with its greatest single source of income, iron and other mineral deposits which Algeria is bountifully endowed with, Algeria's at-

tempt to industrialise is made that much easier. But one of the crucial problems it has had to face is its small number of trained personnel. Now with almost every contract that is signed with foreign firms to set up various plants in Algeria the Algerian government insists that provision must be made for the training of indigenous personnel. It is partly because of this shortage of trained personnel and partly because of the opportunity-incentive which the government affords that very young people are to be found in some of the most senior and responsible positions in the country. A recent graduate of Imperial College, London, now in his mid-twenties is now the head of the quality steel testing unit for the whole of Algeria. Such is the dedication and hard work (often up to 18 hours a day) which these young people give to the tasks at hand that some even say they are becoming distinctly grey as a result.

Despite the strides which have been made, certain basic problems still loom large. Some are natural ones—like the lack of sufficient water in a country that is made up of much desert lands (only one-fifth of Algeria is under cultivation). Others are part of the legacy of French colonialism, like illiteracy and even of unemployment. Again in combating illiteracy there is the lack of enough well-trained teachers. In the painful transition to make Arabic the medium of instruction, there is the complaint that many Algerians know neither Arabic nor French tolerably well and it would probably take many years before this awful reminder of French "deculturation" is effaced. Unemployment is again part of the painful process of transition. When Boumedienne gave the order to uproot the wine producing vines in Algeria he was of course trying to uproot the French colonial past as well, but this has created some displaced persons.

Incidentally with France no longer importing Algerian wines, there is a surplus of wine in Algeria which has made the commodity very cheap and increased its consumption by Algerians.

In the pace of progress in Algeria, it is sometimes said that some of the more treasured aspects of Algerian life are being irretrievably lost. The Tuaregs, for example, the noble and feared war-lords of the desert in times gone by are now made to benefit from educational programmes, free medicine and so on. But now the basis of their lives has been ruined and many are to be found building tourist guest houses on the edge of the desert in order ironically, that the very tourists could come and observe them in their natural habitat. It is the inevitable price that any country would have to pay for encouraging tourism in its modern, lucrative, yet destructive form.

Others complain that the progress has by-passed a whole half of the Algerian population—the women. The comparative absence of women on the streets except those wearing veils is taken as an indication that Algerian society is still basically stern and puritanical and harsh. But the fact that a veiled person could be seen with a short skirt underlines some of the dilemmas and absurdities of change.

Change, in its multifarious aspects, is the fascinating thing about Algerian life. It is perhaps of the utmost significance where the leadership of the country is concerned. The Algerian leadership's attempt to dismantle colonialism and go back to the



Algerian artisan: the beautiful and painstaking task of building

ALGERIAN STATISTICS

Population, 1969	13,349,000
Average rate of increase, 1960-69	2.4%
Area	2,381,740 sq. km.
Pasture, cultivated land	442,030 sq. km.
Per capita GNP, 1969	\$260
Imports 1970	\$1,257 m.
Exports 1970	\$1,009 m.
Ordinary budget expen. 1972	\$1,158m.
Investment budget expen. 1972	\$723 m.

natural roots of the people makes an interesting contrast with, say, the policies of Mustafa Kemal of Turkey earlier in the century. Where the Algerian leaders have been more at home with French, they are now rejecting it or giving it secondary importance; Kemal would not have been able to read the modern Turkish in the Roman script which he advocated so passionately as part of a policy which is still unleashing a whirlwind in Turkey.

Despite the problems which the new Algerians have to grapple with, the pronouncements and the actions of Boumedienne and his ministers all make it manifest that they are dedicated to the welfare of Algerians. In building their democratic society based on social justice they are trying to see to it that no one section of the community is much more privileged than the rest. Boumedienne recently dismissed a claim for higher wages from civil servants on the grounds that the peasants were making more sacrifices than they were. There is a ceiling put by the government on the amount government workers can earn. Measures like these have given rise to the criticism that the government is excessively authoritarian but the reply given is that Algeria cannot afford the luxury of labour disputes and such things as student strikes. Our students, Boumedienne says, have been spoilt.

There is a very conscious attempt in Algeria to shun excessive speech making and 'pointless politics'. Boumedienne and his cabinet of technocrat ministers realised that political independence was merely a condition and not the final objective of the Algerian revolution. There is still a long way to go and as Boumedienne has pointed out: "A poor country, colonised for 130 years, does not pull itself up from underdevelopment, from poverty in eight years." But the beginning of a success story is already there, measured by the fact that Algeria now has a growth rate, so far as living standards are concerned, of 7 per cent a year, which is double the average for Africa as a whole.

The nineteenth century Algerian poet Badi agg Orally, would have been well pleased with the pace of development, and the determination of present-day Algerians. He once wrote: "I was walking at a rapid pace through the desert; I had placed such a supply of perseverance on my heart that it could neither exhaust itself nor be stilled."

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TWO MONTHS AFTER THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

Psychological warfare, the one which is more serious

TUNKU ABDUR RAHMAN PUTRA INTERVIEWED FOR *IMPACT*

"How could I take on a job which needs so much sacrifice, quiet and sober existence in a land away from all my friends? Many were no doubt surprised, but they do not know that behind this facade of gaiety and care-free life, there also lies inside me extreme piety."

That was the Tunku, Tunku Abdur Rahman Putra. Unlike many he refuses to pretend; he is aware of his shortcomings and at the same time conscious of the "inside", of the abiding values, and of over-riding obligations. Tunku does not boast about achievements and progress. He gives an impression of being confident, optimistic and satisfied, but not complacent. A marked difference of mood since his previous interview (*Impact*, 12-25 November, 1971).

The situation at the Secretariat is not what it used to be: no financial contributions and no reply to letters. It has improved and more important, a certain degree of mutuality and trust seems evident. "When matters are urgent I take decision on my own and they accept this as a matter of course and expediency . . . King Feisal too shows much kindness and so do his ministers and officials. My work has been made much less difficult. The organisation which started off with a certain amount of foreboding and lack of optimism is now well under way".

Some ground-work on the cultural projects has been initiated. The Secretariat has started collecting information on the existing Islamic centres and organisations. This is an immense task and would need special allocation of funds. About the Islamic Bank, it is proposed to send two teams of banking experts to visit the member states and discuss the project with local experts and help structurise the whole thing.

Problems? "The one which is more serious and which we have not managed to overcome is the psychological warfare that is being waged against the movement of Islamic unity by the Western press. At first I thought it was an omission on their part to play down the activities of the Secretariat and so I tried to supply them with news but nothing of it appeared in the press, either in Europe or America. One glaring example was the mission to Dacca in July last year. No mention of it ever appeared in the Western press, though even a visit by a British M.P. was given so much prominence. I don't know if the British press gave an adequate coverage to the recent Conference, yes . . . the B.B.C. overseas service carried the news as

a small item. Even the British-owned newspapers in Malaysia played it down.

"It is obvious to me that the intention is to kill the organisation of Muslim unity at birth. What danger they can see in it I do not know now, except perhaps from the Jewish angle this may pose a challenge to their domination in the Middle East.


"Viewing from the political angle they might think that too much power given to the Muslims may harm the European interests in that part of the world. Muslims occupy such strategic and geographical position in the world, particularly in the Middle East, that a strong organised movement may pose serious threat to their missionary activities and to European trade and geo-political interests.

"I personally think it is better to deal with a strong organised group of nations than weak, indecisive and independable ones. Here the unity which has been forged or started has one intention and that is to close the ranks of the Muslims and build a unity which can protect us from exploitation. It is not a negative one."

The problem of misrepresentation and misunderstanding is indeed a big problem but more than anything else, the Muslim world itself has failed to communicate with the vast body of independent public opinion in the West. In fact the flow of communication between Muslim countries themselves is poor both in content and quantum; a great part of it comes through the very European sources. The decision to establish an International Islamic News Agency signified a recognition of the problem but it would be some time before IINA became operational. Saudi Arabia has donated \$40,000 to meet the initial organisation costs and a meeting of the representatives of the national news agencies in the Muslim countries has been called to meet in Kuala Lumpur towards the end of next month. Given due response from all concerned, Tunku felt, a beginning could be made.

Discussing area perspective, Tunku evinced great concern about the problem of the Muslims in the Philippines, the Middle East deadlock and the situation in Bangladesh. The Muslims of Mindanao (South Philippines) are fighting a battle of survival against organised killings and colonisation of their lands but it seems the gravity of the situation is not yet fully realised in the Muslim world.

The problem needed objective projection and a well-organised relief and rehabilitation programme.



"Peace in the Middle East is important to the humanity at large and no less to the Jews themselves. The Jews might think that having won this territory by aggression and use of force they have the right, under the law of the jungle, to retain these territories. But the question is for how long, a generation—may be, but not for all time, because one small people amidst the millions of Arabs cannot hope to escape judgement ultimately.

"The Arabs are prepared to accept the UN resolution of November 1967. The Jews were not satisfied with a pound of flesh but wanted blood as well. In November 1967, the Israeli representative had told the United Nations General Assembly: 'You have chosen repeatedly to meet us in the arena of battles, you cannot refuse to meet us at the negotiating table'.

"That was well said but the question is whether the words carry the meaning or intention on the part of Israel to make peace with honour and justice. If the intention was there, then what was the objection to withdrawing from all the territories occupied, to reach the negotiating table? Or even as a prelude to talk? If Israel agreed to accept resolution 242 and the following resolutions pertaining to Jerusalem, the Arab States would agree to a dialogue that might lead to peace. We could see that Israel by offering to hold a dialogue was in fact talking as if with the

one hand holding a gun and the other the pen offering, so they say, to sign the treaty of peace. No self-respecting people with any pride left in them would accept these terms. The only answer to such offer would be for the Arab nations to prepare for war and this time win or lose; one thing is certain—they will be better prepared, and not repeat the same mistake made by Nasser in 1967.

"For then, according to informed sources, Nasser had no real or serious intention of carrying the fight further than a bluff, hoping thereby to bring Israel to the conference table with less arrogance and more humility.

"The future and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem is the concern no more of the Arabs alone. It is a matter of the deepest and mutual concern of all Muslims throughout the world. It was this widespread emotion and Muslim public opinion which brought up the question of the recovery of Jerusalem time and again and at every meeting of the Muslims.

"This defeat and humiliation which the Arabs suffered at the hands of the Jews, has brought them to a full realisation of their errors. Perhaps they had given much too much time on their Arab thinking and too little on their Muslim comrades. As Muslims, they were strong but as Arabs they are divided. This new awakening gives them fresh hope. They realise as Muslims only will they recover Jerusalem. Alone they will have less chance to succeed. Insofar as the Arabs are concerned, their determination to fight back is made. Admittedly they are not yet ready to start a full scale war but when they strike it will be pretty serious for the Jews and world peace.

"The days of reckoning will surely come for Israel and when they do come, the consequences will be terrible. No American and European help can save them. This is the time for them to think. As I had said in my speech at the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Jeddah —'if they are wise, as they claim to be, then they must make honourable peace and hand back now these territories to their rightful owners'.

"I feel it is the duty of all the peace-loving leaders of the world, of Europe and America to induce them to do so. And if they refuse, then the UN Resolution No. 242 of November 1967 must be forcibly implemented. Unless the UN is prepared to do this, then if war breaks out in the Middle East, UN and the big five will stand condemned in the eyes of the world as being responsible for the war.

What about the mission which the Islamic Conference had decided to send to Pakistan and Bangladesh?

"It could not materialise because the authorities there would not receive a mission from states which have not recognised Bangladesh." Could he himself not have gone personally, after all because his country, Malaysia, had recognised?

Tunku said: "No, because apart from the IC, I am nobody, and I do not represent Malaysia". The fact is, I have been trying all along to help in the alleviation of the situation. I was told that Sheikh Mujib has expressed willingness to receive a delegation from the Secretariat. I was then in Cairo for the meeting on Islamic Bank and I immediately sent a letter through the Indian ambassador. The reply I received was from the Indian P.M. Mrs. Gandhi. It said that since we had not cared during the earlier suffering, Bangladesh authorities do not find themselves in a position to receive us.

"I had visited Dacca, and Islamabad in July 1971. While in Islamabad, I was invited to visit Calcutta and Delhi. But as our mission arrived in Penang to fly to Calcutta (we could not fly directly from Dacca) the Indian High Commissioner in Malaysia explained that the Government of India would not be in a position to receive a delegation from the Islamic Secretariat in view of the strong public resentment against the expulsion of India from the Rabat Summit meeting. India had invited me with full knowledge that I was leading a delegation from the Islamic Secretariat and it was therefore not proper to exclude my colleagues from Iran and Kuwait. I could go to India only as the representative of the IC, so the visit to Calcutta was called off.

"I wrote back telling them that their statement was not true. I did not receive any apology or clarification from the Indian Prime Minister. Later the Indian Ambassador came to me and said they realised it was a mistake.

"When the member states decided at the last Conference to send a mission to Pakistan and Bangladesh, the intention was to be able to help and help in a big way, but we are told that we cannot set our foot there. I had even proposed a meeting between Mr. Bhutto and Sheikh Mujib in Mecca, but with no result. It is really very distressing when one thinks of the sufferings and the problems, and so frustrating to find that we simply cannot get there. Bangladesh is beset with immense problems of food, of relief, and in fact the reconstruction of the whole economy. Then there are continuing reports about the persecution of the non-Bengalis. I can only appeal to the Prime Minister in the name of our religion to stop and prevent cruelties against these people. Added to this, India has handed Pakistani prisoners to be tried for war crimes. The unfortunate result is that both countries are drifting apart, drifting towards the Communist camps.

"The other day I received a letter from an organisation in Dacca calling itself 'Society for the Relief of Bengalis Abroad'. It invites attention to the 'plight' of the Bengalis in Pakistan and claims that Bengali girls are being sold in the Arabian slave markets. This is a very wild statement. To the best of my knowledge I know

of no slave or slave market of any kind in any Arab country. It is absolutely illegal. If people make such irresponsible statements, regardless of facts, one does not know how to trust or help them. In our anxiety and enthusiasm to help we cannot help those who live to profit from the misery of people.

"So here is a situation of sympathy and yet of utter helplessness. We beg to be allowed to go, but they say 'no don't come, you recognise us first'. But you don't quarrel for recognition when people are starving. This is not the way to treat the countries that went out of their way to help. It is bound to offend the Muslim states. Being prevented from reaching Sheikh Mujib would lend credence to feelings that Bangladesh is not an independent entity.

This is one part of the story. In Pakistan, I am told, there is great feeling of anger against me because Malaysia has recognised Bangladesh and probably because I mentioned the name of Bangladesh in my report to the last Conference. A Pakistani press correspondent came to argue it out with me even to the point of rudeness.

"I cannot help feeling that the trouble in that sub-continent is far from ended. So God help us."

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PAKISTAN

Constitution-making in retrospects

SHARIF AL MUJAHID*

Now that a 25-member Constitution Committee of the recently convened National Assembly is drafting a new constitution for Pakistan, the questions that come to one's mind are, first, whether the new assembly would be successful in writing a constitution representing national consensus and, second, what could be outlines of a viable and workable constitution for Pakistan.

Before we venture to locate the important causes that led to the failure or abandonment of Pakistan's previous constitutions, certain basic assumptions must need be noted. A constitution is the basic law of a nation, which in the first place represent its ethos. While it reflects the hopes and aspirations of the nation within the context of the pressures—political, social, economic—beleaguering that nation, it also seeks to suggest ways and means not only to actualise its hopes and aspirations, but also to minimise, nullify, and counteract these pressures.

Seen in this context, constitution making becomes a function of political development; one corollary of this being that if the country is subjected to political crises at the time of constitution making, the ultimate product that comes out of a constituent assembly would be given to serious disputations among the various parties, and fail to achieve national consensus as to its suitability. This explains why, despite serious efforts during the fifties, Pakistan was denied a constitution for the first nine years as also why the second attempt by Ayub failed to gain national consensus.

The second assumption is that the destiny that was conceived for Pakistan when it was launched in 1947 was a democratic one. This is by no means an afterthought, since we could go further and claim that the Pakistan demand itself was informed by the universally accepted democratic principle of the right of nations to self-determination.

There were also other features which underline the democratic nature of the demand. For instance, it was discussed and debated by the Muslims for almost a decade before it was adopted by the Muslim League as its goal, and it was debated for another seven years before it was accepted, albeit reluctantly, by the British, the Hindus and the Sikhs. Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah not only attributed the authorship of Pakistan to "every Mussalman", but defined it in such a way as to relate it to their life, anxieties, ethos and cultural tradition, and the hopes and aspirations of the Muslim nation. Besides, despite his staunch advocacy of the Pakistan demand, Jinnah left the issue to be settled by a reference to the Muslim masses who voted for it overwhelmingly in the 1945-46 elections. And when Pakistan was born, he said the constitution of Pakistan would be "a democratic type, embodying the essential principles of Islam".

The original Constituent Assembly first met on August 11, 1947, but, except for appointing committees on fundamental rights and on minorities, it could not attend seriously to the business of constitution making till March 1949, when it met to consider and adopt the Objectives Resolution; the reason being given is that the government was obliged to attend to the more serious and urgent problems that confronted the nation on the morrow of its birth.

Pakistan had to take expedient choices towards national survival, gravely threatened during the first year by economic disruption, lack of administrative infra structure, breakdown of communications, refugee influx, communal war, and India's occupation of Junagardh, invasion of Kashmir, diversion of canal waters and denial of Pakistan cash balances.

The constitution making was taken up from March 1949 onwards, but it proved to be a rather difficult task. The bifurcated nature of the country,

with the two wings separated by about 1,000 miles of the Indian mainland, East Bengal's predominance in population over the combined population of the other three provinces and six smaller units were problems peculiar to Pakistan and called for a bold approach to centre-province relationship, and concessions to East Bengal's special position in the federal structure. The first report of the Basic Principles Committee was presented by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan on 7 September, 1950, but it had to be shelved because it did not fully reflect the east wing's population predominance in the federal legislature.

The second report of the Basic Principles Committee which was presented by Prime Minister Nazimuddin on 22 December, 1952, rectified this lapse, but only to create a furor among an influential class of Punjab politicians. The report had provided for a bicameral legislature, and conceded East Bengal 60 (50 per cent) out of 120 seats in the House of Units, and 200 (50 per cent) out of the 400 directly elected seats in the House of People. Punjab was given 27 seats in the upper house and 90 in the lower one, and the feeling was that, while introducing the principle of parity, the report had given predominance to one province over all the rest nine units.

The deadlock was sought to be resolved by the Mohammad Ali Bogra formula of October 1953 which while giving representation to the various provinces in the 200-member lower house on population basis—thus conceding East Bengal 165, Punjab 75, NWFP and the tribal areas 24, Sind and Khairpur 24, and Baluchistan, Baluchistan states and Karachi 16 seats—gave equal representation of 10 seats to each one of the five newly devised units in the 50-member upper house.

Two special features made the formula acceptable. First, as against the earlier Basic Principle Committee reports, the two houses were given equal powers. Second, the dominance of one province over others was sought to be precluded by providing that in case of dispute, the two houses would meet jointly, and that, although the joint session would decide by a simple majority, the disputed motion should secure at least 30 per cent vote from either wing.

Once this problem was resolved, constitution making proceeded smoothly: the Basic Principles Committee report, with certain amendments, was finally adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 21 September 1954. The Constituent Assembly was due to meet briefly in fall 1954 to formally approve the constitution before it came into force on 25 December, 1954. But it could not, because Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad, in conspiracy with certain politicians and the army brass ordered dissolution of the Constituent Assembly itself.

Prime Minister Liaquat's assassination earlier in October, 1951, had already created a political vacuum, thereby facilitating the injection, on the one hand, of civil servants into politics, and encouraging, on the other, political intrigues. At any rate, while the politicians got all the blame for making such a mess in the fifties, it was in fact certain civilian and military bureaucrats who were mainly responsible for Pakistan's misfortunes.

More specifically two civil servants (Ghulam Muhammad and Iskander Mirza) who had come to occupy the nation's highest offices, set the tradition, presumably with the support of the army commander-in-chief (General Mohammad Ayub Khan), of an authoritarian rule which was later formalised, and developed by Ayub in his ten-year rule. These civil servants set one party against another, one politician against another, discrediting the parties as well as the politicians in the public eyes. Ghulam Muhammad dismissed Khwaja Nazimuddin from Prime Ministership (although he enjoyed the confidence of the legislature). He also dissolved the first constituent assembly, and several provincial cabinets and legis-

latures when they refused to toe his line.

Iskander Mirza launched a party of his own (Republican Party), presided over or attended its meetings which were held in the President's House, helped to keep it in power, forced Prime Minister Suhrawardy to resign in October 1958 (instead of calling the National Assembly to test his strength as was demanded by him), dismissed governors without sufficient cause, and manipulated the whole political process simply to keep himself at the helm of affairs.

The effect of Ghulam Muhammad's step to dissolve the Constituent Assembly was to deny the nation its right to a written and democratic constitution. In May 1955 the Governor-General who was ruling through fiat and ordinances and wanted to call a Constituent Convention of hand-picked men, was forced by the Federal Court to call a new constituent assembly on the same terms of reference as the original C.A. The second Constituent Assembly, when it was finally convened, unified all the West Pakistan units into one province, and produced a two-province constitution which came into effect on 23 March 1956.

The 1956 Constitution provided for parity between East and West Pakistan in a 300-member unicameral legislature, a federal system with a federal, provincial and concurrent list of subjects, supremacy of the assembly to which the cabinet headed by the prime minister was responsible, a fixed tenure titular president, an independent judiciary, and justiciability of fundamental rights. It also reflected the Islamic bias of Pakistan's national ethos in the Objective Resolution, Directive Principles and the repugnancy clause.

Moreover, not only was it democratic, it also reflected national consensus, being acceptable, by and large, to all sections in the country. No political party raised any fundamental objection to it, and almost all the major and minor parties including Suhrawardy's Awami League (in opposition at the time of its adoption) assumed power under this constitution at one time or other between March 1956 and October 1958.

Since Ayub's seizure of power in 1958, it has assiduously been propagated that the 1956 constitution had failed. For one thing, two years is too short a period for the viability, suitability and workability of a constitution to be judged. For another, the elections scheduled to be held in 1958 were first postponed by the Mirza-backed Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon to February 1959, and Ayub's coup had them permanently postponed. Thus it was not the constitution that had failed; it was never allowed to work. Iskander Mirza and Ayub sabotaged and abrogated the constitution which they had so solemnly sworn to defend and having wrecked it themselves, it was pretty smart to turn round and claim that it had failed.

We have already noted the initiation of civil servants into politics especially since 1951. In the after years the political leadership lost whatever control it had over the country's bureaucracy. While the politicians wrangled among themselves, and went on with politics of fragmentation and attrition, power accrued, if only by sheer default, to the fixed tenure civil and military bureaucracy which, in the meanwhile, had also gained prestige, for making Pakistan administratively, economically and militarily viable. In the absence of general elections, while the "politicians increasingly lost their democratic mandates, the praetorian civil and military services" made good their twin mandates of stability and security.

At any rate, the civil and military bureaucratic coalition has been ascendant at least since 1953 when Prime Minister Nazimuddin who represented a political elitist consensus, was summarily dismissed by the "ceremonial" Governor-General, presumably with the army support. Till October 1958, when General Ayub finally seized power, the civil bureaucracy was the senior partner in this coalition; after the 1958 coup the military became

* Sharif al Mujahid heads the Department of Journalism, University of Karachi.

the focus of power and decision-making.

What, however, the Ayubian take-over did was not merely to formalise and institutionalise the ascendancy of the civil-military coalition. It also banished democratic politics and disbanded the structural apparatus for its functioning: constitution, legislatures, political parties, elections, and a free press.

For a little less than four years Ayub Khan ruled Pakistan with a firm hand under the comprehensive, albeit coercive, martial law umbrella. And all the while he had argued consistently and vehemently in favour of a centralised authoritarian political structure. With politics banned and media monopolised, he had a clear field on the one hand to damn and decry parliamentary politics and hold politics and the politicians responsible for all the pre-1958 failures; and on the other, to hold up to the public gaze all the time his "achievements" and his "system". The prime need of a country like Pakistan was economic development, and the dictates of economic progress, argued Ayub, cannot stand the "strains and stresses of the Western democratic system".

The 1962 constitution which he promulgated under his own authority reflected his passion for a combination of centralisation and authoritarianism. In essence, it was meant to institutionalise martial law and convert it "into a document which will form the basis of running the country". "Semantic" in nature and solely meant to legalise, stabilise, and perpetuate the existing configuration of power, it provided for democratic authoritarianism, and established a system in basis democratic, in organisation hierarchic *a la* Louis Napoleon. Based on the distrust of the people, of politicians, of political parties, of direct elections, of a Vice-President, and of a parliamentary system, it sought to establish a government of the President, by the President, and for the President.

President-centred as Ayub's constitution was, it was by no means a presidential system. Such a system on the pattern of the U.S. system was proposed by the constitution commission under Justice Shahabuddin, appointed by Ayub himself in February 1960. Shahabuddin had proposed a directly elected president, a federal structure, a bicameral legislature (with the lower house, again, elected directly), separation of powers, an independent judiciary, and parity between the two wings. But Ayub rejected this genuine presidential system out of hand, as also the later Franchise Commission Report which provided for the assemblies to be directly elected.

The system not only failed to provide for a separation of powers, thereby vesting legislative powers in the president who could issue ordinances and reducing the assembly to a mere rubber-stamp. It also did not provide for direct election of the president and the assemblies; instead they were to be elected by a limited electorate of 80,000 basic democrats (B.D.) or local "notables", who could be easily manipulated and pressured into voting the way the regime wished. The B.D. system also denied people direct participation in the democratic process, and the politically sensitive strata of the population (such as the urban elites, the intelligentsia, the professional classes) felt cheated and disenfranchised.

For these and other reasons the 1962 Constitution and the political system it established were unpopular and doomed to fail from the beginning. The fact that Ayub's Convention Muslim League fought shy even to contest the B.D. elections in 1964 and went about "adopting" the winners indicated the regime's own doubts about selling its constitution or the political system at the direct-vote level. Moreover, the fact that, despite large scale governmental pressure and bribery, about 30,000 of the 80,000 basic democrats (over 36 per cent) voted for Miss Fatima Jinnah (the opposition candidate) in the 1965 presidential elections indicated that the system was not really popular even among the newly created B.D. elites.

Even so, the nation had to wait another four years and Ayub has to be subjected to a long winter of political disorders during 1968-69 before he could be forced into abandoning his plans for running for a third term, calling a Round Table Conference (R.T.C.), and accepting the two basic

national demands—viz, reversion to the federal parliamentary system and adult franchise. Yet he did not hand over power to the National Assembly Speaker as was provided in his own 1962 Constitution, but to General Yahya, the army Commander-in-Chief, who now began to rule through the instrument of martial law.

While Yahya's holding of the first general elections on adult-franchise basis was a commendable act in itself, he committed certain blunders for which the nation had to pay heavily, rather catastrophically.

First, he had no mandate to rule under martial law. Even if it had become "necessary" to save the country from "utter destruction" as was argued at the time, the army could best have acted to aid the civil power instead of assuming a direct and illegal rule. Yahya had no mandate to enact a new Legal Framework Order (L.F.O.) either. Both the Pakistan Democratic Movement (P.D.M.) and the Direct Action Committee (D.A.C.) which spearheaded the anti-Ayub upsurge during 1968-69 resulting in the R.T.C. had called for a reversion to the 1956 Constitution.

Since the country had rejected Ayub's 1962 constitution, legally speaking, the constitution that was in force at the time of Ayub's coup, automatically became the basic law of the land. Hence, the most practical and proper course was to hold elections under the 1956 Constitution, hand over power to the majority party in the new assembly, and let the assembly amend the constitution as and if it deemed fit.

If the abandonment of the 1956 Constitution and the enactment of a LFO were grievous errors, more devastating were the contents of that document. To put it briefly, Yahya had no mandate either to concede representation to provinces on population basis or to disband One Unit. These were no small issues to be settled through a one-man fiat; these were serious matters relating to the principles of federalism and integration which an assembly with a mandate was competent to deal with.

Anyway the L.F.O. made ample concessions to centrifugalism in Pakistan's body-politics, it failed to incorporate provisions promoting national integration and countering divisiveness. For instance, the quantum of provincial autonomy could have been laid down particularly when the principle of representation on the basis of population had been accepted and West Pakistan split up into four provinces.

Again, the rules of procedure for the assembly could have been laid down obviating extreme situations of either one province imposing a constitution by a simple majority over other provinces or the Chief Martial Law Administrator refusing to give assent to a democratically framed constitution.

Thus it was the failure to work out such an arrangement which provided Yahya the much-wanted pretext to postpone the National Assembly, originally called to meet on March 3, 1972. That the Assembly's postponement was a disaster, need hardly be said now.

From the discussion above, it is clear that the business of constitution making cannot be approached in a light hearted manner or in a partisan spirit.

In the first place, any constitution to be viable and to become acceptable to the nation as a whole must be democratic, both in content and spirit. This is very essential because unless informed by a democratic spirit even the most democratic constitution could be abused as, for instance, the Weimar constitution.

Secondly, there is a lesson from the fate that betook Ayub's one-man constitution, and the constitution committee should scrupulously avoid writing a constitution geared to the interests of any one individual or party. A constitution is always a bi-partisan affair and it would fail to achieve national consensus unless it is comprehensive and representative enough to win the adherence of all sections, irrespective of their political weightage at a given moment.

Thirdly, the principles of federalism and parliamentary democracy must be incorporated. Not only had the Pakistani nation overwhelmingly

rejected the presidential system during the 1968-69 Democratic Movement but all the parties, including the ruling Pakistan People's Party, are committed to the parliamentary system. A Presidential system can become highly centralised and even authoritarian for that matter, East Pakistan's alienation and disaffection may, in the ultimate analysis, be traced to the Ayub Khan's highly centralised system. In the context of Pakistan, a parliamentary system alone could give a sense of participation to the less developed regions.

Fourthly, the constitution must not only be democratic in its content but must also be worked out in a democratic spirit. For this, the chief responsibility lies with the majority party which should nurse patiently and assiduously democratic traditions, and try to create an atmosphere of public trust. The guaranteeing of four freedoms including a free press is a must.

Fifthly, the constitution must also represent national ethos. That Pakistan is primarily and decisively a Muslim nation is beyond doubt. The Mirza-Ayub coalition had initially made the silly mistake of deleting the word "Islamic" from the name of Pakistan; but soon enough even Ayub had to give in to the popular demands on the issue. All the political parties contesting the 1970 elections had pledged not to enact any law repugnant to the injunctions of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and the present regime too is pledged to this.

In short, for a constitution to be viable and to be acceptable to the nation as a whole, it must not only be truly federal and parliamentary, but also democratic and Islamic.

IMPACT international fortnightly

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Two pipelines for the Middle East oil

G. U. SIDDIQUI

Recent statistics on world oil production and its consumption shows that with the exception of USSR, all industrialised nations depend heavily on imported oil from the Caribbean countries, West and North Africa and the Middle East. The pattern of world oil supply and demand shows clearly the nature of oil flow from the LDCs to America and Europe.

Middle East is one of the areas of the world where oil production far exceeds its consumption. The traditional buyers of Middle Eastern oil include Britain, European countries and U.S.A. Japan is a new entrant and is estimated to import 170 million tons of oil a year.


Until 1967, Gulf oil supplies to Britain and European countries were carried through Suez Canal. The closure of the canal after the June 1967 War forced the oil companies to ship these oil supplies round the Cape of Good Hope which has brought the development of the super-tankers.

With Suez staying closed indefinitely Egypt now plans to go ahead with building two parallel 42-inch diameter and 210 miles long Suez-Mediterranean oil pipelines (SUMED) between Ain Soukna, about 25 miles south of Suez and Alexandria. A provisional agreement for the pipelines was signed in April between West European Bankers and Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation. The cost of the project will be more than \$325m (£130m) and it will take nearly three years to complete. When completed and fully operational, the twin lines will be having a maximum flow capacity of 120m tons oil a year. This is nearly 25 per cent of the Gulf oil exports to Europe.

The idea of laying such a pipeline is not new. It was first conceived much before the closure of the canal to help ease pressure on the already congested waterways. But it was not until after the June 1967 War that a serious consideration was given to the project, and in 1968 International Management and Engineering (Britain) was commissioned for a feasibility study.

Two routes were considered, the 210 miles route from Suez to the Mediterranean, west of Alexandria and a shorter 120 miles line from Suez to Dumyat. The idea of the shorter route had, however, to be dropped because of the extensive reconstruction work that it would have entailed in developing adequate port facilities at the Mediterranean end for handling the tankers. Then this would have made it cost more than the longer Western route.

The construction of SUMED is planned in two stages so that as soon as the first line is completed revenue may also start coming in. The first line is expected to be completed in about two years time. It's construction will start from Alexandria working towards Suez. From the Suez the construction team will turn around to lay the second pipeline back to Alexandria. With the completion of the first plan, laying of the second line is expected to



take not more than eight months.

The Suez terminal is designed to accommodate two tankers of 250,000 tons deadweight (dwt) and one up to 120,000 tons dwt. This end will also have twelve 100,000 tons storage tanks. Alexandria terminal is designed to cater for smaller tankers carrying crude oil to individual European destinations.

According to Agency reports the cost will be covered by loans totalling \$293, (£117m). Of the total, \$220m will be provided by a consortium of European and Japanese banks including France (\$46.5m), Italy (\$42m), West Germany (46.5m), Britain (\$32.5m), Spain (\$20m), The Netherlands (\$9m), Belgium (9.5m), Greece (\$4m.), and Japan (\$10m).

A credit of \$50m, of which the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency will contribute \$20m, will be granted by a group of banks led by UBAF and BSUM.

An additional loan of \$23m will be provided by two United States oil companies, American Oil Co. (\$7.5m) and Mobil Oil (\$7.5m), and various Arab banks (\$8m).

The \$220m loan provided by the European and Japanese consortium is for eight years, and the \$50m and \$23m loans for five years.

Although the oil companies working in the Gulf area have given provisional guarantees to ensure a flow of 60m tons of oil a year when the first of the two lines opens, this does not, however, provide any long term guarantee for the success of the project. Apart from the obvious dangers of military action in the area there are factors like competition from a later reopening of the Suez Canal, construction of other rival pipelines, increasing varieties in the tankers freight markets which deserve to be considered. There in fact is a growing body of opposition to the project in Egypt. Recently, some members of People's Assembly questioned the economic and political justification for the project both in and outside the Assembly.

The pipelines carrying oil from Saudi Arabia and Iraq to the Mediterranean ports are also working at below capacity. The reason is that the very low tanker freight charges have made transport of oil around the Cape an economic proposition.

Closing of Suez has, however, been a great boon to Israel which is said to be planning to double the size of its 42-inch diameter line linking the port of Eilat in the Gulf of Aqaba to the Mediterranean coast terminal at Ashkelon. This line being used by Iran to export her oil to Eastern Europe.

Another pipeline scheme that has recently been talked about is a 140 miles line across the Isthmus of Kra in Thailand. Japan's supplies of oil from Gulf States pass through the Malacca Straits. But the traffic along the Straits—about 37,000 vessels of all sizes a year—has virtually reached the maximum the waterway can accommodate. Malaysia and Indonesia have recently suggested that the Japanese super tanker fleet could use Lombok—Macassar Straits. This makes the route 2,200 nautical miles longer than the Malacca Strait route.

A group of Japanese engineers have been studying the project for the last three years but recent developments have added urgency to the scheme. The project report is said to be under consideration of the Thai Government who have already accepted it in principle. The project will cost \$300m and will take three to five years to complete. The cost will be shared by the Japanese and Thai Governments and the oil companies using the line. The plan is to sink the pipeline two meters under the Isthmus, which separates the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Siam. It will jut out 22 miles at each coast to allow tankers to load and unload without coming near shallow waters.

The report envisages a pipeline capacity of 100m tons of crude oil a year. Although this will provide just enough revenue to cover the running cost of the pipeline and the port facilities, the real advantage would lie in the alternative route it will provide to Japan. If it can be enlarged to take 200m tons it can bring 10 to 12 per cent of the capital as annual profit.

There are still a number of factors to be considered but the project if materialises, is likely to affect the Indonesian plan to build docks big enough to receive mega tankers re-routed through the Lombok—Macassar Straits.

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Books

Holy Land, unholy propaganda

The Unholy Land by A. C. Forrest,
McClelland & Stewart, Toronto, Canada,
173 pages, \$6.95

The proliferation of information and the scantiness of truth is one of the paradoxes of the modern times. An outstanding case example is that of "Israel" and the Palestinian question where one comes across a mass of media-information but all this is designed to hide instead of revealing the truth.

Dr. Forrest, a well known Canadian churchman of the *United Church Observer*, shocked public opinion in Canada when he revealed the extent of Israeli atrocities and her ruthless ambitions in the Arab lands. Forrest was a pro-Israeli like most other typical Canadians, but his visits to Palestine and other Arab lands made him aware of the truth and of the extent to which the U.S. and Canadian press and radio/T.V. have brainwashed the common man. He discovered that the Israelis had sprayed civilians with Napalm as liberally as the Americans had in Vietnam. He also found that, photographs of these Napalm victims were not only most unwelcome in the West, but regarded as anti-semitic:

"Later I did publish one of the pictures in the *United Church Observer*, of a little girl recovering from napalm burns. That, I was told, proved I was anti-semitic. To condemn napalm in Vietnam is alright. To report its use by the Israelis is considered anti-semitic."

The book provides a first hand account of the determination of the Palestinian refugees to go back to their homeland. It describes conditions in refugee camps, the plight of the population of the Golan Heights driven out by the invaders, the bombing of defenceless villages and the condition of Arab 'citizens' of "Israel". The author also discusses the situation and the predicament of the Jewish minorities in Arab countries. Their position, he thinks, has become precarious not owing to any basic Arab hostility but because of attempts at infiltration and recruitment by the Zionists.

A significant part of the book is Forrest's indictment of opinion-makers in Canada, most of whom are used by Zionists. In a chapter called "What happened when I criticised Israel" he describes the campaign of abuse and slander which forced him to de-list his telephone:

"The technique of the outright lie, the innuendo, the smear, the pressures on my friends, on editors who have published my stuff, have been a bitter revelation to me."

The media which sing endlessly of Israel's land reclamation programme have never mentioned a similar programme in Egypt's Liberation province which matched the efforts made by Israel.

Forrest has become a sympathiser of the Arabs among whom he found, to his surprise, many Christians. His writing does not reveal prejudice against Muslims, in fact he says:

"It is not only difficult, it is impossible to understand the Middle East without some knowledge of Islam. More than eighty per cent of the people are Moslems; there are few unbelievers. Many are devout. Those of us brought up in the West tend to judge too much by what we were taught in school about the Crusades. Much of our teaching is as over-simplified and distorted as it would be if Moslems illustrated their lectures on Christianity by stories from the Spanish Inquisition."

If there were more people like Dr. Forrest in the West there was no reason why the followers of the two world religions, Islam and Christianity, would not have been friends. The book, incidentally, also provides information about the extent of Church's involvement in the Middle East.

Dr. Forrest ends rather weakly with an appeal for implementation of the UN's November 1967 resolution. Though he recognises the impossibility of its implementation as long as Israel is aggressively armed, he does not call for stoppage of arms supplies to Israel as one would expect him to, after reading his views.

Kaukab Siddique

Science Pioneer

The Muslim Scientist, Quarterly Journal of the Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers, U.S.A., Chief Editor: M. M. Siddiqui, 40 pages, Annual \$4.00.
(Editorial address: 3720 Royal Drive, Fort Collins, Colorado 80521, U.S.A.; Subscriptions: Mustafa Y. Kilinc, 5-D Aggie Village, Fort Collins, Colorado 80521, U.S.A.)

The objective of the AMSE "is to channelise the talents of Muslim scientists and engineers in providing" the Muslim communities with "assistance and guidance in all spheres of human activity" and the publication of the journal is designed to provide a forum for the presentation and discussion of all such efforts.

The Muslim Scientist is published quarterly and so far two issues of the journal have appeared. The current issue (Vol. 1, Nos. 2 & 3, April, 1972) carries five research papers: 'The analysis and performances of the solar still-green house' by Kudret Selcuk and Mehdi Shariat; 'The theory of desalination by reverse Osmosis'

by Ali Kyralla; 'Some perspectives on the sociology of economic change in Muslim countries' by Sahir H. Sudad; 'Traits of tropical cattle' by Naseera Kasim; 'Proliferation of Nuclear weapons' by Abdelfattah Ahmad Husseiny.

The paper on Solar Still-greenhouse discusses the economic and agricultural aspects of its application to arid lands. Sudad presents the view that since the process of change is a social phenomenon rooted in the culture of a society, any change in Muslim countries must derive its utility as well as legitimacy from the basic cultural premises of Islam if it is to contribute in any measure to improving the life of the people. A first step in this direction is the reconstruction of educational institutions in accord with the Islamic frame of reference. Naseera Kasim describes the traits affecting milk productivity, reproductive efficiency and herd efficiency in some tropical breeds of cattle.

The journal also carries book reviews and abstracts of articles published elsewhere. The latest issue carries three abstracts: 'Infinitesimal methods of Ibn al-Haitham' by Jamal al-Dabbagh, (Bulletin of the College of Science, Baghdad, Vol II, 1970, 8-17); 'The role of the Scientist and ancient Khwarizm in the development of the exact sciences' by H. Siddikov, (Vestnik, Karakalpak Filiala Akad. Nauk Uzbekistan SSR, 1967(2), 3-14), and 'The solar theory of Az-Zarqal'—a history of errors by G. J. Toomer, (Centaurus, Vol. 14, 1969, 306-336). The first article describes, in modern notation, Ibn al-Haitham's (965-1039CE) computations of the volume of three solids of revolution, the paraboloid, the parabolic spindle, and the hemisphere. The second (original in Russian) is a survey of the mathematical works of several Muslim scholars of Khwarizm from the 8th to the 13th centuries and includes the works of Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi (780-850 CE), Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Biruni (973-1048 CE), Mansur ibn Ali ibn Iraq (d.1035 CE), and Mahmud ibn Muhammad ibn Umar al-Jagmini (d.1221 CE). The third article concerns the work of al-Zarqal, an 11th century Muslim astronomer in Spain.

The journal also reports two studies prepared by the members of the AMSE. One deals with the establishment of a \$13 million cold storage and canning factory to process the meat of animals sacrificed during Haj. The other study which is still under preparation concerns the feasibility of establishing an international oil shipping company based in an Arab country.

A pioneering effort, the journal deserves fullest intellectual and material support from Muslim scientists all over the world. Apart from technique and methodology, one looks forward to the journal making contribution also in the field of fundamental scientific thought.

Dr. G. U. Siddiqui

Briefing

Palgrave of Arabia by Mea Allan, *Macmillan*, £4.95.

The biography of the Jewish 'soldier, Priest, traveller, writer and diplomat', whose 'Narrative of a year's journey through Central and Eastern Arabia', gives him a prominent place among the pioneer travellers of the Arabian peninsula.

Nigeria: A History by John Hatch, *Secker and Warburg*, £3.00.

Underlines the evolution of the modern state of Nigeria through the British colonial rule and their failure to appreciate the internal problems of different Nigerian minorities, a failure which culminated later in the civil war.

The Nigerian Civil War by John de St. Jorre, *Hodder and Stoughton*, £5.50.

The story of Nigerian Civil war by a correspondent who makes copious use of newspaper accounts of war, his own readings on the subject and information obtained through interviews with important characters of the story.

Marxism in our Time by Isaac Deutscher, *Jonathan Cape*, £2.50.

A collection of unpublished essays and lectures etc. of the famous Trotskyite author, attempts to update Marxism by showing its relevance to the present day world and its problems.

Chance and Necessity by Jacques Monod, *Collins*, £1.75.

The French Nobel Laureate and molecular biologist, looks at the universe from an "objective" standpoint, which he defines as "the systematic denial that 'true' knowledge can be got at by interpreting phenomena in terms of final causes—that is to say of 'Purpose'". Chance for him is a basic law of nature. The paradox that sums up his findings is: Man cannot survive without ultimate values but he knows that he cannot have them! The English translation is by Austryn Wainhouse. **The Lightning Campaign** by D. K. Palit, *Salisbury Compton Press*, £2.50.

War history written in 15 days provides an account of Indian victory in the recent Indo-Pakistan war. Based on newspaper files and unit chats, yet a good reading of India's tactics, aims and involvement in Bangladesh affair.

Blood in my eye, by George Jackson, *Cape* £1.95.

From the pen of the famous black power leader, the book sets forth in a cold blooded manner various tactics and weapons of violence to overthrow the cruel and unjust White American order. **Ambitions and Realities—British Politics 1964-1970** by Robert Rhodes James, *Weidenfeld and Nicolson*, £4.50.

Examines the factors and causes of Tory victory and Labour defeat in the 1970 British general elections; draws a comparison between Heath and Harold Wilson as leaders of their Parties and governments.

Only One Earth by Barbara Ward and Rene Dubos, *Deutsch and Penguin*, £2.95.

A report on environment especially prepared for the UN Stockholm Conference on human environment in accordance with the General Assembly Resolution of December 15, 1969.

The Human Environment: The British view, *HMSO*, £1.20.

Official British document for presentation at the Stockholm UN Environment Conference—a 43 page pamphlet.

The Jews in America: A History, by Rufus Lears, *Ktav Publishing House*, New York.

Outlines the growth of the Jewish Community in the States; Jewish "contribution" in various fields of American life; problems and worries, and finally the rise of the American Zionist movement and its impact on American policies at home and abroad.

Index, Vol. 1, No. 1, edited by Michael Schammell, *Writers and Scholars International*, 50p.

The first issue of the quarterly, *Index*, devoted to the problem of free speech and restrictions imposed on it in various countries of the World. The writings, articles, poems, etc., slashed down by the cruel axe of the censor form a regular feature of the Magazine.

MUSLIM WOMEN ASSOCIATION, LONDON

Efforts in education, culture and welfare

LEILA EL-DROUBIE

The Muslim Women's Association, London now in its tenth year, met for the first time on 21 April 1962, at the Islamic Cultural Centre with Princess Lala Fatima of Morocco as honorary President and Begum Ikramullah, who played a very active role as vice-President in the association until her departure from Britain. Although the initial response was poor the association has grown to a membership of 49 drawn from 15 different countries, as far apart as Indonesia and the United States of America.

The association is involved in various religious, educational, social and charitable activities. Being especially interested in child education and welfare it was first responsible for Islamic classes for children in various parts of London, beginning in 1967. For some time the MWA has been running a Layette Bank: this was started when it was realised that relief for refugees and victims of natural disasters rarely included garments and other provisions for very young children. The association has been instrumental in organising this very necessary aid to Pakistan, Algeria and during the past few years to Jordan through its Patron Princess Dina Abdul Hamid.

The MWA has always tried to help in whatever way possible when the need has arisen in the Muslim community throughout the world—for example money has been sent to the Cypriot-Turks, to the victims of the East Pakistan Cyclone disaster; and to alleviate the sufferings caused by the recent Indo-Pakistan war. In some cases the aid has been sent through the embassies of the countries concerned.

At present the main objective of the association is to provide a family style home for Muslim children in need of care, a 'Medina House'. Many Muslim children for various reasons lose the security of their natural home and are taken into the care of local authorities. Among these, children of 'mixed' marriages figure prominently. The MWA has been approached by various individuals and local authorities for help in placing these unfortunate children in suitable Muslim homes. From time to time certain members of the MWA have taken such children into their own homes on a temporary basis. They are moved by a saying of the Prophet: 'One who takes charge of an orphan will be with me on the Day of Judgement.' To make the house a reality

funds are being raised in various ways; an annual Garden Bazaar, dress showss such as the one in 1967 "Keep Up to Date the Oriental Way", and so on. It is planned to establish a home for no more than 6 children at a time, run by a Muslim couple to create a "family" unit. Here they will read the Quran, hear the Hadiths, and grow up to be Muslims. When the scheme was first announced the local press referred to it as the "New Style Orphanage Planned by Muslim Women".

Lectures are a regular feature at MWA meetings with speakers like Dr. Zaki, Head of the Islamic Department, Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria, and Kurshid Ahmad, a senior lecturer of Karachi University, Pakistan. From time to time demonstrations on various subjects such as cookery and flower arrangement are held at meetings.

A monthly newsletter is published by the association. This not only reports the activities of the association but also contains information on religious matters, lectures and articles by prominent writers and the events of the worldwide Muslim community.

The MWA which holds its meetings on every second Sunday at the Islamic Cultural Centre is an organisation which provides a nucleus for communication and unity among the Muslim ladies in London. Sometimes members of the association are asked by various schools or other Women's associations in this country to speak about Islam to their members.

● To celebrate the tenth anniversary of the MWA a reception was held on Saturday, 20 May, 1972, at the Islamic Cultural Centre. In all about 90 guests were present. In addition to members, their families, and friends, the staff of the Islamic Cultural Centre attended.

The reception opened with a reading from the Qu'ran, after which there was a short talk on the role of the Muslim women of today. The President, Mrs. El Droubie then gave an account of the MWA, its origin, growth, and future plans.

Various stalls which displayed objects of Islamic interest and other handiwork were on show. To complete the atmosphere of an 'open day', a number of scrapbooks illustrating the history of the MWA were available for inspection.

WORLD OPINION WORLD OPINION WORLD OPINION WORLD OPINION

In reply to sycophancy

Dear Tito, to me has fallen the exceptionally pleasant duty of saying a few words on the occasion of your jubilee. Much has recently been and is being written about you, . . . It is difficult to say anything special to add to this. Yesterday you asserted in the Federal Assembly, and thus before all our peoples and all our public, that you are the oldest among us . . . Allow me, however, to refute this assertion of yours. I think that by the freshness of your mind, the revolutionary character of your work and . . . you have always been in fact, throughout this 35-year period at the head of our Party, the youngest, the freshest and the most revolutionary one amongst us.

... Some time ago, when Tito was in Brioni, I received Arafat. The talks were successful and he was satisfied, but he was unhappy when he left because he had not been able to meet Tito. He asked both Milatovic and me for at least a telephone conversation so as to be able to tell the Arab fighters, the Palestinians, a tragic national liberation movement, that he had at least heard Tito's voice. At the end, when saying goodbye, he gave me a tie and asked me to hand it to Tito; he asked me three times to stress and repeat that it had been made by the women of Palestine in occupied Jerusalem, expressing through their embroidery their deep affection and devotion to—I may say this clearly and I do not think it will be misunderstood—the most prominent fighter for the freedom of the peoples.

Replying to Krste Crvenkovski's toast, President Tito said: . . . You have organized the celebration of my 80th birthday. This hurts me a little, not because it reminds me that I am 80 years old, but because it adds much more to my obligations. There is also a little exaggeration in this. One should not magnify things too much but look at them realistically . . . The fact that our struggle and our policy has been successful is thanks to all the comrades. One man cannot achieve much on his own. . . (Tanyug radio, 26 May 1972).

Literacy and Colonialism

It is a mistake to think of precolonial Africa as the dark continent unenlightened by the lamp of literacy. We do not, it is true, know of any early systems of writing which developed there, though some, such as the famous Vai, and the lesser known scripts, such as Nsibidi, were invented after the colonial period had begun. But alphabetic writing of Middle Eastern origin made its mark outside Egypt as Judaism, then Christianity, and finally Islam penetrated into the northern sectors of the continent. Christianity and its literature continued to be important in Ethiopia, and Islam spread in the savannah country of the West and along the coastal regions of East Africa, bringing its teachers, its brotherhoods, its books.

Let us look at the situation in Northern Ghana in greater depth. Writing was not unknown in this region before the colonial conquest.

Indeed that conquest was recorded by a Muslim author, Al-Hajj Umar of Salaga, who wrote a widely distributed poem on the coming of the Christians. In B. G. Martin's translation, it runs:

A sun of disaster has risen in the West,

Glaring down on people and populated places . . .
The Christian calamity has come upon us

Like a dust-cloud.

At the start of the affair, they came Peacefully,

With soft sweet talk.

"We've come to trade", they said,
"To reform the beliefs of the people,
To halt oppression here below, and theft,

To clean up and overthrow

corruption."
Not all of us grasped their motives,
So now we've become their inferiors.
They deluded us with little gifts
And fed us with tasty foods . . .
But recently they've changed their tune.

(Jack Goody: "Literacy and the non-literate", *Times Literary Supplement*, London, 12 May 1972).

Manpower, development and under-development

... At the beginning of the huge labour exodus a decade ago, politicians and economists predicted that the migrant boom would aid Southern Europe and North Africa by relieving vast unemployment in underdeveloped areas while remittances from workers abroad would put enough hard currency into the coffers of poorer governments to build up industry for a returning semi-skilled, or even skilled, labour force. But in many instances the absence of a large labour force at home has led to governments putting off plans for industrial expansion.

Of course, not all migrants have picked up the skills they possibly intend to, chiefly due to language barriers. Migrant workers tend to be clannish and very few turn up at basic language courses in the country where they are working.

It is not unusual, for instance, for a Yugoslav or a Turk to spend up to three years in West Germany and return with only a supermarket smattering of German.

Another reason for workers returning unskilled is simply that they are not afforded the opportunity. The boulevards of Paris, for example, are kept clean by 1,500 workers, mainly from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. In many parts of Germany, street cleaning and refuse collecting is the sole task of Turks and Yugoslavs (mainly those coming from the Albanian minority in Kosovo). A high percentage of workers in Western Europe's migrant labour force are employed in non-skilled construction jobs . . . (Alan Dean: "Europe's migrants", *To The Point* fortnightly, Johannesburg, 20 May 1972).

In search of peace

... No man in the Middle East wants peace more than President Sadat. His record speaks for him; he has

offered the Israelis concessions never heard of before in the Arab world and has tried to improve relations with the United States at the risk of weakening relations with the Soviet Union. If he has been talking of liberation. "If God willing by the next feast" it is only because his concessions have only made the Israelis ask for more and because the United States has poured cold water on his attempt at friendship. But he still wants peace. ("Still for Peace", *Daily Star*, Beirut, 18 May 1972).

India and Britain—a natural relationship

Those who write about India usually go out of their way to emphasise how different it is from Britain, and of course there are many obvious differences. India is huge, Britain small; India poor, Britain rich . . . Yet the differences are, in fact, mostly superficial. Beneath them unnoticed by the merely clever, are deep affinities of national character which existed long before the Raj and will long survive it.

Without them, indeed, it is more than likely that the Raj would never have existed in the form it did. The British who ruled India were so few in relation to the vast multitude of Indians that one must assume the Raj was, until near the end, at least tolerable to the majority. . . "Plassey", an Indian friend once said to me, "was not a battle: it was a negotiation". . .

Mr Heath has spoken of the "natural relationship" between Britain and the United States. Paradoxical as it may seem, the bonds of nature between Britain and India are considerably stronger. At bottom, the two peoples are very much alike. Both are enamoured of tradition, mistrustful of logic. Both are intensely snobbish, but at the same time capable of being made ashamed of their snobbery. Both are conservative, yet capable of accepting the need for radical action. Both have a flair for commerce and a tendency to think of liberty in terms of private property. Both are opposed to regimentation, both the despair of high-minded planners; yet both have a genius for improvisation, for rising to emergencies, for muddling through. Both are fundamentally tolerant, but subject to occasional fits of irrational violence. Both are much given to self-righteousness and both are religious, but with a religious instinct which expresses itself in a way of life rather than in the assertion of dogmatic truth.

Links created by the Raj are not, therefore, the only links between Britain and India, and they might never have been forged if the two peoples had not been "made for each other" psychologically . . . (John Grigg: "Aftermath of Empire", *Encounter*, London, June 1972).

Deploring Autonomy

Addressing . . . the Tamil Nadu Congress at Madurai, the Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi declared that the talk of "greater autonomy" for the States was deplorable. The word, in her opinion

could be a "dangerous word".

She said: "It can be a threat to the unity and strength of the country. It can divert the people's attention from the basic problems which had to be solved so that we can help the poor and the needy". She was astonished to see newspaper cuttings which compared the Bangladesh events with what was happening in Tamil Nadu . . .

But it is obvious that the DMK leaders have a different angle . . . The DMK leaders seem to think that the psychology of the different cultural and linguistic units of India is not much different from that of the different regions of Pakistan. ("Is Autonomy Dangerous", *Radiance Viewsweekly*, Delhi, 28 May, 1972).

Nations—one, two, three

"It is only a matter of time you have made claim, before you recognise 'Bangladesh.' What sort of country is what remains of Pakistan going to be?"

"Pakistan still maintains its ideological complexion because the Lahore Resolution of 1940 talked of two States, of two Muslim States. That was later on amended to make one State and the British left one State."

"So you can argue till the cows come home, whether it was one or two States. But now we are one State and we can pick up that part of the argument—and why not?—to reinforce our ideological basis."

"I do not see anything immoral in that although the Indians have said that the Two-Nation Theory has collapsed. How has the Two-Nation Theory collapsed? By the emergence of three Nations? Two-Nation Theory would have collapsed if there had emerged one Nation; because India says there is one Nation—we said there were two."

"If at that time we had said there are three, the Indians would have said, 'my God, that is out of the question. We might consider two; we cannot consider three.'"

"So the Two-Nation Theory does not collapse by the creation of a third Nation. It would have collapsed if they had all become one Nation. Now if India thinks that it has collapsed so in order to reabsorb both East Pakistan and West Pakistan, that is another matter . . . (President Bhutto speaking to Richard Linley of the ITN, *Pakistan News*, London, 15 May, 1972).

Advertising

... The Russian Encyclopaedia defined in 1941 advertising as "Hullabaloo, a means of swindling people and foisting upon them goods frequently useless or dubious in value." The 1972 Soviet Encyclopaedia, however, describes advertising as: "The popularisation of goods with the aim of selling them, the creation of demand for these goods, the acquaintance of consumers with their quality, particular features and the location of their sales, and explanation of the methods of their use". ("Violence replacing screen sex", *The Guardian*, London, 23 May, 1972)

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ALGERIA. President Bumadyan addressing a rally in Algeria in honour of the visiting Cuban Prime Minister, Fidel Castro, stressed that "more than natural" relations existed between the Algerian and Cuban revolutions. ● A group of 17 North Vietnamese students arrived in Algiers to study at the Algerian Petroleum Institute. ● The 8th Arab Oil Conference declared its support for Iraq's claim in dispute with oil companies.

AUSTRIA. An Austrian Museum of Jewish history founded in Eisenstadt, the capital city of Burgenland. A study congress on Jewish Art and literature was held in the city on 2-4 June.

BANGLADESH. The Food Minister said that a large quantity of food grains had been released to the market but anti-social elements were creating artificial shortage. ● The President promulgated an order providing for trial and punishment for hoarding and black marketing etc. of food grains and other essential commodities. ● A massive anti-Indian student demonstration greeted Mr. D. P. Dhar, Mrs. Indira Gandhi's personal envoy to protest against Indianisation of Bangladesh. Slogans: No engineers from India; and No Titas gas (natural gas) to India.

● About 50,000 workers of the Bangladesh Industrial Development Corporation defied the recent ban on strikes in support of a pay rise. ● The trial of the Pakistani officials and pro-Pakistan citizens is to start from July 1972. ● The US State Department announced \$90 million grant to Bangladesh, the first direct aid since its break with Pakistan.

CHINA. A movement "to each according to his work", has been launched in rural areas. ● A delegation of American Scientists arrived at the invitation of the Chinese Scientific and Technical Association. **CYPRUS.** First oil refinery opened near Larnaca which will process 750,000 tons of crude oil annually.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Dr. Milos Jakes, Chairman of CPCZ Central Control and Auditing Commission said that there still existed in the country people to whom the unity between the Party and the people was like a thorn in their flesh. They did not like "friendly relations with our liberator and ally, the Soviet Union and with other socialist countries".

EGYPT. A squadron of Soviet ships and submarines arrived in Alexandria. A Soviet Party delegation also arrived on a two week visit for talks with Arab Socialist Union Central Committee members. ● Under a ten year contract, the Soviet Union is to gradually increase its present import of Egyptian wines to \$48m. yearly from the present \$2.4m. ● The Fifth Congress of the International Confederation of Arab Trade Union opened in Cairo on 26 May; the Jordanian Trade Union Federation protested at its exclusion from the Congress. ● Egypt to resume diplomatic relations with West Germany within a few weeks. Of the ten Arab countries that broke with West Germany in 1965, Jordan, Yemen, Algeria and Sudan have already

resumed relations.

INDIA. The Orissa Praja Socialist Party formally merged with Congress. ● A Central Bureau for building merchant ships and warships will be established and the Mazagaon Docks in Bombay will build patrol boats with powerful weapons systems. ● Mr. K. C. Pant told Lok Sabha that the Indian Government was maintaining adequate watch on CIA activities in the country.

INDONESIA. Four Islamic parties in the Jakarta Metropolitan area merged to form a development union group within a Confederation.

IRAN. Documents concerning the demarcation of continental shelf between the governments of Bahrain and Iran were exchanged. ● Two Soviet warships arrived at Bandar Abbas on a friendly visit.

IRAQ. Iraqi National Oil Company to export large quantities of crude oil to European markets. ● Iraqi economic delegation to leave for Nigeria on July 3 to conclude the first Iraqi Nigerian trade agreement. **ISRAEL.** Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan told Knesset, that any agreement with the Arabs must include Israel's right to establish settlements on the West Bank of the Jordan. Since the six-day war 20 permanent civilian settlements and 19 Nahal outposts have been established in the administered Arab territories.

● Secondary schools in Gaza to start teaching Hebrew from next year. Ten local teachers, selected from about 400 candidates, are studying Hebrew in a language school. ● 82% of Israel's current defence Budget (£500 m) is to be spent on strengthening the country's air force and armour.

JAPAN. The Japanese Kyodo agency and a US firm to exploit natural gas resources jointly in Central Siberian region of Soviet Russia.

● British Secretary of Trade and Industry in a meeting with his Japanese counterpart expressed his government's anxiety over the greatly increased flow of Japanese goods into British market without effective counterbalancing flow of products to Japan.

JORDAN. A cultural and technical co-operation agreement signed with Soviet Russia. ● The country faces a deficit of over 12 m Dinars (£14 m) during the next fiscal year—unless Kuwait resumes its annual financial subsidy.

KUWAIT. Kuwait has decided to give an annual sum of 10 m Kuwaiti dinars to Syria. ● The Chinese trade delegation agreed to buy about 10,000 tons of surplus oil from the Kuwait National Petroleum Company in exchange for increased imports of Chinese goods. Kuwait's imports from China during the first six months last year amounted to 3,266 dinars; Kuwaiti exports to China: 941,000 dinars for the same period.

LEBANON. New government formed with Mr. Sa'ib Salam as the Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior.

LIBYA. The Libyan Federation of Trade Unions held its first meeting. ● The creation of an Islamic Propa-

gation Association with Tripoli as its headquarters was announced. It will be financed by a special Jihad Fund. The association will train missionaries, establish schools and universities, and prepare books on Islam in different languages. Its branches will be opened in other countries. **MOROCCO.** Many prisoners including Said Ajjar alias Abu Lajlat and Bin Musa (of Skhyrat Palace incident of July 1971) have been given amnesty. The death sentence of Cadet Sayyid Ar-Rayis commuted to life imprisonment.

PAKISTAN. President Bhutto to meet Indian Premier Mrs. Indira Gandhi on 28 June in New Delhi. ● Pakistan and India agreed to stop radio war. ● The police resorted to a mild lathi charge and tear gas in Lyallpur to disperse a crowd of student demonstrators. ● President Bhutto has warned that drastic action will be taken against those who try to increase prices of essential commodities after the devaluation of the Rupee. ● The Finance Minister announced major reforms in the banking system. ● The Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan expressed satisfaction with the outcome of last month's emissary level talks between India and Pakistan. ● President Bhutto assured that the national Assembly due to meet on 14 August would not be bypassed while concluding any settlement with India. He also told businessmen in Karachi that Pakistan had accepted a pattern of mixed economy. He said the government does not intend any further nationalisation of industry.

● Imports from Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, India and Rhodesia have been banned. ● Relics of the 9th Century Islamic period found near Bannu in NWFP.

POLAND. The Secretariat of Lodz PZPR asked the investigating authorities to increase their inquiries into cases of corrupt practices in the economy and thefts at work.

SAUDI ARABIA. Saudi Arabia submitted two suggestions at the first meeting of the Arab League Committee of legal experts at Cairo called to look into modifying the UN charter and the constitution of International Court of Justice. Suggestions include the establishment of a permanent Arab seat in the Security Council and making Arabic the 6th international language in the UN. ● Saudi Arabia announced financial aid of more than a quarter million Saudi Riyals to various Muslim Societies and Institutes in different countries. Among the beneficiaries: Al-Iman Mosque Damascus; Tawa Mosque in Niger; Lebanese Moslem League, Beirut; a charitable Society in Lebanon; Sirman Mosque in Northern Syria; Al-Falah University in India; and Madinat Al Ulema Institute Kashmir. ● Several Committees sent to Egypt, Syria and Jordan to recruit more women teachers in view of growing number of girl students in schools. ● The General Presidential Board of the Religious Society warned women that they are not allowed to unveil on the streets and in public places and they should wear decent dress. Those not observing this instruction are liable

to be sprayed with ink on their garments.

SUDAN. ● Protocol with China has been signed increasing the volume of trade to £28 m. stg. ● Saudi Arabia is to build three large villages (cost £200,000) in the South for the returning Southerners. ● Maj-Gen. Muhammad Abd al-Qadir, Chief of Staff of Armed Forces has been relieved of his post.

TURKEY. The 13-month old Martial Law has been extended for further two months. Mr. Ferit Melen formed a new government after the President Cevdet Sunay's approval of the new 23 man list of Council of Ministers.

UNITED KINGDOM. A survey of 50 British hospitals revealed that the immigrant doctors in British hospitals were grossly exploited. Junior Hospital Doctors' Association says it is seriously troubled by the extent to which these doctors are prepared to tolerate their conditions. About half the training posts in British hospitals are filled by immigrant doctors. ● The Council for the protection of Rural England rejected the plea that continuing immigration is not in the national interest. The net flow of migration was outward rather than inwards.

PEOPLE

George P. Schultz, new US Secretary of Treasury. ● Syed Idries Shah, Director of Studies, Institute for Cultural Research, London, appointed guest Professor at the University of Geneva. ● Chiang Ching-Kuo, President Chiang Kai Shek's son, new Premier of Taiwan. ● Syed Abdur Rahman elected President, Indian Muslim League. ● W. H. Auden, new English Poet Laureate.

VISITS

Libyan Chairman Qadhafi to Sudan. ● Russian Patriarch Pimen to Israel. ● President Bourguiba to Algeria. ● Sheikh Khalifah bin Zayid Premier of Abu Dhabi to Cairo. ● Lt. Gen. Sa'ad ad Din ash-Shadhli, Chief of the Egyptian General Staff to Baghdad. ● Syrian Defence Minister, Maj-Gen. Mustafa Talas to Saudi Arabia. ● Southern Yemeni Foreign Minister to Libya. ● Deputy Chief of Staff of Thailand to Israel. ● Dr. Adam Malik to Pakistan. ● Bangladesh Minister for local government, Mr. Huq to Delhi. ● Bangladesh Foreign Minister, Mr. Abdus Samad to Burma. ● Princess Ashraf of Iran to Pakistan. ● Amir Fahd Ibn Abd al-Aziz, Saudi Arabian Minister of Interior to Egypt. ● Syrian Foreign Minister, Abd al-Halim Khaddam, to China. ● Dr. Elias Saba, Lebanese Minister of Defence to Saudi Arabia. ● Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, to Geneva. ● Dr. Ramsey, the Archbishop of Canterbury, to Bulgaria in June. ● Sh Khalifah Ben Said Ben Sultan, Crown Prince and Premier of Abu Dhabi to Sudan. ● Dr Yusuf Ali Arefi, Kenya Muslim leader, A. H. Isphani former Pakistan ambassador in Britain, Dr. A. J. Faridi, Indian Muslim leader, A. K. Brohi, Pakistan jurist, and Prince Sultan, Saudi Defence Minister, to London.

DIPLOMATS

● Liu Chun, China's first Ambassador to Turkey. ● Victor Sanchez Messas Y Juste, Spanish Ambassador to Indonesia. ● Jacques Grootaert, first Belgian Ambassador to Peking. ● Akbar Tyabji new Pakistani Ambassador to Indonesia. ● Qasim Umar al-Yagut, Kuwait's Charge d'Affaires to China. ● Muhammad Bashir al-Mughayribi, first Libyan Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. ● Li Lien-pi, China's first Ambassador to Belgium. ● Khuram Khan Panni, first Bangladesh Ambassador to Indonesia. ● Kazi Ahmad Kamal, Bangladesh Ambassador to G.D.R. ● Nasrullah Khattak, Pakistan's Ambassador to Tunis. ● Sung Chih Kuang, China's first Ambassador to Britain. ● Robert-Tesh Britain's new Ambassador to Bahrain.

DIED

Duke of Windsor in Paris on 28 May. ● English Poet Laureate Cecil Day-Lewis on 22 May. ● D. N. Pritt Q.C., Barrister, associated with some famous political trials in Asia and East Africa.